Executed September 27, 2010 10:16 p.m. by Lethal Injection in Georgia

40th murderer executed in U.S. in 2010
1228th murderer executed in U.S. since 1976
2nd murderer executed in Georgia in 2010
48th murderer executed in Georgia since 1976

Since 1976	Date of Execution	State	Method	Murderer (Race/Sex/Age at Murder-Execution)	Date of Birth	Victim(s) (Race/Sex/Age at Murder)	Date of Murder	Method of Murder	Relationship to Murderer	Date of Sentence
1228 (40)	09-27-10	GA	Lethal Injection	Brandon Joseph Rhode W / M / 18 - 31	07-16-79	Steven Moss W / M / 37 Bryan Moss W / M / 11 Kristin Moss W / F / 15	04-23-98	.357 Handgun	None	02-27-00

Summary:
Rhode and Daniel Lucas were ransacking the Moss home in search of valuables when 11 year old Bryan Moss saw them through a front window and entered through a back door armed with a baseball bat. They wrestled Bryan to a chair and Lucas shot him in the shoulder. When they heard 15 year old Kristin approaching the house, Rhode forced her to a chair and shot her twice with a pistol. Rhode then ambushed Steven Moss when he arrived home, shooting him with the same pistol. Lucas later shot each of the victims again to make sure they were dead. Accomplice Lucas was also convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a separate trial and remains on death row.

Citations:
Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. 2001). (Direct Appeal)
Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2009). (Habeas)

Final/Special Meal:
Rhode did not request a final meal and received the standard meal tray being served at the prison. His final meal consisted of a chili dog, tater tots, carrots, cole slaw, a slice of cake, and fruit punch.

Final Words:
None.

Internet Sources:

Georgia Department of Corrections (Rhode)

MAJOR OFFENSE: MURDER
MOST RECENT INSTITUTION: GA DIAG & CLASS PRIS-PERM
KNOWN ALIASES: A.K.A. RHODE,BRANDON JOSEPH

STATE OF GEORGIA - CURRENT SENTENCES
CASE NO: 439113
OFFENSE: MURDER
CONVICTION COUNTY: JONES COUNTY
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 04/23/1998
SENTENCE LENGTH: DEATH

CASE NO: 439113
OFFENSE: BURGLARY
CONVICTION COUNTY: JONES COUNTY
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 04/23/1998
SENTENCE LENGTH: 20 YEARS, 0 MONTHS, 0 DAYS

CASE NO: 439113
OFFENSE: BURGLARY
CONVICTION COUNTY: JONES COUNTY
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 04/23/1998
SENTENCE LENGTH: 20 YEARS, 0 MONTHS, 0 DAYS

CASE NO: 439113
OFFENSE: KIDNAPPING
CONVICTION COUNTY: JONES COUNTY
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 04/23/1998
SENTENCE LENGTH: LIFE

Atlanta Journal Constitution

"Georgia executes inmate who had attempted suicide," by Greg Bluestein. (AP September 27, 2010)

JACKSON, Ga. — A Georgia prisoner who tried to kill himself last week by slashing his arms and throat with a razor blade was executed Monday night amid heightened security for the 1998 murders of a trucking company owner and his two children.

Georgia Department of Corrections FILE - This undated file photo released by the Georgia Department of Corrections shows inmate Brandon Joseph Rhode. The Georgia death row inmate scheduled to be executed Monday Sept. 27, 2010 for the 1998 triple murders of a trucking company owner and his two children. (AP Photo/Georgia Department of Corrections)

Brandon Joseph Rhode, 31, was put to death by injection at the state prison in Jackson. He was pronounced dead at 10:16 p.m. Rhode declined to speak any last words or have a final prayer.

He was convicted in 2000 of killing Steven Moss, 37, his 11-year-old son Bryan and 15-year-old daughter Kristin during a burglary of their Jones County home in central Georgia. His coconspirator, Daniel Lucas, was also sentenced to death in a separate trial and remains on death row.

Rhode's execution had been set for 7 p.m. but was pushed back several hours as corrections officials waited for the U.S. Supreme Court to decide on his plea for a stay of execution. The court rejected appeals later that night. Medics then tried for about 30 minutes to find a vein to inject the three-drug concoction.

The prisoner's eyes darted around the room before the lethal mixture began coursing through his veins. Within minutes he was staring blankly at the ceiling of the death chamber. Moments before Rhode was pronounced dead he turned his head, exposing a bandage over the part of his neck he slashed. It took 14 minutes for the lethal dose to kill him.

Rhode had initially been scheduled to be put to death Sept. 21, but the Georgia Supreme Court postponed the execution after Rhode was rushed to the hospital that day following a suicide attempt.

Rhode was stabilized at a local hospital and placed in a restraining chair to prevent him from removing the sutures from his neck or doing any other harm to himself, state attorneys said. Defense attorney Brian Kammer countered that Rhode was put in a "torture chair" and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

"He has been subjected to the surreal and incomprehensible: Heroic measures taken to stabilize his life by the prison staff that would then execute him," Kammer said in one court filing. Kammer urged the Georgia Supreme Court Monday to push back the execution again so experts could evaluate whether Rhode was mentally competent to be executed, or understood why he was being punished. He said Rhode lost half his blood Sept. 21 when he cut himself, went into shock and could have suffered brain damage. "The threat of execution has pushed Mr. Rhode's limited coping skills to the breaking point," spurring him to slash himself with blades he hid from guards while under a blanket, he said in the filing.

Rhode and Lucas were ransacking the Moss' home in search of valuables in April 1998 when Bryan Moss saw them through a front window, and entered through a back door armed with a baseball bat, prosecutors said. They said Moss and his son and daughter were shot to death. Lucas later shot each of the victims again to make sure they were dead, according to the records.

Rhode appealed the case several times, arguing that his trial attorneys failed to present enough evidence to persuade the jury to spare his life. Kammer argued more recently that his client should be granted clemency because doctors discovered he suffered from organic brain damage and a fetal alcohol disorder.

Augusta Chronicle

"Georgia executes inmate who tried suicide; Man convicted in 1998 Jones County triple murder case is denied final appeal. (Associated Press Monday, Sept. 27, 2010)

JACKSON, Ga. --- A death row inmate who tried to kill himself last week by slashing his arms and throat with a razor blade was executed Monday night, amid heightened security, for the 1998 murders of a trucking company owner and his two children.

Brandon Joseph Rhode, 31, was put to death by lethal injection at the state prison in Jackson. He was pronounced dead by authorities at 10:16 p.m. Rhode declined to speak any last words or have a final prayer.

He was convicted in 2000 of the killings of Steven Moss, 37, his son Bryan, 11, and daughter Kristin, 15, during a burglary of their Jones County home. His co-conspirator, Daniel Lucas, was sentenced to death in a separate trial and remains on death row.

Rhode's execution had been set for 7 p.m. His attorneys applied Monday afternoon to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of execution. The court rejected the appeals later that night. Rhode had previously been scheduled to be put to death Sept. 21, but the Georgia Supreme Court postponed the execution twice after he was rushed to the hospital that day after a suicide attempt. Rhode was stabilized at a hospital and placed in a restraining chair to prevent him from pulling out the sutures on his neck or doing any other harm to himself, state attorneys said.

Defense attorney Brian Kammer countered that Rhode was put in a "torture chair" and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Kammer urged the Georgia Supreme Court on Monday to push back the execution again so experts could evaluate whether Rhode was mentally competent to be executed, or understood why he was being punished. He said Rhode lost half his blood Sept. 21 when he cut himself, went into shock and could have suffered brain damage.

The inmate's supporters filed a separate motion urging the execution be delayed for three weeks so officials could determine how Rhode got the razor blades he used to slash himself. A federal judge rejected the appeal but ordered state prisons officials to take more security precautions to make sure he did not harm himself.

Rhode and Lucas were ransacking the Moss home in search of valuables in April 1998 when Bryan Moss saw them through a front window and entered through a back door armed with a baseball bat, prosecutors said. They said they wrestled Bryan to a chair and Lucas shot him in the shoulder. When the intruders heard Kristin approaching the house, Rhode forced her to a chair and shot her twice with a pistol, according to court records. Rhode ambushed Steven Moss when he arrived home, shooting him with the same pistol. Lucas later shot each of the victims again to make sure they were dead, according to the records.

