Executed February 20, 2009 6:13 p.m. by Lethal Injection in South Carolina
15th murderer executed in U.S. in 2009
1151st murderer executed in U.S. since 1976
1st murderer executed in South Carolina in 2009
41st murderer executed in South Carolina since 1976
(Race/Sex/Age at Murder-Execution) |
Birth |
(Race/Sex/Age at Murder) |
Murder |
Murder |
to Murderer |
Sentence |
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|
Luke A. Williams III W / M / 38 - 56 |
Linda Williams W / F / 39 Shaun Williams W / M / 12 |
Strangulation |
Son |
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Citations:
State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (S.C. 1996) (Direct Appeal).
Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 611 S.E.2d 232 (S.C. 2005) (PCR).
Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2007) (Habeas).
Final Meal:
Fried chicken, steak, baked potato with sour cream and butter, a tossed salad, cranberry sauce, peach cobbler, fried turkey and ketchup.
Final Words:
None.
Internet Sources:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
Inmate: Williams, III, Luke A.
DOC#: 4874
DOB: 08/14/52
County: Edgefield
Date Received: 11/24/93
Race: White
Trial Judge: L. Brown, Jr.
"Man who killed family put to death," by Lisa Marie Pane. (Associated Press Saturday, February 21, 2009)
COLUMBIA — A Georgia man convicted of killing his wife and son to collect life insurance money was executed Friday. Luke Williams, 56, was put to death by lethal injection. He made no final statement and kept his eyes closed as the drugs were administered. Williams was pronounced dead at 6:13 p.m.
He was convicted of killing his 39-year-old wife, Linda, and their 12-year-old son, Shaun, in June 1991. Authorities said he took them across the state line into Sumter National Forest, where he killed them. Their bodies had been doused with gasoline and set afire in the family's van. The van had been driven into a tree in what police called a botched attempt to stage an accident. Linda Williams had been beaten to death; Shaun strangled.
Williams was arrested the next year after trying to collect on $525,000 in life insurance policies.
Williams and his family had been living in Georgia, about 10 miles west of the South Carolina border. Williams had told authorities that he last saw his family when they went shopping the morning their bodies were discovered. Investigator Don Bullock said that shortly after the deaths, Williams' plan became apparent: The disability money he'd been living off was about to run out, and his wife was planning to leave him and return to her parents in Florida.
Williams took out life insurance policies totaling more than half a million dollars on his wife and their son. "I think he panicked," Bullock said recently. "He decided to take his family out. ... I think he had a plan, but it wasn't ready. He found out she was leaving, so he had to act fast."
In the more than 15 years since his conviction, Williams had exhausted his state and federal appeals. Only eight other inmates have been on South Carolina's death row longer.
"Convicted murderer Williams executed," by Jennifer Miller. (2/21/2009 2:36 AM)
COLUMBIA -- Without opening his eyes or flinching more than a small facial muscle, Luke Williams was executed Friday night, 18 years after he killed his wife and son. The 56-year-old chose not to make a final statement before he was administered the drug cocktail that would kill him.
Williams lay motionless on the steel table in the death chamber. He was strapped to the table with his left arm stretched out to the side for the needles that carried the drugs into his body. The tubes carrying the drugs flinched slightly as the liquid began flowing at 6 p.m. Within seconds Williams eye lids lightly fluttered and lips parted slightly as he appeared to snore. By 6:02 p.m. his breathing appeared to stop. At 6:04 p.m. a prison official walked to the table for a closer look then walked back to the corner. A few minutes later the official checked again and summoned a doctor who check his pupils and heartbeat. The doctor nodded at the prison officials who then pronounced him dead at 6:13 p.m.
Williams was convicted on killing his wife Linda, 39, and their 12-year-old son Shaun in June 1991. Linda had been beaten to death. Shaun was strangled. Their bodies were doused with gasoline and set afire in the family van, which was driven into a tree in the Sumter National Forest in Edgefield County. Police said it was a botched attempt to make their deaths look like an accident.
The motive was money, authorities said. Shortly before the murders, Williams took out $525,000 in life insurance on his family. He was unemployed at the time and was receiving workman's compensation for an on-the-job injury. He was taking classes at Augusta Technical Institute.
For his last meal Williams requested fried chicken, steak, a baked potato with sour cream and butter, tossed salad, cranberry sauce, peach cobbler, fried turkey and ketchup, according to Josh Gelinas, Communications Director for the state Department of Corrections.
Linda's mother, Dora Azrak, said Friday night she was relieved that Williams had finally been executed. But it was a tough day for her while she waited on word at her Florida home. "It just brings back all these memories." She's looking for closure now. "I'm just hoping I will get better," she said. Since the murders she's been depressed. And it was hard knowing that for two years after the murders Williams was free.
It took authorities about a year to arrest him, and he was free on bond until his trial in 1993.
Williams only visitor Friday was his attorney, David Bruck of Virginia, who also witnessed the execution. There were no members of either Williams' or his wife's families at Broad River Run Correctional Institution on Friday. Former Edgefield County Sheriff's Investigator Don Bullock, who helped make the case against Williams, was a witness along with three members of the media.
Linda Williams was a teacher's aide for a kindergarten class at Belair Elementary School in Columbia County. Shaun attended Lakeside Middle. The family lived in the Bridlewood subdivision off Fury's Ferry Road in Evans.
Williams told police he last saw his wife and son when they left their home about 7 a.m. June 19, 1991 for a shopping trip in Edgefield and Aiken. However, according to court testimony Linda was dressed in an oversized T-shirt, sweat pants and no bra when she was found. The van was found about eight miles from the family home.
In the 15 years since his conviction, Williams had exhausted all his state and federal appeals. Only eight other inmates have been on South Carolina's death row longer. The longest, 50-year-old Edward L. Elmore, began serving a sentence for murder in 1982. His execution was the 282nd in South Carolina since 1912.
"S.C. man set to die for killing family for insurance," by Meg Kinnard. (Associated Press Thursday, February 19, 2009)
COLUMBIA, S.C. - Investigator Don Bullock made a promise nearly two decades ago: He would watch Luke Williams die for killing his wife and son in a failed attempt to collect life insurance. Barring an unexpected development, Bullock will make good on that promise Friday, when South Carolina is set to execute Williams for the deaths of 39-year-old Linda Williams and 12-year-old Shaun Williams.
Their bodies were found in June 1991 in Sumter National Forest, where they had been doused with gasoline and set ablaze in the family’s van. The van had been driven into a tree in what police called a botched attempt to stage an accident. Linda Williams had been beaten to death, Shaun strangled. Williams was arrested the next year after trying to collect on $525,000 life insurance policies.
Bullock, a retired investigator with the Edgefield County Sheriff’s Office who spent hours interrogating him, says he never cooperated with investigators or expressed remorse. “He never did get upset, he never did cry — nothing like that,” Bullock says. “He was very, very cold.” Now, authorities say, Williams has exhausted his state and federal appeals.
He has also sued over the legality of lethal injection, and a South Carolina federal judge denied his request to delay execution while that case goes forward. A federal appeals judge turned down Williams’ appeal of that decision, and his attorneys on Thursday petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider. It was not clear when the high court would rule.
Williams and his family had been living in Georgia, about 10 miles west of the South Carolina border. Williams, now 56, had told authorities he last saw his family when they went shopping the morning their bodies were discovered. Shortly after the deaths, Bullock said, Williams’ plan became apparent: The disability money off of which he had been living was set to run out, and his wife was planning to leave him and return to her parents in Florida.
Williams took out life insurance policies totaling more than half a million dollars on his wife and son, an El Salvador native orphaned during that country’s civil war. “I think he panicked,” Bullock says. “He decided to take his family out. ... I think he had a plan, but it wasn’t ready. He found out she was leaving, so he had to act fast.”
In the more than 15 years since his conviction, Williams has exhausted his state and federal appeals. Only eight other inmates have been on South Carolina’s death row longer. The longest, 50-year-old Edward L. Elmore, began serving a sentence for murder in 1982.
Bullock said he’s ready to see Williams die. “I told him I’d be there. I promised him I’d be there,” Bullock said. “I just want to finalize it.”
"Luke Williams: a killer’s execution that almost didn’t happen," by Rob Pavey. (February 22, 2009 - 10:23 AM)
Almost 18 years after the bodies of Linda Williams and her son Shaun were found in their van in Sumter National Forest, justice finally caught up with the man who murdered them. What you’re about to read is the true story of how it almost didn’t happen.
Friday’s execution of Luke Williams III was carried out quietly—and humanely—by a lethal injection of drugs and sedatives, even though his victims—his own wife and son—died a much more violent death.
Linda, a teaching assistant at Bel Air Elementary, was pummeled with fists until she lost consciousness and died. Her nose and cheekbones were shattered. Her lips and face were cut open and her jaw was broken. Bruises on her wrists and arms showed she tried in vain to defend herself.
Their 12-year-old son, an adopted orphan from El Salvador and rising seventh grader at Lakeside Middle School, was strangled, perhaps after witnessing his mother’s violent death. It was one of the most notorious murder cases in Columbia County history.
It all started very late the night of June 18, 1991, at the family’s home at 886 Hunting Horn Way East in Bridlewood subdivision, off Fury’s Ferry Road. The next morning, the family minivan was found in Edgefield County, where it had been driven into a tree and set afire. The killer’s intent, police concluded, was that the van would explode into flames and appear to be nothing more than a horrific traffic accident. But Mr. Williams made a critical mistake: after dousing the bodies of his wife and child with gasoline and setting them afire, he closed the van’s door with its windows rolled up.
Soon after he left, the fire burned itself out for lack of oxygen. The bodies were intact enough to tell their story to investigators. Police knew there was a killer on the loose, but there were no arrests. For the better part of a year, it was an open case—a whodunit of epic proportions involving a double homicide that Georgia and South Carolina authorities each thought should belong in the neighboring state’s jurisdiction.
Months into the investigation, a break emerged from an unlikely source: insurance adjustors came to town asking questions about a claim involving a fatal traffic “accident” for which a sizable sum was to be paid. It came to light that Mr. Williams had secretly insured his wife and child just weeks before their deaths. The combined payout from several policies was $525,000 and Mr. Williams was the sole beneficiary.
A closer look at the unemployed husband and father revealed he had a history of living off insurance settlements for injuries and accidents. He was out of money and had filed for bankruptcy protection. Police also learned Linda had contacted United Way’s Help Line a few days before her death and was referred to Safe Homes Inc., a shelter for battered women. The shelter’s phone number, scrawled on a torn slip of paper, was still in her purse when her body was removed from the burned out van.
Just two weeks shy of the one-year anniversary of the tragedy, police finally took Mr. Williams into custody on two counts of murder. He had been free all those months, and remained free on bond for another 18 months until his trial began in autumn of 1993. The case was to be tried in Edgefield and Prosecutor Donnie Myers did not hesitate to seek the death penalty.
Although evidence produced by the state in the 11-day trial was mostly circumstantial, it was also compelling enough to leave no doubt that Mr. Williams was the only person who could have carried out such a treacherous crime. But there was one primary problem in the quest to deliver justice for Linda and Shaun: the murder trial was held in Edgefield County, where their bodies were found. Defense lawyers pointed out repeatedly that blood and other evidence from the family’s house in Bridlewood indicated the murders occurred in Columbia County, not in South Carolina, which meant Edgefield had no jurisdiction in the case. The prosecution had little to counter such arguments but moved ahead with the case as best they could.
After 23 witnesses had completed their testimony, and the prosecution rested, the defense made a surprise announcement on the morning of the trial’s ninth day: they rested their case without calling any of the three dozen defense witnesses they had subpoenaed to testify. The reason: Mr. Williams’ lawyers were so confident the state had not proven the murders occurred in Edgefield County that the jury would have no choice but to acquit their client. Mr. Williams’ lawyer, citing a series of indisputable legal precedents, then petitioned the trial judge to formally instruct jurors that they must acquit Mr. Williams unless there was proof the killings occurred in Sumter National Forest.
The judge, over the objections of the prosecutor, reluctantly agreed. Just before deliberations were to begin, he turned to the jury and told them they must conclude the ``fatal blows’’ were ``struck in Edgefield County, S.C.,’’ in order to find the defendant guilty. As jurors retired to deliberate, Mr. Williams was likely thinking his chances of acquittal were good, but he was in for a big surprise. Six hours and 12 minutes later, they returned with guilty verdicts on both counts. After a separate phase of the trial in which Mr. Williams begged jurors to spare his life, it took them barely 90 minutes to impose the death penalty.
So what actually happened in that jury room? If you’ve read this far into my story, you’ve likely figured out I was the reporter who covered that trial so long ago. Was it possible—or perhaps likely—that Linda and Shaun were killed at their home in Columbia County? Could the jury have ignored a technicality of the law in order to prevent a killer from going free?
They may have. Edgefield is a quiet town with mostly law-abiding folks with little tolerance for people who murder women and children. “We did our job,” one of the jurors told me. “It’s what we were supposed to do.” The case was appealed all the way to the S.C. Supreme Court, where justices eventually declined to second-guess a jury’s finding of where the deaths occurred.
During the appeals process, one of the high court’s justices pointed out a shred of irony that could have bolstered the state’s case: Mr. Williams, in a notarized document he submitted in his attempt to claim the insurance payout, was asked to specify the “location of death.” He wrote, “Edgefield County. S.C.”
The appeal for a new trial was denied, and the jury’s decision was kept intact. Last Friday, at 6:13 p.m., Mr. Williams was pronounced dead and the sad case came to a close.
In a different town, with a different jury, the outcome could have been vastly different. Had that happened, the ghost of a little boy who never had the opportunity to grow up would remain restless and unsatisfied, and an unrepentant killer would have moved on to other victims. Perhaps now everyone can rest in peace.
"Murders had long lasting impact," by Jennifer Miller. (2/20/2009 3:30 AM)
If Dora Azrak could ask condemned killer Luke Williams one question before he's executed tonight it would be "Why?" "Why, Luke? She was a good wife to you. And Shaun. Why Shaun?" she said Thursday from her Florida home.
Linda Azrak Williams was her only daughter. Shaun, 12, was her oldest grandchild. At 6 p.m. today Luke Williams is scheduled to die by lethal injection for their 1991 murders.
Linda was 39 and had been married to Luke for 17 years. The couple had adopted Shaun when he was 2 after he was orphaned during civil wars in El Salvador.