Rhode appealed the case several times, arguing that his trial attorneys failed to present enough evidence to persuade the jury to spare his life. Kammer argued more recently that his client should be granted clemency because doctors discovered he suffered from organic brain damage and a fetal alcohol disorder. Each time, though, the appeals were denied.

Associated Press

"Georgia execution delayed after suicide attempt," by Greg Bluestein. (AP Sep 21, 2010)

ATLANTA — The Georgia Supreme Court delayed the execution Tuesday of a convicted killer who attempted suicide hours before he was to be put to death by injection. Brandon Joseph Rhode, 31, tried to slit his wrists and his throat, according to his attorneys who want to halt the execution with a new mental competency challenge.

Rhode's attorney Brian Kammer said the attempted suicide proves Rhode was "incompetent" and executing him violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. "He's utterly terrified and just hopeless," said Kammer. "He was very morose, frightened and subdued. This was a product of him just being in terror, of losing hope altogether."

Georgia prisons officials have rescheduled the execution for Friday.

Rhode was convicted in 2000 of the killings of Steven Moss, 37, his 11-year-old son Bryan and 15-year-old daughter Kristin during a burglary of their Jones County home. His co-conspirator, Daniel Lucas, was also sentenced to death in a separate trial and is on death row.

Suicide attempts on death row are rare, but have happened. In March, Ohio inmate Lawrence Reynolds overdosed on an antidepressant hours before he was to be transferred to the state's death chamber. He recovered in a hospital and was executed a week later.

In Texas, David Long was executed in December 1999 after overdosing on antidepressants authorities believe he hoarded in his death row cell. Long's attorneys sought to postpone the execution, but a judge refused a reprieve, saying that because Long previously was judged competent to be executed, there was a presumption of competency.

Jones County News

"Rhode finally executed," by Debbie Lurie-Smith.

Although unwillingly, Brandon Joseph Rhode ultimately took responsibility Monday night for the murders of three members of a Jones County family. Rhode was pronounced dead at the Georgia Diagnostic Prison in Jackson at 10:16 p.m. Sept. 27. The execution was scheduled to occur at 7 p.m., but a last minute appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court delayed Rhode’s death.

The Monday execution date was the fourth time it had been scheduled since the original order set the time for Sept. 21, 7 p.m. Rhode was able to get his hands on a razor the night before he was to be executed and made cuts in his neck and arms that were severe enough to cause him to be hospitalized, and the date moved to 9 a.m. Friday. That time was later moved to 7 p.m. the same day, and late that afternoon, it was rescheduled for this past Monday.

Jones County was represented at the execution by assistant district attorneys Gregory Bushway and Keagan Goodrich. Bushway prosecuted the case with District Attorney Fred Bright, who was not able to be at the prison Monday.

ProDeathPenalty.com

Central Georgia News

Gerri Ann Moss: Twelve Years Later Kimberly Newman Story Created: Sep 20, 2010 at 5:28 PM CDT (Story Updated: Sep 20, 2010 at 5:32 PM CDT ) “Nothing will be able to put this to rest. Nothing… I guess I’m mad because I have to live like this.” –Gerri Ann Moss/Victim’s Mother and Wife Gerri Moss wears her emotions on her sleeves Monday as she remembers the day fate took control of her life. “It’s such a great loss to society and I just remember them being so kind and sweet and they always always always were thinking of others.” –Gerri Ann Moss/Victim’s Mother and Wife The stronger than most mother of Kristin and Bryan, and wife of Steven Moss emotionally recalls the kindness of her children and the impact her family had on others. Twelve years after their death, people are still working hard to remember the Moss family in every way possible, even if it isn’t always easy. “Kristin was beautiful, popular athletic. Bryan was, just, he was my best friend, protector, he protected everyone, he was just everyone's friend, and Steven made you laugh.” –Rebecca Nobel/Family Friend On the eve of the scheduled execution of one of her family’s killers, Gerri says she’s letting the poison out of her system, and receiving lots of love and comfort from community members. “They're giving back the love that they received from us, and it’s beautiful.” –Gerri Ann Moss/Victim’s Mother and Wife A candle light memorial will be hosted by friends of the Moss family, Rebecca Noble and Donya Dupree. They ask that everyone bring their own candle and join them in front of the Jones County Court House in Carrol’s Park Tuesday evening. Gerri Moss will remain at her California home during the memorial, and Brandon Rhode’s execution.

Georgia Attorney General

Thurbert E. Baker
Georgia Attorney General
PRESS ADVISORY
Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Execution Scheduled For Killer Convicted Of Brutal Triple Homicide In Jones County Georgia Attorney General Thurbert E. Baker offers the following information in the case against Brandon Joseph Rhode, who is scheduled to be executed at 7:00pm on September 21, 2010 for the brutal murders of Steven Moss and Moss's two children, daughter Kristin, aged 15, and son Bryan, aged 11.

Scheduled Execution

On September 7, 2010, the Superior Court of Jones County filed an order, setting the seven-day window in which the execution of Brandon Joseph Rhode may occur to begin at noon, September 21, 2010, and ending seven days later at noon on September 28, 2010. The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections then set the specific date and time for the execution as 7:00pm on September 21, 2010. Rhode has concluded his direct appeal proceedings and his state and federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Rhode’s Crimes (1998)

The Georgia Supreme Court summarized the facts of the case as follows:

The evidence presented at trial suggested the following account of the crimes. Rhode and his co-perpetrator, Daniel Lucas, burglarized the home of Steven and Gerri Ann Moss on April 23, 1998, fled the scene when Rhode discovered an alarm system, and returned later that day to burglarize the home again. While Rhode and Lucas were ransacking the home searching for valuables, 11-year-old Bryan Moss arrived, observed Rhode and Lucas through a front window, and entered through a back door, armed with a baseball bat. Rhode and Lucas subdued Bryan at gunpoint, sat him in a chair, and began discussing what to do with him. Lucas turned and fired at the boy, inflicting a non-fatal shoulder wound. As Kristin Moss was approaching the house, Lucas took Bryan into a back bedroom. Rhode met Kristin as she arrived, sat her in a chair, and shot her twice with a .357 caliber pistol. Lucas repeatedly shot Bryan with a .25 caliber pistol. Rhode later shot Steven Moss with the .357 caliber pistol when Steven arrived. Finally, Lucas obtained a .22 caliber pistol from Rhode’s automobile and shot Bryan and Kristin again.

Chad Derrick Jackson, Rhode’s roommate, testified that he observed Rhode and Lucas handing rifles and other items out of Jackson and Rhode’s bedroom window and loading them into Rhode’s automobile on the evening of the crimes. Jackson further testified that Rhode and Lucas admitted to him the next day that Lucas first shot Bryan in the shoulder, that Lucas then shot Bryan while Rhode simultaneously shot Kristin, that Rhode next shot Steven Moss, and that lastly Lucas shot each victim to ensure their deaths.

Danny Ray Bell, who also lived in the same house as Rhode, testified that Rhode and Lucas spoke to him between the two burglaries and that Bell advised Rhode not to return to burglarize the same home. Bell testified that, at the time of this conversation, Rhode had a .357 caliber pistol in his waistband. According to Bell, when Rhode returned from the second burglary, Rhode said that he had "messed up big time" and needed to dispose of some weapons and other items. Rhode admitted to Bell that Lucas shot a young boy and that Rhode shot a girl and a man.

Several witnesses testified that they saw an automobile similar to Rhode’s at or near the victims’ home on the day of the murders. A search of Rhode’s automobile revealed damage to the front and rear bumpers and a spare tire in the trunk that showed signs of use. A photograph of the crime scene suggested a vehicle had backed into a gas tank at the victims’ home. Expert testimony disclosed that paint on a cement block at the victims’ home matched the paint on Rhode’s automobile, including two layers applied at the factory and a third layer likely applied later. Additional expert testimony indicated that a crime scene imprint could have been made by Rhode’s spare tire.

Rhode made a statement admitting he fired two times at Kristin with the .357 caliber pistol, and he led law enforcement officers to two locations where he and Lucas had secreted weapons and other items. Expert testimony matched the found .357 and .25 caliber pistols to bullets retrieved from the crime scene and the victims’ bodies.

Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377-378, 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001).

The Trial (1998-2000)

Rhode was indicted in the Superior Court of Jones County, Georgia on June 30, 1998 for three counts of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of burglary and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury. On February 25, 2000, following a jury trial, Rhode was convicted on all counts. The jury’s recommendation of a death sentence was returned on February 27, 2000.

The Direct Appeal (2001-2002)

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Rhode’s convictions and sentences on October 1, 2001. Rhodev. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001). Rhode filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on June 17, 2002. Rhode v. Georgia, 536 U.S. 925 (2002).

State Habeas Corpus Proceedings (2003-2007)

Rhode, represented by Brian Kammer, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia on April 3, 2003. Rhode filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 30, 2004. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 31, 2005. On March 16, 2006, the state habeas corpus court entered an order denying Rhode state habeas relief. Rhode’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal filed in the Georgia Supreme Court was denied on April 24, 2007.

Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings (2007-2009)

Rhode, represented by Brian Kammer, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on June 25, 2007. On September 9, 2008, the district court denied Rhode federal habeas corpus relief. The district court denied a motion to alter and amend judgment on November 5, 2008. The district court granted Rhode a certificate of appealability on January 20, 2009.

11th Circuit Court of Appeals (2009)

The case was orally argued before the Eleventh Circuit on September 10, 2009. On September 17, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion which denied relief. Rhodev. Hall, 582 F.3d. 1273 (11th Cir. 2009). Rhode filed a petition for panel rehearing, which was denied November 17, 2009.

United StatesSupreme Court (2010)

Rhode filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied June 7, 2010. Rhode v. Hall, 130 S.Ct. 3399 (2010). Rhode then filed a petition for rehearing in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on August 16, 2010. Rhode v. Hall, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5635 (Case No. 09-10597).

Chamblee54

Ocmulgee Circuit District Attorney Fred Bright prosecuted the case. Because of the brutality of the crime, a plea bargain was not offered. Mr. Bright wanted the death penalty. “I vividly remember in the guilt-innocence portion of the trial, when the jury had been out five hours, the attorneys asked me about a manslaughter plea. My response was ‘read my lips, I’m not even interested in offering life without parole’.”

The case went through the required series of appeals and reviews. Lawyers claimed that other lawyers did not do a good job, and that it was really Mr. Lucas who did the killing. There seems to be little doubt that Mr. Rhode was at the crime scene at the time of the murders. On Sept. 17, 2009 the verdict was issued. “Brandon Rhode, a Georgia death row inmate, appeals from the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to Rhode’s claim of ineffective penalty phase investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence by his trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s denial of Rhode’s petition.”

The mitigating circumstances deal largely with Mr. Rhode’s mental capacity. Amnesty International tells the story. Brandon Rhode was born in Mississippi to a young mother, who as a 15-year-old was not even aware she was pregnant for the first five months. During this time she consumed alcohol and drugs. Brandon Rhode has been diagnosed as suffering from organic brain damage, and in 2010, using modern methods of testing, experts concluded that he “definitely suffers from a Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder” (FASD), and that his development was significantly delayed as a result of his exposure to alcohol as a foetus. Dr Richard Adler has said that “what we now know for certain in 2010… is that the brain of a healthy child continues to grow and develop and mature into the early 20s.

During that time, the executive functions of the brain – impulse control, judgment, planning, appreciation of consequences, empathy, ability to course-correct – are the last areas of brain functioning to develop. This is why adolescents – even 18 year old teenagers like Brandon Rhode was in 1998 – are definitely impaired in these areas of functioning as compared to adults. Furthermore, the characteristic deficits associated with FASD only exacerbate the impairments associated with adolescent brain immaturity… In effect, Brandon was functioning… at a considerably younger level than his chronological age at the time of the subject crimes”. Brandon Rhode began drinking alcohol at the age of 11, and by the age of 13 was abusing alcohol and drugs regularly. He was hospitalized at the age of 13 after a suicide attempt. At 15, he dropped out of school and was sent by his mother to live with his biological father who was a drug addict and alcoholic. The teenager’s own substance abuse escalated and he began to burgle houses in the pursuit of money to buy alcohol and drugs”

As this is written, Brandon Rhode is held in restraints. He attempted suicide before his scheduled execution Tuesday night. As the fishwrapper tells the story “Rhode tried to kill himself by slitting the side of his neck and both arms. By the time he was discovered, Rhode was unconscious and had lost half the blood in his body; he was revived at the hospital in nearby Griffin…Rhode had concealed the razor blade he used to cut his neck and arms while lying under a blanket, said Joe Drolet, a lawyer for the state attorney general’s office. He was being observed by guards, but they could not see what was happening under the blanket and took action when they saw blood.”

There are reports that the razor was given to Mr. Rhode by a prison guard. This is denied by the officials. “There’s not a pattern of recklessly handing out razors to suicidal death row inmates,” They do not deny that Mr. Rhode was being observed, by guards, while he cut himself under a blanket.

The state is still planning to poison Brandon Rhode tonight at 7:00 p.m. Until that time , “Two guards — and not the guards who were assigned to watch Rhode at the time he tried to kill himself — must be assigned continuously to observe Rhode.” There have been other suicides on death row recently. On January 1, 2010, Leeland Mark Braley was found hanging in his cell. And then there is the case of Timothy Pruitt. Timothy Woodrow Pruitt tried to hang himself on November 19. He died on December 6. ( PG is puzzled why it would take 17 days for a botched suicide to have the desired effect). When announcing his demise, the Department of Corrections referred to an “alleged suicide attempt” that is under investigation.

On January 8 , “Georgia’s top Department of Corrections official has now acknowledged that one of two recent reported suicides on Georgia’s death row may not have been a suicide.” And now, there are reports of guards giving an unstable inmate razor blades, on the eve of his execution. Pictures are from the Georgia Department of Corrections and ” The Special Collections and Archives,Georgia State University Library”.

UPDATE: The Georgia Supreme Court has granted another stay of execution. The procedure is now scheduled for Monday, September 27, at 4:00 p.m..

UPDATE2: Brandon Rhode died Monday night, September 27. He did not make a final statement.

Georgians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty

Amnesty International

Index:AMR 51/092/2010 USA

Brandon Rhode was executed in Georgia, USA, shortly after 10pm on 27 September. Six days earlier he had almost died after slashing his arms and neck with a razor. The execution was delayed a number of times during the six days, but in the end the courts refused to stop it.

Brandon Rhode was due to be put to death at 7pm on 21 September. That morning, however, despite supposedly being under constant observation by two guards, Brandon Rhode attempted suicide by making deep cuts in both arms and his neck with a razor blade. He was rushed to hospital where he was assessed as being in immediate danger of losing his life, having lost half his blood. He was revived, stitched up, and brought back to prison. His lawyer saw him there on the afternoon of 21 September, held in a restraint chair, in which Brandon Rhode was “in severe pain and discomfort”, his face “haggard, pallid and jaundiced” (see also USA: Cruel, inhuman, degrading: 40th execution of the year approaches, 24 September, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/091/2010/en).

On 21 September, the Georgia Supreme Court issued a stay of execution until 2pm on 23 September. The death warrant did not expire until 28 September, however, and the authorities reset the execution for 9am on 24 September. They later rescheduled it to 7pm on that day to allow litigation to continue. On 24 September, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered another stay, and the execution was reset for 7pm on 27 September. One by one, the courts refused to intervene to delay the execution beyond the 28 September that would have taken the case out of the time pressures imposed by the active death warrant and allowed full consideration of the issues raised.

Brandon Rhode’s lawyers pursued a number of avenues in the courts – including seeking to challenge the state’s failure to protect their client from self-harm on “death watch”, and raising the claim that he was “incompetent” for execution, that is that he was not in a fit mental state to understand the reason for and reality of his punishment. On 23 September, a doctor who had worked on Brandon Rhode’s case during the appeals process, visited him and reported back to the lawyer that the prisoner was “actively dissociating, losing his grasp on reality”.