It's been 18 years since the killings. Linda had been beaten to death. Shaun was strangled. Their bodies were doused with gasoline and set afire in the family van, which was driven into a tree in the Sumter National Forest in Edgefield County. Police said it was a botched attempt to make their deaths look like an accident. The motive was money. Shortly before the murders, Luke took out $584,000 in life insurance on his family.
Dora isn't coming to Columbia for the execution. Neither is her son. She isn't in good health and her doctor's advised against it. Three years ago she lost her husband Fred who had pushed authorities to arrest Luke for his daughter and grandson's murders. "It killed him," she said. "It's been almost 18 years and it hasn't gotten any better."
Fred and Dora's life were filled with tragedy. In 1967 Fred's brother George was killed while working as a border patrol inspector in California. George and another officer stopped a vehicle carrying more than 800 pounds of marijuana. The men were overpowered by four convicted felons and taken to a remote mountain cabin. The officers were handcuffed together and shot, according to the U.S Department of Homeland Security website. Today Border Patrol has a special award honoring the men -- the Newton-Azrak Award.
Dora's voice lightens when she talks about Linda and Shaun. Linda was a teacher's aide for a kindergarten class. She was a good daughter who loved her son. Linda was the breadwinner in the family. Luke was on disability and at the time of the killings was taking classes. Dora's 14-year-old granddaughter Lindsey is named for Linda. "She's the spitting image of Linda."
Shaun, she said, was a precious child. "He would take my face and hold it and say 'I love you Grandma." He was smart and talked about being an architect when he grew up. "He told me 'I'm going to build you a house and you're going to live in it.' I said 'Why, to clean it?' He said 'No, to live in it with me.'" Those are the good memories. Her memories of Luke aren't so good. "He is a monster."
Fred didn't like Luke and begged Linda not to marry him. "But she was 22 and we couldn't tell her anything." When the Williams lived near the Azrak's in Florida they had dinner together every week. And later when the couple ran into serious financial problems it was the Azrak's who gave them money.
When Luke and Linda lived in Alabama they needed money to get by while they sold their house. Fred and Dora took out an $18,000 loan on their home to give to the Williams, she said. Linda promised to pay the money back as soon as the house sold and even brought a check to her parents. Luke didn't want to pay them back and the couple fought over the money. "He was the type that would take anything from anybody," she said.
She doesn't know what she'll do at 6 p.m. tonight. She asked for reports of what Luke's final words are and for what happens during the execution. "I never dreamed it would be so hard."SClB
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19, 1991, the bodies of Linda Williams and Shaun Williams were discovered inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County, South Carolina, approximately six miles from their home near Augusta, Georgia. The front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had partially damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline inside the van. Linda was discovered in the driver’s seat, which was positioned so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and Shaun was seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece of PVC pipe on the van’s floorboard.
Linda was dressed in a gray t-shirt, gray sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks, nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Shaun was also shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants. Linda suffered a black eye, a contusion on the bridge of her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that Linda’s cause of death was blunt head trauma due to a beating. Shaun suffered a bruise to his forehead, as well as abrasions to his chin, back, and right side of his neck. His cause of death was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation. Wounds created by the fire were postmortem.
Although the deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time of death was not determined. At trial, several friends of Linda testified that she always dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because Linda was short in stature, she always positioned the driver’s seat of the van close to the steering wheel. One friend stated that she last spoke with Linda by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on June 18, 1991. A neighbor testified that on June 19, 1991, a car drove into the driveway at Williams’ home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Linda’s van was not parked in the driveway. A bath towel and Shaun’s tennis shoes with blood stains on them were found at Williams’ home. In addition, Williams’ right hand was severely bruised and swollen — this injury was consistent with having occurred on June 19th.
Williams told a friend that on the day of the homicides, Linda and Shaun were planning to go shopping at Columbia Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the autopsy results, Williams informed the friend that Linda had been beaten to death, and Shaun had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap similar to wire wrap Shaun had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed Linda and Shaun, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Linda were experiencing significant marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that they frequently overheard Williams and Linda engaging in hostile arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a "loud thump" during one of the arguments. In addition, Williams and Linda had declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against their home. Williams had substantially increased life insurance benefits on Linda and Shaun during May of 1991, designating himself as beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in the amounts of $100,000 for Linda and $20,000 for Shaun. Williams forged Linda’s name on the enrollment form. After their deaths, Williams made claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of $200,000 on Linda and $45,000 on Shaun. Williams also took out new life insurance policies for Linda and Shaun with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30, 1991, providing Linda with death benefit insurance in the amount of $250,000 and Shaun with $25,000 in death benefit insurance. Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit insurance for Linda; however, until the policy was approved a binder limited the amount of coverage to $250,000.
Williams indicated on the claims forms that Linda and Shaun had died in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
Shaun was an orphan from El Salvador who had been adopted by the Williams couple, and was an honor student in the 7th grade at the time of his murder. Linda's mother Dora Azrak said that from the moment she heard the news of her daughter’s death she knew who was responsible. “I said 'Luke killed her. Call the police and tell them Luke killed her.' That's what I told my son. I knew. I knew. I knew,” she said. “I can't get over it. I loved my daughter very, very much and I miss her every day.”
South Carolina Equal Justice Initiative
State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (S.C. 1996) (Direct Appeal).
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Edgefield County, Luke N. Brown, Jr., Special Judge, of murdering his wife and adopted son, and he was sentenced to death. He appealed. The Supreme Court, Burnett, J., held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported conviction and imposition of death penalty; (2) evidence that there were marijuana growers in the area was properly excluded; (3) admission of evidence of marital discord was properly admitted; (4) court was not required to charge jury on parole minimums; and (5) photographs of bodies were admissible. Affirmed.
BURNETT, Justice:
In this death penalty case, Appellant Luke A. Williams (Williams) was convicted of murdering his wife and twelve-year-old adopted son. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19, 1991, the bodies of Linda Williams (Wife) and Shawn Williams (Son) were discovered inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County, South Carolina, approximately six miles from their home near Augusta, Georgia. The front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had partially damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline inside the van. Wife was discovered in the driver's seat, which was positioned so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and Son was seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece of PVC pipe on the van's floorboard. Wife was dressed in a gray t-shirt, gray sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks, nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Son was also shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants.
Wife suffered a black eye, a contusion on the bridge of her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that Wife's cause of death was blunt head trauma due to a beating. Son suffered a bruise to his forehead, as well as abrasions to his chin, back, and right side of his neck. His cause of death was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation. Wounds created by the fire were postmortem. Although the deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time of death was not determined.
At trial, several friends of Wife testified that she always dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because Wife was short in stature, she always positioned the driver's seat of the van close to the steering wheel. One friend stated that she last spoke with Wife by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on June 18, 1991. A neighbor testified that on June 19, 1991, a car drove into the driveway at Williams' home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Further testimony established that at approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Wife's van was not parked in the driveway.
A bath towel and Son's tennis shoes with blood stains on them were found at Williams' home. In addition, Williams' right hand was severely bruised and swollen-this injury was consistent with having occurred on June 19th. Williams told a friend that on the day of the homicides, Wife and Son were planning to go shopping at Columbia Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the autopsy results, Williams informed the friend that Wife had been beaten to death, and Son had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap similar to wire wrap Son had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed Wife and Son, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Wife were experiencing significant marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that they frequently overheard Williams and Wife engaging in hostile arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a “loud thump” during one of the arguments. In addition, Williams and Wife had declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against their home.