On 22 and 23 September, a trial judge held what the Brandon Rhode’s lawyer, in a subsequent appeal to the state Supreme Court, described as a “pseudo-hearing”. The hearing, he wrote, “went at breakneck speed”, allowing the defence “no time to prepare”. He said that the first half of the hearing went ahead before he had been able to have Brandon Rhode evaluated by a mental health expert. He continued: “Once an expert was allowed access to Rhode he determined that Rhode’s mind was slipping in and out of reality from the effect his loss of blood, and the surrounding gruesome circumstances, had on his long-damaged brain. The State’s own mental health expert could not say that Rhode was competent. But this hearing was designed to ensure an execution rather than meaningfully examine competence, an intent punctuated by the lower court’s wholesale and uncritical signing of the state’s 14 page order ‘finding’ Rhode competent”. On 27 September, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal against this lower court ruling. The state Board of Pardons and Paroles refused to reconsider its denial of clemency of 17 September.

The federal courts also refused to intervene. Finally, the execution was delayed past its 7pm scheduled time while the authorities waited for word from the US Supreme Court. The latter refused to stay the execution, and it went ahead with the lethal injection team taking about half an hour to find a vein in which to inject Brandon Rhode. Once they had done so, it took 14 minutes for the drugs to kill him. He was pronounced dead at 10.16pm.

Brandon Rhode becomes the 40th person to be put to death in the USA this year, and the 1,228th since judicial killing resumed there in 1977. Georgia accounts for 48 of these executions.

Augusta Chronicle

Jack Edward Alderman, 45, was sentenced to death in June 1975 by a Chatham County jury for killing his wife, Barbara Jean Alderman, 27, on Sept. 21, 1974. His sentence was overturned on a federal appeal in 1980, but in April 1984, he was again sentenced to death. A co-defendant, John Arthur Brown, pleaded guilty for a life sentence and told investigators Mr. Alderman wanted to kill his wife for the insurance money. Mr. Brown was paroled in 1987. The state appeal concerning the fairness of Mr. Alderman's second trial has been pending in Mr. Alderman's case since December 1994.

Stanley Edward Allen, 42, was sentenced to death in Elbert County in July 1981. Mr. Allen and an accomplice, Woodrow Davis, 18, were convicted in the Jan. 5, 1981, break-in of the home of Susie C. Rucker, 72. Both men raped the woman, and she was strangled to death. Mr. Davis was sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Allen's death sentence was overturned by the Georgia Supreme Court in January 1982, but he was resentenced to death in October 1984. Mr. Allen had previously been sentenced to 10 years in prison for rape in 1975. Since September 1991, Mr. Allen has been awaiting a new sentencing trial on the issue of mental retardation.

James Douglas Andrews, 28, was sentenced to death on Oct. 16, 1992, in Muscogee County for rape, robbery and murder. Investigators say that on July 23, 1990, he broke into the home of Viola Hick, 78. His first appeal ­ to the state Supreme Court ­ hasn't been filed.

Joseph Martin Barnes, 27, was sentenced to death in Newton County in June 1993 for the robbery and shooting death of Prestiss Lamar Wells, 57, on Feb. 13, 1992. Although Mr. Barnes was sentenced to death four years ago, his first appeal hasn't been filed yet.

Norman Darnell Baxter, 45, was sentenced to death in Henry County in November 1983 for the murder of Kathryn June "June Bug" Brooks, 22. Her nude body ­ bound feet, wrists and neck ­ was found a week after she was reported missing in July 1980. Mr. Baxter, who spent time in state mental hospitals, had prior criminal convictions. A new sentencing trial has been pending since February 1995.

Jack Alfred Bennett, 68, was sentenced to death in Douglas County for killing his 55-year-old wife four days after they were married on June 24, 1989. As she lay sleeping, Mr. Bennett stabbed her more than 100 times and caved in the left side of her head with a claw hammer. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

Billy Sunday Birt, 60, and Bobby Gene Gaddis, 56, were sentenced to death in Jefferson County for the Dec. 22, 1973, torture and killing of Lois and Reed Oliver Fleming, ages 72 and 75. Three other men, including the man who arranged the robbery-killings, were granted immunity. A third man, Charles Reed, was sentenced to life in prison. Four years after Mr. Birt and Mr. Gaddis were sentenced to death for killing the white couple, their sentences were overturned by a state judge reviewing the fairness of their trials. Nothing has been done since and this year the Department of Corrections moved Mr. Birt and Mr. Gaddis off death row.

Joshua Daniel Bishop, 22, was sentenced to death in Baldwin County on Feb. 13, 1996, for the robbery and beating death of Leverett Lewis Morrison, 44, who refused to turn over his jeep keys. Mr. Bishop helped beat to death another man and that evidence was used against him in his capital murder trial. His first appeal is pending.

Roy Willard Blankenship, 41, was sentenced to death in April 1980 in Chatham County for beating, raping and killing Sara Bowen, 78, for whom he had done work in the past. Ms. Bowen actually died from a heart attack brought on by trauma including being bitten, scratched and stomped. Mr. Blankenship has been sentenced to death three times, the last time in June 1986, following the reversal of his sentence. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since March 1994.

Kenneth Dan Bright, 36, was sentenced to death in Muscogee County for the Oct. 30, 1989, robbery and murder of his grandparents, R.C. Mitchell, 74, and Fannie Monroe Mitchell, 69, less than eight months after being released from a mental hospital. Mr. Bright was a crack addict on parole at the time of the killings. His sentence was overturned by the state Supreme Court in March 1995. He's still awaiting retrial.

Ward Anthony Brockman, 25, was sentenced to death March 12, 1994. He and three others killed a service station attendant during an attempted robbery on June 27, 1990. Mr. Brockman, who was the triggerman, and his accomplices had pulled a number of armed robberies, and he was arrested after a chase in Phenix City, Ala. His first appeal to the state Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

James Willie Brown, 48, was sentenced to death in Gwinnett County in July 1981 after he had been hospitalized for nearly six years. Mr. Brown, who had a history of mental illness and convictions for an attempted rape and robbery, killed Brenda Sue Watson, 19, on May 12, 1975, after the two went out for dinner and dancing. A federal court reversed Mr. Brown's death sentence in 1988. He was sentenced to death a second time in February 1990.

Raymond Burgess, 38, was sentenced to death on Feb. 25, 1992, in Douglas County. During a robbery spree with co-defendant Norris Young. Mr. Burgess shot and killed Liston Chunn, 44, eight months after he was paroled from a life sentence for another robbery-killing. Mr. Burgess was also convicted in 1977 of armed robbery and sexual assault. Mr. Young was sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Burgess' state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since August 1995.

David Loomis Cargill, 38, was sentenced to death in Muscogee County in July 1985 for the robbery and murder of a couple with four children under age 10. Cheryl Williams, 29, and Danny Williams, 41, were at a service station when Mr. Cargill and his brother, Tommy, robbed it the night of Jan. 22, 1985. The couple was forced to lie on the floor where David Cargill shot both twice in the head. Tommy Cargill received a life sentence. David Cargill's federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial is pending.

Timothy Don Carr, 26, was sentenced to die in Monroe County in October 1992. He and his girlfriend were partying the night of Oct. 8, 1992, with Keith Patrick Young, 18, whom Mr. Carr stabbed numerous times, slit his throat and bashed his head with a baseball bat. Mr. Carr, who was on probation, and his girlfriend stole Mr. Young's car and $120. The girlfriend was sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years. Mr. Carr's first appeal to the state Supreme Court was denied in February. Mr. Carr's execution was set in August. Since Mr. Carr had no attorneys, a deadline to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court passed in May. The state Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's attempt to lift the stay of execution.

Roddy Elroy Childress, 49, was sentenced to death in May 1994 in Glynn County for the shooting deaths of his half-sister's husband, Patrick Kappus, 40, and her daughter, Emma Kappus, 15, on May 1, 1989. Mr. Childress' conviction and sentence were overturned in March 1996, however, because Mrs. Kappus violated the rules of sequestration during the trial by talking to other witnesses about testimony. Mr. Childress is awaiting a new trial.

Scott Lynn Christenson, 26, was sentenced to death in Harris County in March 1990 for the robbery and murder of Albert L. Oliver III, 31. Mr. Oliver gave Mr. Christenson a ride on July 6, 1989. His body, with five gunshot wounds, was found later that day. Mr. Christenson, then 18, had a juvenile record of burglaries and thefts and adult convictions for forgery, burglary and car thefts. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since October 1995.