Williams had substantially increased life insurance benefits on Wife and Son during May of 1991, designating himself as beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in the amounts of $100,000 for Wife and $20,000 for Son. Williams forged Wife's name on the enrollment form. After their deaths, Williams made claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of $200,000 on Wife and $45,000 on Son. Williams also took out new life insurance policies for Wife and Son with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30, 1991, providing Wife with death benefit insurance in the amount of $250,000 and Son with $25,000 in death benefit insurance.FN1 Williams indicated on the claims forms that Wife and Son had died in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
FN1. Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit insurance for Wife; however, until the policy was approved, a binder limited the amount of coverage to $250,000.
At the conclusion of the State's case, counsel for Williams moved for a directed verdict maintaining that there was insufficient evidence linking Williams to the murders, that venue in Edgefield County was not established, and that the circuit court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The motions were denied, after which Williams waived his right to testify and present a final argument. The jury found Williams guilty of murder. He was sentenced to death after the jury determined the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Williams committed the murders to receive money or a thing of monetary value; and (2) two or more persons were murdered.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of the Motion for a Directed Verdict Based Upon Lack of Evidence.
Williams contends the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor because the evidence failed to link him to the homicides. We disagree.
The trial court has a duty to submit the case to the jury where the evidence is circumstantial if there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 274, 400 S.E.2d 131 (1991); State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888 (1989). In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence of evidence, not with its weight. State v. Edwards, supra. When this Court reviews the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, refusal by the trial judge to direct a verdict is not error. State v. Stokes, 299 S.C. 483, 386 S.E.2d 241 (1989); State v. Edwards, supra; State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 243 S.E.2d 195 (1978).
The record provides evidence from which Williams' guilt could fairly and logically be deduced: (1) Williams and Wife were having severe marital as well as financial difficulties; (2) Williams substantially increased life insurance benefits for Wife and Son during the month prior to the homicides and made himself the beneficiary, and the resulting death benefits would remedy Williams' poor financial situation; (3) Williams forged Wife's name to insurance forms; (4) no motive for robbery was established, and it appeared from the way the victims were dressed and placed in the van that they had been forced from their home suddenly; (5) shortly after the homicides, Williams did not deny killing Wife and Son; (6) Williams knew details about the homicides prior to receiving results from the autopsy reports; (7) Williams' hand was injured and Wife's injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human fist; and (8) a towel and shoes were found at Williams' residence on which human blood was discovered. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to submit this matter to the jury.
II. Denial of the Motion for a Directed Verdict With Respect to Venue and Jurisdiction.
Williams asserts he was entitled to a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to establish that the homicides occurred in Edgefield County, South Carolina. Therefore, he maintains that Edgefield County was without venue, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over him. We disagree.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to present evidence that the offense was committed in the county alleged in the indictment. State v. Evans, 307 S.C. 477, 415 S.E.2d 816 (1992); State v. McCoy, 98 S.C. 133, 82 S.E. 280 (1914). For the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution, it is not necessary that the county in which the crime was committed be proved affirmatively if there is sufficient evidence from which it can be inferred. State v. McLeod, 303 S.C. 420, 401 S.E.2d 175 (1991); State v. Wharton, 263 S.C. 437, 211 S.E.2d 237 (1975); State v. Henderson, 285 S.C. 320, 329 S.E.2d 448 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover, venue, like jurisdiction, in a criminal case need not be affirmatively proved, and circumstantial evidence of venue, though slight, is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987); Wray v. State, 288 S.C. 474, 343 S.E.2d 617 (1986); State v. Wharton, supra. Generally, it can be inferred that the crime was committed in the state as well as county where the body is found. United States v. Rees, 193 F.Supp. 849 (D.Md.1961). Furthermore, where some acts material to the offense, and requisite to its consummation, occur in one county, and some in another, venue is proper in either county. State v. McLeod, supra; State v. Gasque, 241 S.C. 316, 128 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
Although there is evidence that some of the acts material to the homicides may have been committed in Georgia, the deaths occurred sometime between the time the victims were last seen in Georgia and the time the fire started in the van in South Carolina. Because both bodies were found in Edgefield County, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer that the victims died there. Moreover, Williams signed insurance documents conceding that Wife and Son died in Edgefield County. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, although not conclusive, to support the inference that the victims died in Edgefield County, South Carolina, and Williams was not entitled to a directed verdict.
III. Proffer of Evidence.
At trial, Williams proffered evidence that there were marijuana manufacturers in the area where the bodies were found who had subsequently threatened the lives of a confidential informant and a narcotics agent. Williams maintains that because these men had the motive and opportunity to kill the victims, the circuit court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce this evidence to create a reasonable doubt of his guilt. We disagree. We have held that:
[E]vidence offered by accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.... But before such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out such other person as the guilty party. Remote acts, disconnected and outside the crime itself, cannot be separately proved for such a purpose. An orderly and unbiased judicial inquiry as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant on trial does not contemplate that such defendant be permitted, by way of defense, to indulge in the conjectural inferences that some other person might have committed the offense for which he is on trial, or by fanciful analogy to say to the jury that someone other than he is more probably guilty. State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 104-05, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534-35 (1941). See also State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377, 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994); State v. Parker, 294 S.C. 465, 366 S.E.2d 10 (1988).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence offered by Williams failed to establish that the persons arrested for growing marijuana had any connection whatsoever to the homicides. Hence, the drug offenses were isolated from the homicides, and evidence pertaining to them should not have been admitted to insinuate that someone other than Williams could have murdered the victims. Accordingly, because Williams failed to show that the proffered evidence was inconsistent with his guilt, the circuit court exercised sound discretion in excluding it.
IV. Admission of Evidence of Marital Discord.
Williams maintains that he is entitled to a new trial because the details about prior marital difficulties should not have been admitted. He specifically asserts that testimony referring to a telephone conversation he had with Wife concerning a bill was prejudicial and inadmissible. In addition, he contends that the following colloquy between the Solicitor and a witness and the Solicitor's subsequent references to it prejudiced his case: A. Well, one time I heard a loud thump but I didn't know what it was. Q. What do you mean by a loud thump? A. Like something was knocked over. Q. Coming from inside the house? A. From inside the house. Q. Now would this be during the daylight hours or nighttime or what? A. This was during the day. Well, it wasn't real late. It was somewhere between 5 o'clock in the evenin' time. Q. A loud thump noise.
In homicide cases, although evidence of previous quarrels and ill feelings or hostile acts between parties is admissible to show that animus probably existed between the parties at the time of the homicide, the details of the difficulties should be excluded. State v. Clinkscales, 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E.2d 663 (1957) (details relating that husband had previously shot his wife in the back with a shotgun were held to be inadmissible).
The evidence presented did not detail the problems of the marriage, but merely established that there was animus between Williams and Wife. Although references to loud altercations and controversial telephone conversations between the couple established that their relationship was strained, specific details of the marital disputes were not revealed. Furthermore, references to the fact that “something” was knocked over inside the house does not qualify as a detailed description of a marital problem. Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of this evidence.
V. Refusal of the Request to Charge.
Williams argues that the circuit court neither charged the jury on parole minimums nor did it charge the jury that the term life imprisonment was to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning.
Williams first contends that the circuit court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in refusing to instruct the jury that if they sentenced him to life without an aggravating circumstance, he would serve a minimum of twenty years without parole, and if they found an aggravating circumstance, he would serve a minimum of thirty years without parole.
Under the Eighth Amendment,FN2 States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance which could cause the jury to decline to impose the death penalty. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); State v. Stewart, 288 S.C. 232, 341 S.E.2d 789 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has “deferred to the State's choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty determination.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S 992, 1001, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). Therefore, whether parole eligibility is relevant to the sentencing determination is a matter of state law. Id. We have determined parole eligibility is not relevant to a jury's sentencing considerations. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (Chandler, A.J., concurring); State v. Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220 (1991). We therefore conclude that the Eighth Amendment was not violated. FN2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Nevertheless, under the Fourteenth Amendment,FN3 when the State places the defendant's future dangerousness at issue, and the only available alternative sentence to the death penalty is life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible. Simmons v. State, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). However, Simmons is inapplicable in this case because the State did not rely upon Williams' future dangerousness as a justification for the jury to impose the death penalty. See State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. 425, 462 S.E.2d 263 (1995); State v. Young, 319 S.C. 33, 459 S.E.2d 84 (1995); State v. Southerland, supra. FN3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Next, Williams contends the circuit court should have charged the jury that the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. If a capital defendant requests it, a charge must be given at the sentencing phase that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for life. State v. Davis, supra; State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987). According to our review of the record, Williams did not request a plain meaning charge. Moreover, because Williams failed to object to the trial judge's instructions, this issue is not preserved. State v. Torrence, supra (a contemporaneous objection must be made to preserve error).
VI. Admission of Photographs.
Williams asserts error in the admission during the sentencing phase of five close-up autopsy photographs of the victims. Three photos illustrated the wounds to Son's neck and face. The two other photos portrayed the wounds to Wife's forearm and injuries to her face and shoulder. Williams argues that the photos were admitted to inflame the passions of the jury. We disagree.
Photographs of the victim's body are admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial to show the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant. State v. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986). The trial judge must balance the prejudicial effect of the photographs against their probative value. However, the scope of the probative value is much broader during the sentencing phase. Id.
Although the admitted photographs were taken during the autopsy rather than at the scene, they are not unnecessarily gruesome. The photographs merely illustrate the nature of the bruises on the victims' bodies. Moreover, they depict the manner in which the homicides were committed, thus, corroborating testimony given during the sentencing phase. Accordingly, we find no error in their admission.
VII. Upholding of the Death Sentence.
Williams contends that when determining his guilt the jury relied on circumstantial evidence which was too unreliable to uphold a death sentence consonant with the Eighth Amendment. We disagree.
We have held that a conviction and sentence of death based upon circumstantial evidence is not improper. State v. Owens, supra. Furthermore, in several other cases, courts have determined that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to sustain the imposition of capital punishment: People v. Hawkins, 10 Cal.4th 920, 897 P.2d 574, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 (1995) (imposition of death penalty for murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence is not unconstitutional); People v. Alcala, 4 Cal.4th 742, 842 P.2d 1192, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 877, 114 S.Ct. 215, 126 L.Ed.2d 171 (1993) (imposing the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment even though the conviction rests in part upon circumstantial evidence); Boggess v. State, 855 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 915, 109 S.Ct. 3237, 106 L.Ed.2d 585 (1989), on remand, 855 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 921, 113 S.Ct. 3034, 125 L.Ed.2d 721 (1993) (circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support defendant's sentence to death); Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. 172, 274 S.E.2d 317 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 365, 70 L.Ed.2d 192 (1981) (imposition of death penalty based upon circumstantial evidence is not unconstitutional).
As previously addressed, the following circumstantial evidence existed from which the jury could conclude that Williams had the motive, means, and opportunity to perform the homicides: Williams and Wife were having severe marital as well as financial difficulties; Williams substantially increased life insurance benefits for Wife and Son immediately prior to the homicides and made himself the beneficiary-the resulting death benefits would remedy Williams' poor financial situation; Williams forged Wife's name to insurance forms; no motive for robbery was established and it appeared that the victims had been forced from their home suddenly; shortly after the homicides, Williams did not deny killing Wife and Son; Williams knew details about the homicides prior to receiving results from the autopsy reports; Williams' hand was injured and Wife's injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human fist; and a towel and shoes on which human blood was found were discovered at Williams' residence.
While the State offered no evidence directly connecting Williams with the homicides, we find that the circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently supported Williams' conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment was not violated.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the death sentence was not a result of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors and the evidence supports the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstances. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1)-(2) (1985). The death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Tucker, supra; State v. Southerland, supra; State v. Owens, supra; State v. Kornahrens, supra. Accordingly, Williams' convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 611 S.E.2d 232 (S.C. 2005) (PCR).
Background: After affirmance of his murder convictions and death sentence, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626, defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR). The post-conviction trial court, Edgefield County, Marc H. Westbrook, J., granted a new capital sentencing proceeding. Certiorari was granted.
Holdings: The Supreme Court held that: (1) trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to request instruction, at sentencing phase of capital murder trial, that the term “life imprisonment” is to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning, but (2) defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance, and thus, counsel was not ineffective. Reversed.
PER CURIAM:
We granted certiorari to review a post-conviction relief (PCR) order granting respondent a new capital sentencing proceeding, finding his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a “plain and ordinary” meaning jury charge.FN1 We find that counsel's performance was deficient, but that there is no evidence of resulting prejudice. We therefore reverse the PCR order.
FN1. It is well settled that a capital defendant is entitled upon request to a jury charge in the sentencing phase of his trial that the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. See Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 524 S.E.2d 833 (1999) (reviewing the history of the “plain meaning” charge).
FACTS
Respondent was convicted of murdering his wife and his son and received two death sentences. His direct appeal was affirmed. State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (1996). At the PCR hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that there was no strategic or tactical reason why he failed to request a “plain meaning” charge. The PCR judge granted relief, and the State sought a writ of certiorari to review that decision.
ISSUE
Whether there is any evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's finding that respondent received ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of his capital trial?
ANALYSIS
A PCR applicant claiming trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance must demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Sellers v. State, 362 S.C. 182, 607 S.E.2d 82 (2005). In other words, the applicant must establish both error and prejudice. Id. On appellate review, this Court will uphold the PCR judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law if there is any evidence of probative value in the record to support them. Id.
The PCR judge found that trial counsel's testimony established the error prong of the ineffective assistance test. We agree. He found resulting prejudice from the failure to give “the plain meaning” charge because: 1) respondent had no prior criminal record; 2) respondent had been out on bond prior to the trial and remained out until the guilty verdicts were returned; and 3) the penalty phase evidence was predominately circumstantial, far from overwhelming, and the State had primarily relied on this weak evidence in aggravation during the penalty phase. We disagree.
We have carefully considered whether the record supports the PCR judge's conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning charge, and conclude it does not. While the factors cited by the PCR judge might support a prejudice finding in some cases, they do not in the context of this case. The evidence, albeit circumstantial, showed that respondent and his wife were experiencing significant marital problems and financial difficulties, and had in fact declared bankruptcy and seen foreclosure proceedings initiated against their marital home. In May 1991, respondent substantially increased life insurance benefits on his wife and child, naming himself as beneficiary. He also forged wife's signature on an automobile insurance form in the course of increasing that coverage. On June 19, the bodies of respondent's wife and son were found in the family car, which had been partially burned. The wife had died of blunt head trauma consistent with that inflicted by a human fist, and son had been strangled. Respondent had hand injuries consistent with beating, and told others the causes of death prior to receiving autopsy results.