Michael Anthony Cohen, 40, was sentenced to death in Glynn County in December 1986. Mr. Cohen, who had a history of burglary convictions, had been out of prison about a month when he started burglarizing homes again, stealing a handgun Oct. 13, 1985. The next day, Auzzie Douglas Sr., 55, a disabled man, was shot to death inside his home. His case has been sent back to Glynn County on the issue of mental retardation.

Robert Lewis Collier, 49, was convicted in Catoosa County in August 1978 for shooting to death a sheriff's investigator, Baxter Shavers, 24. Investigator Shavers was investigating a robbery call April 14, 1978, when shot. Investigator Shavers, the youngest chief deputy in state history at the time, was married with one son. Jeremy Shavers followed in his father's footsteps and now is a sheriff's deputy in Catoosa County. Mr. Collier's second federal appeal challenging the fairness of his conviction is pending in the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Roger Collins, 38, was sentenced to death in Houston County on Feb. 17, 1978, for the rape and murder of Deloris Luster, 17. On Aug. 6, 1977, he and a friend offered Ms. Luster a ride. The teen was raped, then Mr. Collins killed her with a car jack. William Durham was sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Collins' case was returned to the Houston County trial court in March 1991 on the issue of mental retardation.

Robert Dale Conklin, 36, was sentenced to death in June 1984 in Fulton County. Mr. Conklin was having an affair with attorney George Grant Crooks, 27, when the two got into an argument on March 28, 1984, and Mr. Conklin stabbed the other man in the ear with a screw driver. Mr. Conklin said he panicked afterward because he was on parole at the time. So he drained the blood from Mr. Crook's body and cut it up into nine pieces. Mr. Conklin's appeal is pending in federal court.

John Wayne Conner, 40, was sentenced to death in July 1982 in Telfair County. Six months before, Mr. Conner was drinking with his friend, James T. White, 29, when he became enraged and started beating Mr. White with his fist, a whiskey bottle and a stick. In the most recent appeal action, Mr. Conner's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was denied in December. That decision is being appealed to the state Supreme Court.

Eddie A. Crawford, 50, was sentenced to death in Spalding County in March 1984 for the kidnapping, rape and murder of his 29-month old niece, Leslie Michelle English, on Sept. 25, 1983. The toddler was strangled to death, bruised and raped. He told police he remembered the toddler had been in his car and remembered carrying her out of the car. He was sentenced to death twice. He was on probation when he killed the girl.

Samuel David Crowe, 36, was sentenced to death in Douglas County in November 1989. The former church deacon was convicted of the robbery and murder of his former boss, Joe Pala, 39. Mr. Pala was knocked to the floor of Wickes Lumber Co., shot, hit with a paint can and crowbar, and covered in paint the night of March 2, 1988. Mr. Crowe had no criminal record before the killing. His first appeal to the state Supreme Court was denied in June 1995, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected hearing the case on appeal in March 1996.

George Bernard Davis Jr., 39, was sentenced to death in Elbert County in February 1985. He was convicted of robbing and shooting to death Richard L. Rice, 63. The garage owner was found dead in his tow truck Feb. 13, 1984. His wallet had been stolen along with more than $800. Mr. Davis had argued with Mr. Rice over payments for car repairs. Davis, who had no major felony convictions before the killing, has been awaiting a trial court decision on the issue of mental retardation since April 1990.

Troy Anthony Davis, 28, was sentenced to death in Chatham County in September 1991 for killing an off-duty police officer, Mark Allen MacPhail, 27. Officer MacPhail was trying to break up a fight between Mr. Davis and another man when Mr. Davis shot him. He was wearing a bullet-proof vest, but as Mr. Davis stood over the officer and shot him again, the bullet pierced his side. Mr. Davis' state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since March 1994.

Andrew Grant DeYoung, 22, was sentenced to die in October 1995 in Cobb County. He and a friend, David Michael Haggerty, 28, stabbed to death his parents and little sister ­ Gary Wayne, 42, Kathryn, 41, and Sarah, 14, ­ on July 15, 1993. Mr. DeYoung had no prior criminal record. Mr. Haggerty was sentenced to life in prison in July 1996. An appeal hasn't been filed yet for Mr. DeYoung.

Wilbur Wiley Dobbs, 48, was sentenced to death in Walker County in May 1974 for the shotgun slaying of Roy L. Sizemore, 50. The grocery store owner was killed Dec. 14, 1973, when Mr. Dobbs and two others robbed the store. A salesman visiting the store was also shot but survived, as did a female customer who suffered a skull fracture after she was hit with a gun butt. Mr. Dobbs' co-defendants were sentenced to life in prison. In May, a federal judge ordered a new sentencing hearing for Mr. Dobbs, ruling his trial attorney was ineffective.

Leonard Maurice Drane, 37, was sentenced to death in Elbert County in September 1992 for killing Linda Renee Blackmon, 27, on June 13, 1990, while he was on probation for other crimes. The trial was moved from Spalding County to Elbert County. She had been raped and shot. Her throat was cut. Co-defendant David Robert Willis was sentenced to life in prison. Three years ago, the state Supreme Court sent Mr. Drane's case back to the trial court for a ruling on appeal issues.

Eric Lynn Ferrell, 34, was sentenced to death in September 1988 in DeKalb County for the robbery and murder of his 72-year-old grandmother and 15-year-old cousin. The bodies were found Dec. 30, 1987. Both had been shot twice in the head at close range. Mr. Ferrell was on probation at the time. At the time of his grandmother's and cousin's killings, two of his uncles had killed a man and police initially thought the double homicide was revenge for that homicide. When arrested, police found four spent .22-caliber casings in Mr. Ferrell's pockets, along with $600. The murder weapon was later found at his home. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial and sentence has been pending since July 1995.

Eddie William Finney Jr., 40, was sentenced to death in Jones County in November 1977 ­ about three months after the bodies of Thelma Kalish, 69, and Ann Kaplan, 60, were found in their home. On Sept. 22, 1977, the women were robbed, raped and beaten to death. Mr. Finney and Johnny Mack Westbrook, who had both done yard work for the women, were convicted and sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Mr. Westbrook's death sentence because the judge sent the jury back into the deliberation room when it first voted for life. Mr. Westbrook died of heart disease in prison in 1993. Mr. Finney's case was returned to the trial court in April 1991 for a decision on the issue of mental retardation.

Son Fleming, 66, was sentenced to death in January 1978 in Lanier County for the murder of Ray City Police Chief Ed Giddens, 29. The officer stopped a speeding car in February 1976, not knowing the men inside had just pulled an armed robbery. It was Chief Giddens' last day on the job ­ he had intended to move to Florida. Mr. Fleming's brother was sentenced to life in prison. Henry Willis III, 36, was sentenced to death, too, and he was executed May 18, 1989. Mr. Fleming was the test case for the 1988 mental retardation exception for the death penalty. He was returned to Lanier County in March 1991 for a new sentencing trial.

Melbert Ray Ford Jr., 36, was sentenced to death in Newton County in October 1986. Seven months before, Mr. Ford shot to death his former girlfriend, Martha Chapman Matich, 31, and her 11-year-old niece, Lisa Renee Chapman. Although prosecutors contended Mr. Ford killed the woman and child in revenge for a romantic breakup, Mr. Ford also robbed the store where Ms. Matich was working that night. His attorneys are currently appealing the denial of his first appeal challenging the fairness of his trial and sentence.

Timothy Tyrone Foster, 29, was sentenced to death in Floyd County in May 1987. Mr. Foster confessed that on the night of Aug. 27, 1986, he broke into the home of Queen Madge White, 79. Her jaw was broken, she had gashes on the top of her head and she had been sexually assaulted and strangled. Mr. Foster had a juvenile record including armed robbery. In July 1991, his case was sent back to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation.

Wallace Marvin Fugate III, 47, was sentenced to death in Putnam County in April 1992 for killing his estranged wife, Pattie Fugate, 40. On May 4, 1991, he broke into his wife's home and waited for her. When she came in, he grabbed Ms. Fugate and dragged her outside to his vehicle, pistol whipped her about 50 times and then shot her in the forehead. Their son, who witnessed the killing and testified against his father, was the victim of a homicide the next year. One of the men who beat his son to death is now on Death Row too. Mr. Fugate's attorney has appealed the denial of his first appeal, challenging the fairness of his trial and sentence in October 1996.