We do not agree with the PCR judge's characterization of the evidence of respondent's guilt as weak. Further, the evidence demonstrated that respondent's motives were financial gain and the elimination of his domestic problems. Having achieved what he set out to accomplish, it is not surprising or meaningful that respondent met the obligations of his bond. Further, given the nature of these crimes, we find the fact that he had no prior criminal record irrelevant to the question whether he was prejudiced by the lack of a “plain meaning” charge.
The jury, by its guilty verdicts, found respondent planned in cold blood the deaths of his child and his wife, making arrangements to benefit financially. Further, the “plain meaning” charge evolved from the Court's concern that capital juries were speculating about parole eligibility. See Southerland v. State, footnote 1, supra. There is nothing in this record to indicate that the jurors in respondent's capital trial were concerned with parole eligibility, or confused about the meaning of a life sentence. We hold there is no evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance, that is, that had the jury been given a “plain meaning” charge there is a reasonable possibility that it would have returned two life sentences. Sellers v. State, supra.
CONCLUSION
Finding no evidence to support the PCR judge's conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by the lack of a “plain meaning” charge, the order granting respondent a new sentencing proceeding is REVERSED.
Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2007) (Habeas).
Background: Following affirmance of his state court murder convictions and death sentence, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626, and denial of postconviction relief, petitioner sought writ of habeas corpus. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Cameron McGowan Currie, J., granted petition. State appealed, and petitioner cross appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Michael, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) state court reasonably determined that counsel's failure to request plain meaning instruction was deficient performance; (2) state court reasonably determined that capital defendant was not prejudiced by failure to request instruction; (3) state court reasonably applied reasonable doubt standard in determining that evidence was constitutionally sufficient; and (4) state court reasonably determined that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed for jury to find that murders occurred in South Carolina, as required for venue. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
Luke A. Williams, III, was convicted and sentenced to death in South Carolina state court for the 1991 murders of his wife and son. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed his conviction and sentence and later denied his application for post-conviction relief. Thereafter, Williams petitioned for habeas review in federal court. The district court issued the writ, concluding that Williams received ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to request a jury instruction that the term “life imprisonment” should be understood in its “ordinary and plain meaning.” See State v. Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1991). The state appeals, and we must reverse. We conclude that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), when it determined that Williams's defense was not prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning instruction. We also reject Williams's cross-appeal, concluding that the state supreme court did not unreasonably apply the standards enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), when it determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Williams committed the murders and that venue was proper in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
I.
The facts, as recounted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in its opinion in Williams's direct appeal, are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19, 1991, the bodies of Linda Williams (Wife) and Shawn Williams (Son) were discovered inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County, South Carolina, approximately six miles from their home near Augusta, Georgia. The front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had partially damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline inside the van. Wife was discovered in the driver's seat, which was positioned so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and Son was seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece of PVC pipe on the van's floorboard. Wife was dressed in a gray t-shirt, gray sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks, nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Son was also shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants.
Wife suffered a black eye, a contusion on the bridge of her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that Wife's cause of death was blunt head trauma due to a beating. Son suffered a bruise to his forehead, as well as abrasions to his chin, back, and right side of his neck. His cause of death was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation. Wounds created by the fire were postmortem. Although the deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time of death was not determined.
At trial, several friends of Wife testified that she always dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because Wife was short in stature, she always positioned the driver's seat of the van close to the steering wheel. One friend stated that she last spoke with Wife by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on June 18, 1991. A neighbor testified that on June 19, 1991, a car drove into the driveway at Williams' home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Further testimony established that at approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Wife's van was not parked in the driveway.
A bath towel and Son's tennis shoes with blood stains on them were found at Williams' home. In addition, Williams' right hand was severely bruised and swollen-this injury was consistent with having occurred on June 19th. Williams told a friend that on the day of the homicides, Wife and Son were planning to go shopping at Columbia Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the autopsy results, Williams informed the friend that Wife had been beaten to death, and Son had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap similar to wire wrap Son had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed Wife and Son, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Wife were experiencing significant marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that they frequently overheard Williams and Wife engaging in hostile arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a “loud thump” during one of the arguments. In addition, Williams and Wife had declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against their home.
Williams had substantially increased life insurance benefits on Wife and Son during May of 1991, designating himself as beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in the amounts of $100,000 for Wife and $20,000 for Son. Williams forged Wife's name on the enrollment form. After their deaths, Williams made claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of $200,000 on Wife and $45,000 on Son. Williams also took out new life insurance policies for Wife and Son with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30, 1991, providing Wife with death benefit insurance in the amount of $250,000 and Son with $25,000 in death benefit insurance. [Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit insurance for Wife; however, until the policy was approved a binder limited the amount of coverage to $250,000.] Williams indicated on the claims forms that Wife and Son had died in Edgefield County, South Carolina. State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (1996).
At the conclusion of the state's case, Williams moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the murders, that Edgefield County, South Carolina, was not the proper venue, and that the Edgefield County circuit court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion, and Williams thereafter declined to testify or present other evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both charges of murder. In the penalty phase the jury recommended death sentences, finding two (statutory) aggravating circumstances: (1) that Williams committed the murders for monetary gain and (2) that he murdered two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The circuit court followed the jury's recommendation and imposed a separate death sentence for each murder. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Williams claimed, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to establish venue and guilt. The state supreme court, in a thorough opinion, affirmed Williams's convictions and sentences, id., and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Williams v. South Carolina, 519 U.S. 891, 117 S.Ct. 230, 136 L.Ed.2d 161 (1996).
Williams filed two applications for state post-conviction relief, the second of which was granted by the circuit court (PCR court). The PCR court concluded that Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction that the term “life imprisonment” should be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. According to the PCR court, the instruction was necessary to ensure that the jury understood the nature of its life imprisonment option. The PCR court therefore granted Williams a new sentencing proceeding. The state then petitioned the Supreme Court of South Carolina for a writ of certiorari, and that court reversed the decision of the PCR court. Although the state supreme court concluded that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to request a plain meaning instruction, it ultimately determined that Williams was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. Specifically, the court found “no evidence in the record to support the ... conclusion ... that had the jury been given a ‘plain meaning’ charge there is a reasonable possibility it would have [reached a different result and] returned two life sentences.” J.A. 188.
Next, Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court, and that court granted relief. First, the district court agreed with the Supreme Court of South Carolina that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to request a plain meaning instruction. Second, the court determined that counsel's ineffectiveness “was reasonably likely to have affected the outcome of [Williams's] capital sentencing hearing” because, among other things, Williams's “prior history contained a number of mitigating factors,” including no criminal record. J.A. 385. The district court rejected Williams's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions or South Carolina venue. The state appeals the award of the writ on Williams's ineffective assistance claim, and Williams cross-appeals, arguing that the writ should have been awarded on the additional ground that the evidence was not sufficient to establish his guilt or proper venue.
II.