Kenneth E. Fults, 28, was sentenced to death in May in Spalding County for killing a neighbor, 19-year-old Cathy Bonds, after breaking into her home on Jan. 30, 1996. Mr. Fults smothered her with a pillow and then shot her before stealing her car. Mr. Fults had a history of mental illness but no prior felony convictions. A direct appeal hasn't been filed yet.

Carlton Gary, 46, was sentenced to death in Muscogee County in August 1986. Between Sept. 11, 1977, and April 19, 1978, eight elderly women in Columbus were raped and strangled in their homes. One survived. In 1984, a gun stolen in the same neighborhood as the killing spree was found in Michigan in the possession of Mr. Gary's cousin. Mr. Gary's fingerprints were then matched to some left in the homes of four of the homicide victims. He was convicted of murdering three women. Mr. Gary had been accused of the rape and murder of an 89-year-old New York woman in 1970 and an additional rape, but he blamed another man who was tried and acquitted. Mr. Gary's second state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial and sentence was denied in December 1995. On May 27, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an appeal on the same grounds.

Johnny Lee Gates, 41, was sentenced to death in Muscogee County in September 1977. On Nov. 30, 1976, Mr. Gates posed as a gas company employee to get into the home of 19-year-old Katharina Wright, whom he robbed, raped and then shot in the head. Mr. Gates was on parole at the time. He was arrested on unrelated charges Jan. 31, 1977, and confessed. Between Mrs. Wright's killing and his arrest, Mr. Gates also committed two other armed robberies and voluntary manslaughter. In 1992, Mr. Gates' case was sent back to Muscogee County for a new sentencing trial on the question of mental retardation.

Exzavious Lee Gibson, 25, was sentenced to death in Dodge County in June 1990. He was convicted of robbing and stabbing to death 46-year-old Douglas Coley at the Eastman convenience store where Mr. Coley was working Feb. 2, 1990. Mr. Gibson, who was covered in Mr. Coley's blood when arrested shortly after the robbery-slaying, was convicted four months later. This year, Augusta Judicial District Superior Court Judge J. Carlisle Overstreet denied Mr. Gibson's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial, although Mr. Gibson had no legal counsel.

Fred Marion Gilreath Jr., 59, was sentenced to death in Cobb County in March 1980 for the killing of his estranged wife and her father. On May 11, 1979, Linda Gilreath, 28, and Gerrit W. VanLeevwen, 57, were shot to death ­ she had been shot five times with a rifle, and then shot in the face at close range with a 12-gauge shotgun, he was shot with a rifle, shotgun and handgun. Mr. Gilreath's federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was denied in April 1996.

Daniel Greene, 30, was sentenced to death in December 1992 in Clayton County where the venue was changed from Taylor County. He committed a violent crime spree the night of Sept. 27, 1991, when he walked into a Reynolds convenience store and pulled a clerk into the back room, demanded money and stabbed her. He then stabbed customer Bernard Walker, 20, in the heart, killing him. A short time later, he forced his way into the home of an elderly couple he knew and stabbed both and stole their car. He then went to a convenience store in Warner Robins where he robbed and stabbed the clerk. In May, the state Supreme Court let the conviction and sentence stand.

Dennis Charles Hall, 41, was sentenced to death in August 1990 in Barrow County for the shotgun killing of his 10-year-old son, Adrian Hall. Police had been called to the Hall home numerous times before Jan. 7, 1990, when they found a drunken Hall and the dead child. His wife and two daughters told police Mr. Hall became enraged at Adrian for being noisy. The girls tried to hide Mr. Hall's gun, but he found it and shot the boy. He told a neighbor afterward, " I couldn't learn him nothing by beating him with a belt. So I guess I learned him something this time." His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

Willie James "Bo" Hall, 40, was sentenced to death in DeKalb County in February 1989 for killing his estranged wife, Thelma Hall, 23, who moved out of the family home just six days before her murder. On July 11, 1988, Ms. Hall made a frantic call to 911, and the dispatcher heard the sound of breaking glass and screams. Police arrived in minutes but, Mr. Hall had stabbed her 17 times. The day before, Mr. Hall told his sister-in-law that he would kill his wife and wouldn't get more than 10 years in prison for it. His state appeal was denied.

Emanuel Fitzgerald "Demon" Hammond, 30, was sentenced to die in Fulton County in March 1990 for the kidnapping, robbery, rape and murder of 27-year-old Julie Love. She was last seen by her boyfriend the night of July 11-12, 1988, when she left his apartment for home. A year later, in August 1989, Janice Weldon filed assault charges against Mr. Hammond after he tried to strangle her. Ms. Weldon told police that he and his cousin Maurice Porter killed Ms. Love. Mr. Porter confessed and took police to Ms. Love's remains near a trash pile. Ms. Love was kidnapped at gunpoint, Mr. Porter told police. Ms. Love was raped by Mr. Porter and beaten. Then the men tried to strangle her by wrapping a coat hanger around her neck and pulling the opposite ends. When that didn't work, Mr. Hammond shot her. Mr. Hammond had carjacked three other women ­ stabbing one and leaving her to die on a trash pile, and he also broke into a woman's home and raped her. As a juvenile, he raped, robbed and kidnapped a woman and slit her throat, and he raped and sodomized another. While awaiting trial, he bragged to a deputy that he also had raped Ms. Love. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was filed in December 1995.

George Russell Henry, 28, was sentenced to death in Cobb County in November 1994 for shooting to death a police officer. Officer Robert Ingram, a two-year police veteran, was shot in the face and behind his left ear while he was investigating a report of a suspicious person. Mr. Henry had previously been convicted of burglaries and forgery and was on probation at the time of the murder. His first appeal to the state Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Robert Karl Hicks, 40, was sentenced to death in January 1986 in Spalding County for the kidnapping, rape and murder of 28-year-old Toni Strickland Rivers. On July 13, 1985, Ms. Rivers was waiting for a friend at a public park when she disappeared. That night, two men driving down a country road heard a scream and saw a man making stabbing motions. Ms. Rivers bled to death. Mr. Hicks had previously been convicted of rape. At his trial, doctors testified yes and no that Mr. Hicks was mentally ill. The denial of his state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was upheld by the state Supreme Court in November 1995.

Jose Martinez High, 38, was sentenced to death in December 1978 in Tallaferro County for the kidnap and murder of 11-year-old Bonnie Bulloch who was kidnapped along with his father in July 1976. Judson Ruffin and Nathan Brown also were convicted and sentenced to death for Bonnie's murder, but their cases were reversed on appeal. They were resentenced to life in prison. A fourth man with the gang when Bonnie and his father were kidnapped and shot, Alphonso Morgan, was convicted and sentenced to die in Richmond County for another abduction and murder in the gang's crime spree. His sentence, however, also was overturned and he's now serving a life sentence. A second federal appeal challenging the fairness of Mr. High's trial is pending.

John W. Hightower, 53, was sentenced to death in Morgan County in May 1988 for killing his wife and two stepdaughters. Mr. Hightower's trial was moved from Baldwin County, where on July 12, 1987, the bodies of Dorothy Hightower, 42, Sandra Reaves, 22, and Evelyn Reaves, 19, were found at their home. Each had been shot. Mr. Hightower was arrested hours later in his wife's car, a bloody handgun inside. He bought the murder weapon the day before the slayings. A federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since November.

Floyd Ernest Hill, 60, was sentenced to death in July 1981 in Cobb County for shooting to death Austell Police Officer Gregory Mullinax. On Feb. 8, 1981, Officer Mullinax was sent to a trailer park on a domestic disturbance call. Officer Mullinax became the target of the battling couple when Mr. Hill got into the fray and shot the officer, and the officer shot and killed another person in the fight. Mr. Hill's death sentence was overturned on federal appeal in December.

Warren Lee Hill, 36, was sentenced to death in September 1991 in Lee County for beating to death fellow inmate Joseph Handspike, 34, with a nail-embedded board on Aug. 17, 1990. At the time, Mr. Hill was serving time for a 1985 murder. Mr. Hill's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since April 1994.

Travis Clinton Hittson, 26, was sentenced to death in Houston County in March 1993 for killing 20-year-old Conway U. Herbeck, a fellow sailor. On April 3, 1993, Mr. Hittson, Edward Vollmer and the victim left Pensacola, Fla., where they were stationed, and drove to Mr. Vollmer's parent's home in Warner Robins. Mr. Vollmer wanted to kill Mr. Herbeck and gave Mr. Hittson a baseball bat to use on April 5, 1992. Mr. Hittson hit the victim in the head several times with the bat and then shot him. They cut up Mr. Herbeck's body, buried the torso in Houston County and the rest in Pensacola. Mr. Vollmer was sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Hittson had never been convicted of a felony before the killing. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

Dallas Bernard Holiday, 34, was sentenced to death in November 1986 in Jefferson County for killing 66-year-old Leon Johnson Williams on March 11, 1986. Mr. Williams went on his usual early morning walk when Mr. Holiday attacked him, hitting him in the head at least seven times and shooting him. Mr. Holiday had broken into a home the night before and stolen the murder weapon. Mr. Holiday had prior felony convictions. His case was returned to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation in June 1990.

Robert Wayne Holsey, 31, was sentenced to death on Feb. 13, 1997, in Morgan County where his trial was moved. In December 1995, he shot to death Baldwin County Sheriff's Deputy Will Robinson, 26. The officer had stopped Mr. Holsey's vehicle after an armed robbery. At the time, Mr. Holsey had been out on parole less than a year following convictions for assault and armed robbery.

Tracy Lee Housel, 38, was sentenced to death in February 1986 in Gwinnett County for the rape and murder of 46-year-old Jean D. Drew. Ms. Drew was in the habit of stopping at a truck stop for a snack after her ballroom dancing lessons. On the night of April 7, 1985, she met Mr. Housel at the restaurant. Her body was found the next day, and he was arrested about a week later in Daytona Beach, Fla., after using her credit cards. He confessed to killing Ms. Drew, killing a man in Texas, and trying to kill two others in Illinois and Texas. He also confessed to murders in California and Tennessee. A decision is pending from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals on Mr. Housel's federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial.

Carl J. Isaacs, 43, was sentenced to death in Seminole County in 1974 and again in Houston County at a retrial in 1988. In May 1973 when he was 19 years old, he escaped from a Maryland prison and took off for Florida with his brother Billy, half brother Wayne Coleman and friend George Dungee. On May 14, 1973, they ran out of gas in Seminole County and stopped to burglarize a trailer. Within hours, they had shot to death Jerry Alday, Ned Alday, Jimmy Alday, Chester Alday and Aubrey Alday in addition to raping Mary Alday and then killing her. They were arrested in West Virginia with the murder weapons and items belonging to the Alday family. Billy Isaacs, 15 years old at the time of the killings, received a 40-year sentence. He was taken to Maryland in 1993 to serve a life sentence there for murder. At the 1988 retrial, Mr. Coleman and Mr. Dungee received life sentences.

Jonathen Jarrells, 40, was sentenced to death in March 1988 in Walker County for the robbery and murder of Gertie E. Elrod, a 77-year-old woman. On Aug. 24, 1987, Ms. Elrod and her sister, Lorraine Elrod, were attacked in their home by Mr. Jarrells. He stabbed both with scissors, tied their hands and feet and beat them with an iron. Lorriane survived the attack although she lost the sight in one eye and her hearing in one ear. When arrested in Hazard, Ky., he had items belonging to the Elrod sisters in his possession. In May 1991, Mr. Jarrell's case was sent back to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation.

Lawrence Joseph Jefferson, 42, was sentenced to death in March 1986 in Cobb County for the robbery and killing of his construction job supervisor Edward Taulbee, 37. On May 1, 1985, they went fishing at Lake Allatoona. Later, Mr. Jefferson arrived home in the victim's vehicle and told a neighbor, "My fat little buddy is dead." Mr. Taulbee's body was found the next day; he had been beaten with a stick and then his skull was crushed with a 40-pound tree trunk. In 1979, Mr. Jefferson had pleaded guilty in Louisville to armed robbery and burglary. His first appeal to the state Supreme Court and next state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial have been denied.

Larry L. Jenkins Jr., 21, was sentenced to death in Wayne County for the robbery and killing of the owner of a laundry and her 15-year-old son. Mr. Jenkins accosted Terry Ralston, 37, and her son Michael on Jan. 8, 1993. He kidnapped the mother and son and shot them both to death in a rural area. Although sentenced to death in September 1995, his first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Ashley Lyndol Jones, 23, was sentenced to death in June 1995 in Coffee County. On March 31, 1993, in Ware County, Mr. Jones and co-defendant Allen Brunner were drinking and driving in a stolen vehicle when it developed car trouble. Mr. Jones knocked on the door at Carlton Keith Holland's home and asked for help. As Mr. Holland, 39, leaned over the engine and his wife watched through the window, Mr. Jones slammed a wrench and later a sledgehammer on Mr. Holland's head. Mr. Brunner was sentenced to life without parole. In March, the state Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Jones' conviction and death sentence.

Brandon Aston Jones, 54, was sentenced to death in October 1979 in Cobb County. On June 17, 1979, he and Van Roosevelt Solomon were arrested at a service station after an officer who just happened to drive up heard gunshots. In the storeroom, the officer found 29-year-old Roger Tackett, the station manager, who had been shot in the legs and arms and beaten before the fatal contact shot was fired behind his left ear. Mr. Solomon also was sentenced to death and he was executed on Feb. 20, 1985. In 1989, a U.S. District Court judge reversed Mr. Jones' sentence, ruling it was unfairly imposed considering the prosecutor's Bible quoting. Mr. Jones is still awaiting a new sentencing trial. In September 1996, the Department of Corrections transferred him off death row and into the general prison population.

Ronald Leroy Kinsman, 39, was sentenced to death April 18, 1987, in Muscogee County for the robbery and murder of a Hardee's manager. Bruce Keeter, 29, was found shot to death the morning of Sept. 14, 1984. About $400 was stolen from the restaurant safe, and Mr. Keeter's car was later found abandoned. Two years later, a friend of Mr. Kinsman's told police Mr. Kinsman had admitted to the murder. In 1976, Mr. Kinsman had been convicted of another robbery-murder and was paroled not long before Mr. Keeter was murdered. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

J.W. Ledford Jr., 25, was sentenced to death in Murry County ­ with a jury selected from Gordon County ­ in November 1992 for the murder of a neighbor he had known all his life, Dr. Harry Johnston Jr., 73. On Jan. 31, 1992, Mr. Ledford went to the Johnston home and asked his wife, Antoinette, to speak to Mr. Johnston. He forced his way into the home at knife point, demanding money and guns. Mr. Johnston's body was found later, his head nearly cut off and a knife in his back. Mr. Ledford's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

James Allyson Lee, 22, was sentenced to death in June by a Charlton County Superior Court jury. On Nov. 17, 1996, he shot his 43-year-old stepmother, Sharon Varnadore Chancey, to death. Although Mr. Lee pleaded with the jury to spare him because he wasn't the same man who committed murder, when first questioned by police, Mr. Lee said killing was so easy it would be easy to do again.

Larry Lee, 36, was sentenced to death in November 1987 in Wayne County for the robbery and killing of a couple and their 14-year-old son. Clifford and Nina Murray Jones Sr., both 48, and Clifford Jones Jr. were killed April 26, 1988 ­ all had been shot, stabbed and beaten. Mr. Lee's brother Bruce Lee was reportedly also involved in the triple homicide, but he died while committing a burglary two months after the Jones family killings. Mr. Lee's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was denied, but the judge was ordered to reconsider it in June 1995 because of new case law.

William Anthony Lipham, 33, was sentenced to death in Coweta County in February 1987 for the rape, robbery, burglary and murder of a 79-year-old woman, Kate Furlow. Mr. Lipham was seen in Ms. Furlow's home on Dec. 4, 1985. The next day, her nude body was found at home with a .25-caliber bullet wound in her head. Mr. Lipham confessed but said he had sex with the elderly woman after she was dead. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since 1989.

William Earl Lynd, 42, was sentenced to death in February 1990 for killing his girlfriend three days before Christmas 1988. Mr. Lynd was living with 27-year-old Virginia "Ginger" Moore when they got into an argument and he shot her in the face and went outside. Ms. Moore followed him outside where he shot her again and put her in the trunk of his car. When he heard noise from the trunk, he stopped the car and shot her a third time. After burying her body, Mr. Lynd drove to Ohio where he shot and killed another woman. He returned to Georgia and surrendered to police on New Year's Eve. Mr. Lynd had numerous convictions for prior assaults on women. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

James Mathis, 51, was sentenced to death in Douglas County in May 1991 for killing J.L. Washington and his wife Ruby Washington, both 69. On Thanksgiving Day 1980, Mr. Mathis was seen in the back seat of the Washington's vehicle as they drove through their apartment complex. Their bodies were found in a wooded area. Both had been beaten, stabbed and shot. In 1989, a U.S. District judge reversed Mr. Mathis' death sentence because of ineffective counsel, but in 1992 the 11th Circuit sent the case back to the federal judge to explain the ruling.

Mark Howard McClain, 30, was sentenced to death in Richmond County in September 1995 for the robbery and murder of a Domino's Pizza store manager. In November 1994, Mr. McClain, who had previously been convicted of armed robbery, forced his way into the closed Domino's store and robbed Kevin Brown, 28. As Mr. McClain turned to leave he shot and killed Mr. Brown, an eyewitness testified. The witness got the license tag number off the getaway car and police traced the vehicle to Mr. McClain's girlfriend. Earlier this year, the state Supreme Court affirmed Mr. McClain's conviction and sentence, and in June, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal of that decision.

James R. McDaniel, 23, was sentenced to death in June by a Butts County Superior Court jury. He was convicted of murdering his grandparents ­ Erner and Eugene Barkley, ages 70 and 75, and his 10-year-old stepbrother, Justin Davis. Family members of the victims, also Mr. McDaniel's family, opposed the death penalty for the young man with a history of commitments to mental hospitals and crack addition. Police said Mr. McDaniel robbed his grandfather to buy crack.

Kim Anthony McMichen, 39, was sentenced to death in Douglas County in July 1993 for the shooting deaths of his estranged wife and her boyfriend. On Nov. 16, 1990, he shot Luan McMichen, 27, and Jeff Robinson, 27, and then walked his 8-year-old daughter past the bodies. Ms. McMichen's friends told police he had harassed her since she left him in January 1990 and that he had raped her. Mr. McMichen had no prior criminal convictions. His first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court hasn't been filed.

Jimmy Fletcher Meders, 36, was sentenced to death in April 1989 in Glynn County for the robbery and murder of a convenience store clerk. Don Anderson, 47, was shot twice as he lay on the floor after being robbed of $38 the night of Oct. 14, 1987. Police say two men with Mr. Meders weren't involved in the killing and they weren't prosecuted. Mr. Meders' current attorneys claims just the opposite ­ that the other two men did the robbery and killing while a drunken Mr. Meders was in the back of the store. All three men had prior felony convictions. Mr. Meders state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since April 1993.

Michael Miller, 34, was sentenced to death in November 1988 in Walton County for the robbery and killing of 35-year-old Larry Judson Sneed. On Oct. 29, 1987, Mr. Sneed was driving along a Walton County road when shots were fired at his vehicle and he was forced off the road. Mr. Sneed got out and ran but he was shot in the back and bled to death. Two days before, Mr. Miller and another man had kidnapped a man during a burglary. In January 1995 his case was sent back to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation.

Terry Mincey, 37, was sentenced to death in August 1982 in Bibb County for the robbery and killing of a store clerk, the mother of two small children. On April 12, 1982, Paulette Riggs was working at a convenience store when Mr. Mincey and two others decided to rob it. After making Ms. Riggs hand over the money, he walked her outside where Russell Peterman was pumping gas into his car. Mr. Mincey shot Mr. Peterman in the chest and when he fell, Mr. Mincey shot him again in the face. Ms. Riggs tried to run away, but Mr. Mincey shot her and after she fell, he shot her in the face. Mr. Peterman survived but lost 40 percent of his vision in one eye and lives with a bullet lodged near his spine. Mr. Mincey, a preacher's son, had at least three prior armed robbed convictions in 1977. His two co-defendants in the 1989 killing received life sentences. In September 1996, his federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was filed.

Nelson Earl Mitchell, 34, was sentenced to death in January 1990 in Early County for killing Iron City Police Chief Robert Cunningham, 51, during a routine traffic stop. Mr. Mitchell, who had prior convictions for larceny and theft, testified that the white police chief used racial slurs and the gun went off during a struggle. One issue the defense may raise on appeal is an allegation that the jury foreman's husband was sitting in the courtroom and allegedly signaled his wife to vote for death by drawing his finger across his throat. Although it's been more than seven years since his conviction, the first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court hasn't been filed.

William Mark Mize, 40, was sentenced to death in Oconee County in December 1995 after demanding the jury sentence him to death. The Klansman ordered the killing of William Eddie Tucker, 34, because he was angry Mr. Tucker had messed up an arson job on a crack house in October 1994. Mr. Mize had prior convictions for escape, theft, arson, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Co-defendants Christopher Hattrup and Mark Allen received life sentences.

Stephen Anthony Mobley, 31, was sentenced to death in Hall County in February 1994. During a Feb. 17, 1991, robbery of a Domino's store, he shot and killed 24-year-old John Copeland Collins. Mr. Mobley had been convicted of burglary and forgery, but he didn't get into violent crimes until 1991 when he began a robbery spree that ended in Mr. Collins' death. While awaiting trial, Mr. Mobley raped his cellmate and had Domino's tattooed on his chest. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since March 1996.

Larry Eugene Moon, 52, was sentenced to death in Catoosa County in January 1988 for killing 34-year-old Ricky Callahan who had driven to a convenience store to buy his wife some aspirin on Nov. 24, 1984. At the time Mr. Callahan was murdered, Mr. Moon was hiding out in Georgia after committing a Tennessee murder. After killing Mr. Callahan, Mr. Moon drove back to Chattanooga and on Dec. 1, 1984, he robbed an adult book store and kidnapped a female impersonator whom he raped. The next day, he killed another man in Gatlinburg, Tenn., and shot at a woman; then on Dec. 7, 1984 he robbed a Chattanooga convenience store. He was arrested Dec. 14, 1984 in Oneida, Tenn., in another stolen car containing a number of guns, including Mr. Callahan's murder weapon. Mr. Moon's prior record included seven burglaries, three aggravated assaults and escape. Mr. Moon's federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was filed in April 1996.

Carzell Moore, 45, was sentenced to death in January 1977 in Monroe County for the Dec. 12, 1976 rape, robbery and murder of 18-year-old Teresa Carol Allen, an honors college student. Mr. Moore met up with Roosevelt Greene the day before the killing. Mr. Greene had just escaped from prison. On Feb. 12, 1976, they robbed the store where Ms. Allen worked, taking her, $466 and her vehicle. Both men raped Ms. Allen and Mr. Moore shot her. Mr. Green was arrested in South Carolina driving Ms. Allen's car. He was sentenced to death and executed Jan. 9, 1985, at the age of 28. Mr. Moore's sentence was overturned once but he was resentenced to death. It was overturned a third time, and a new sentencing trial has been pending since August 1992. Mr. Moore, who has a Web site, was transferred to the general prison population last September.

Ernest Ulysses Morrison, 36, was sentenced to death in November 1987 by Richmond County Superior Court Judge Albert Pickett. Mr. Morrison pleaded guilty to the rape, robbery and murder of a family acquaintance, Mary Edna Griffin, 54, on Jan. 9, 1987. Mr. Morrison asked Judge Pickett to sentence him to death. At the time he killed Mrs. Griffin, he was an escapee from the Aiken jail where he was awaiting trial for rape and robbery. A new sentencing trial to include the issue of mental retardation has been pending in Richmond County Superior Court since June 1993.

Robert L. Newland, 54, was sentenced to death in August 1987 in Glynn County for killing Carol Beatty, a 27-year-old woman who lived across the street from Mr. Newland and his roommate. Mr. Newland used a pocket knife to cut Ms. Beatty, slashing her throat deep enough to cut her vocal cords and her stomach enough for her intestines to show. Ms. Beatty lived for 22 hours after the attack and with an investigator's help she was able to spell out the name of her attacker. Mr. Newland had previously been convicted of a similar assault, but that conviction was reversed on appeal. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since January 1991.

Curtis Osborne, 27, was sentenced to death in Spalding County in August 