When, as in this case, a district court's decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is based on a state court record, our review is de novo. Frazer v. South Carolina, 430 F.3d 696, 703 (4th Cir.2005). Federal habeas review in this case focuses only on legal determinations made by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in adjudicating the merits of claims raised by Williams. Accordingly, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), provides that a federal writ may not be issued unless the underlying state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court instructs us that “[u]nder § 2254(d)(1)'s ‘unreasonable application’ clause ... a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be [objectively] unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
III.
A.
Williams contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to request the South Carolina “plain meaning” instruction in his capital sentencing proceeding. In rejecting Williams's claim, the Supreme Court of South Carolina applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court case that sets the standards for judging whether a criminal defendant's conviction or death sentence must be set aside because counsel rendered ineffective assistance. A conviction or death sentence must be set aside when counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The deficiency inquiry centers on whether counsel's performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To avoid “the distorting effects of hindsight,” however, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant (or petitioner) bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. Id. When counsel's assistance in a capital sentencing proceeding was deficient, the prejudice inquiry centers on “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel's] errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The “totality of the evidence before the judge or jury” must be considered in making this determination. Id. Our review convinces us that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not engage in an unreasonable application of Strickland when it determined that although Williams's counsel performed in a deficient manner when he failed to request the plain meaning instruction, there was no resulting prejudice.
B.
South Carolina law provides a capital defendant with the right, invoked by request, to a jury instruction at sentencing that “the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 524 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1999). The instruction is available even if the defendant might become eligible for parole, and a trial court's refusal to grant a request for the instruction is reversible error on direct appeal. Id. at 834. The purpose of the plain meaning instruction is to ensure that the jury understands its sentencing options (life imprisonment or death) without speculating about the possibility of parole. See State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1985).
Because a South Carolina capital defendant's right to the plain meaning instruction is so well entrenched, the state supreme court concluded that Williams's trial counsel rendered substandard (deficient) performance when he failed to request the instruction. Instead of asking for a plain meaning instruction, counsel's initial strategy was to ask for a parole eligibility instruction to advise the jury that, if it opted for a life sentence, Williams would be eligible for parole in thirty years. Counsel explained at the PCR hearing that he requested the parole eligibility instruction to enable the jury to understand that a life sentence meant “more than five or ten or fifteen years.” J.A. 63. The trial court refused the parole eligibility instruction, which is not required to be given at the defendant's request. See McWee v. State, 357 S.C. 403, 593 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2004). Williams's counsel did not follow up with a request for the plain meaning instruction. As the South Carolina Supreme Court observed, counsel acknowledged that he had no strategic or tactical reason for not requesting the plain meaning instruction. He admitted that he believed the trial court would give the plain meaning instruction as a matter of course; and when it was not given, it did not occur to him to raise the issue with the court.
In these circumstances the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not unreasonably apply Strickland's performance standard. Williams's counsel was well aware of the plain meaning instruction and of its availability upon request. He surely knew that the instruction would have furthered his goal of making the jury aware that a life sentence would in all events result in a long prison term, and he could not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to ask for the instruction. Thus, the state supreme court reasonably concluded that the representation provided by Williams's counsel was deficient under Strickland's performance standard, that is, it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
After determining that Williams's counsel was deficient in his performance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered whether counsel's substandard performance prejudiced the defense. The state supreme court's analysis focused first on why the PCR court had erred in concluding that Strickland's prejudice requirement was satisfied. The PCR court believed that, without the plain meaning instruction, Williams's defense at the sentencing phase was prejudiced because: (1) the state relied largely on its circumstantial proof in the guilt phase to establish the statutory aggravating factors in the sentencing phase; (2) Williams had no prior criminal record; and (3) he was released on bond prior to trial. The state supreme court, after “carefully consider[ing]” the trial record, concluded that Williams was not “prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning charge.” J.A. 187.
In the sentencing phase the jury found two statutory aggravating factors that allowed it to recommend that Williams be sentenced to death for each murder: (1) Williams committed each murder for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value, and (2) he murdered two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that strong evidence, “albeit circumstantial,” supported the jury's finding of the two statutory aggravating factors. J.A. 187. The state supreme court recounted this evidence as follows.
Williams and his wife had been experiencing significant martial problems, and they were in dire financial straits; they had recently declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against their home. In the month before the murders, Williams had substantially increased life insurance coverage on his wife and son, naming himself beneficiary. Williams forged his wife's signature on forms that added vehicle-related death benefits under family automobile policies. The bodies were found in the family van, which had been partially burned. Right after the murders Williams displayed injuries to his right hand (severe bruising and swelling) that were consistent with the beating (or blunt head trauma) that killed his wife. The son's death was due to strangulation. After the murders, but before Williams received the autopsy results, he accurately described the causes of the deaths to a friend, stating that his wife had been beaten to death and that his son had been strangled by a plastic wire wrap. From this evidence the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that the jury “found [Williams] planned in cold blood the deaths of his child and his wife, making arrangements to benefit financially.” J.A. 188. The gist of the state supreme court's analysis of the factual record is that the strong evidence supporting the two statutory aggravating factors-two murders, both committed for financial gain-weighs in favor of the conclusion that Williams was not prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning instruction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina then considered the two items of mitigating evidence considered by the state PCR court, specifically that Williams was released on bond (and met his bond conditions) prior to his convictions and that he had no prior criminal record. The state supreme court indicated that the lack of a plain meaning instruction did not affect the jury's consideration of these two mitigating factors. First, the state supreme court found it unsurprising that Williams met the conditions of his bond. After all, the court said, Williams “ha[d] achieved what he set out to accomplish,” that is, the death of his wife and son and the prospect of substantial life insurance or death benefits. J.A. 188. Second, the court concluded that “given the nature of [Williams's] crimes ... the fact that he had no prior criminal record [is] irrelevant to the question whether he was prejudiced by the lack of a ‘plain meaning’ charge.” Id. Here, the court was referring to “the evidence demonstrat[ing] that [Williams's] motives were financial gain and the elimination of his domestic [or financial] problems.” Id. It was the depraved motive of financial gain that allowed the jury to find one of the aggravating factors that triggered the recommendation of death. The state supreme court thus indicated by its evaluation that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors by a significant degree.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded its analysis of Strickland's prejudice factor by considering whether there was anything “in th[e] record to indicate that the jurors in [Williams's] capital trial were concerned with parole eligibility, or confused about the meaning of a life sentence.” J.A. 188. The court found nothing, and the record supports that determination. First, the aggravating factors found by the jury (two murders and a financial motive) are not ones that indicate that the jury was concerned about how long Williams would serve if he received a life sentence or whether he would be a danger to society if he was paroled at some future date. It appeared to be solely the nature of, and the motive behind, Williams's crimes that triggered the jury's recommendation of death. Second, there is no indication in the record that a plain meaning instruction would have prompted the jury to give more weight to the mitigating evidence. The aggravating factors-a double murder planned in cold blood for financial gain-simply outweighed the mitigating factors, such as bond compliance and lack of a prior criminal record.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina thus concluded that there was no reasonable probability that, had a plain meaning instruction been given to Williams's sentencing jury, the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant the death sentence. This decision, we conclude, did not involve an unreasonable application of Strickland. Of course, the district court concluded that the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland, in four respects. We will evaluate the district court's decision and explain why that court's reasoning does not provide a sufficient basis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to set aside the state court determination.
First, the district court said that the Supreme Court of South Carolina's determination that Williams's lack of a prior criminal record was irrelevant to the prejudice question is contrary to Strickland, which required the state court to consider the “totality of the evidence.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (sentencer may not be precluded from considering any mitigating factor). The state supreme court did not exclude Williams's clean record from its consideration of the prejudice factor. Rather, the state supreme court weighed Williams's lack of a prior record against the cold-blooded and brutal nature of the murders and the aggravating factors of financial motive and a double murder; only then did the court conclude that the lack of a prior record was irrelevant to the prejudice question. The court was thus saying that the aggravating factors were so significant that the addition of a plain meaning instruction would not have transformed Williams's clean record-which the jury was instructed to consider in mitigation-into a factor that outweighed William's depraved motive and his cold-blooded planning and execution of the murders.
Second, the district court noted that the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in concluding that the lack of a plain meaning instruction did not prejudice Williams, erred in relying on lack of evidence of juror concern about parole eligibility under a life sentence. The district court believed that the state court's reliance on this factor was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001); and Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002). These decisions require a state court, as a matter of due process, to instruct a capital sentencing jury that a defendant would be ineligible for parole if the prosecution has put the defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See, e.g., Shafer, 532 U.S. at 51, 121 S.Ct. 1263. Kelly made clear that a court must give a parole ineligibility instruction under these circumstances regardless of whether the jury indicates concern about parole. 534 U.S. at 256-57, 122 S.Ct. 726. Neither Kelly nor any other Supreme Court case has considered the question raised by the district court-whether a state court may rely on the absence of evidence of juror concern or confusion about parole eligibility or the meaning of a life sentence in considering whether the lack of a plain meaning instruction prejudiced the defense. Again, the purpose of South Carolina's plain meaning instruction is to ensure that a capital jury understands its sentencing options (life imprisonment or death) without speculating about the possibility of parole. It is not unreasonable for a court, in reviewing a record for prejudice resulting from lack of a plain meaning instruction, to look for signs of juror confusion about parole eligibility or the meaning of a life sentence. In any event, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Williams's case did not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply any U.S. Supreme Court precedent, when it relied on the lack of evidence of juror confusion about the consequences of the sentencing options.
Third, the district court concluded that the state supreme court, in conducting its prejudice analysis, unreasonably failed to consider the likely effect of statements made by the prosecution and defense in closing arguments. The prosecutor told the jury that imposing a life sentence on Williams would “pat him on the back” and indicate that Edgefield County “forgave” him. J.A. 376. Defense counsel later told the jury that it would hear a charge that “life [in prison] means the remainder of one's natural life.” J.A. 377. This charge never materialized because counsel did not request a plain meaning instruction. The district court concluded that these statements could have confused the jury about the meaning of a life sentence. We disagree. The prosecutor's statement simply reflected the view that a death sentence would be the most appropriate punishment. This view was expressed without any mention that parole might be possible under a life sentence. Further, it is not likely that defense counsel prompted the jury to make parole eligibility a deciding factor in its sentencing recommendation when he mistakenly said that a plain meaning instruction would be given. The statements therefore are not of sufficient materiality to allow us to say that the state supreme court was unreasonable in determining that “[t]here is nothing in th[e] record to indicate that the jurors in [Williams's] capital trial were concerned with parole eligibility, or confused about the meaning of a life sentence.” J.A. 188.
Fourth, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court of South Carolina's prejudice inquiry involved an unreasonable application of Strickland because the court “did not mention” several mitigating factors. These factors included Williams's good behavior during childhood; his many friends in high school, where he was active in sports; his ten-year estrangement from his family as a result of a will contest, and the reconciliation after he was arrested for murder; and his “quiet, withdrawn” nature while an inmate in the Edgefield County Jail. J.A. 379. The district court treated the state supreme court's failure to mention these factors as an indication that the state court did not follow Strickland's directive to “consider the totality of the evidence before the ... jury,” including the “aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As we discussed above, the state supreme court specifically mentioned two mitigating factors: that Williams adhered to his bond conditions and obligations and that he had no prior criminal record. Moreover, the state supreme court stated that it had “carefully considered whether the record supports the ... conclusion that [Williams] was prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning charge.” J.A. 187. The state supreme court thus implied that it considered all of the mitigating circumstances, including the unmentioned ones, but ultimately determined there was not a reasonable probability that, had a plain meaning instruction been given, the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors warranted two life sentences instead of death. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This determination did not involve an unreasonable application of Strickland.
For the foregoing reasons the district court's order granting Williams's application for a writ of habeas corpus will be reversed.
IV.
In Williams's direct appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected his claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support either his convictions or venue in South Carolina. Williams reasserted these claims in his federal habeas petition, and they were also rejected by the district court. He cross-appeals this aspect of the district court's decision.
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a [state] criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To determine whether this due process right has been violated, the appropriate inquiry before the passage of AEDPA was a straightforward question of ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original)). Now, under the AEDPA provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “we inquire whether a state court determination that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction was an ‘objectively unreasonable’ application of [the standard enunciated in] Jackson.” Id.
A.
South Carolina defines murder as “the killing of any person with malice aforethought.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10. In rejecting Williams's claim that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of South Carolina began by focusing on the evidence that demonstrated Williams's motive and planning. He and his wife were experiencing severe financial difficulties, as evidenced by their bankruptcy and the foreclosure on the family home; neighbors regularly overheard loud arguments between Williams and his wife; and he substantially increased the life insurance coverage (naming himself the beneficiary) on his wife and son a month before the murders. Immediately after the murders, Williams's right hand was severely bruised, and the injury marks on his wife's body were consistent with injuries that would be inflicted in a beating with a human fist. Finally, Williams described the methods that were used to murder his wife and son before he received the autopsy results. This evidence, along with the other evidence recited in the statement of facts, see part I supra, was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find Williams guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of murdering his wife and son.
B.
South Carolina law requires a murder indictment to specify the place of the victim's death for purposes of establishing venue and providing adequate notice to the defendant. See S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-30; State v. Brisbon, 323 S.C. 324, 474 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1996) (quoting State v. Bostick, 243 S.C. 14, 131 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1963)). Williams's jury was thus instructed that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders occurred in Edgefield County, South Carolina, as alleged in the indictment. Williams contends here, as he did in his direct appeal, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the murders occurred in Edgefield County rather than in Georgia. The factual issue of where the murders occurred is a close one to be sure. The evidence would have allowed the jury to find that the victims were murdered in either Edgefield County, South Carolina, or in Georgia. The jury nevertheless found that the deaths occurred in Edgefield County. An objectively reasonable application of the Jackson standard requires that a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume ... that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The Supreme Court of South Carolina pointed to evidence that supported the jury's determination that the murders occurred in South Carolina: the victims were dressed in a way that suggested they were forced from their home suddenly while still alive; their bodies were found in South Carolina; and Williams signed insurance claim forms conceding that his wife and son had died in Edgefield County. The state supreme court's conclusion that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the inference (and a finding beyond a reasonable doubt) that the victims died in South Carolina was not objectively unreasonable under the standards enunciated in Jackson.
V.
For the reasons stated in part III of this opinion, the district court's order issuing a writ of habeas corpus for Luke A. Williams, III, is reversed. For the reasons stated in part IV, the district court's determination that the writ cannot be granted on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt or venue is affirmed. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART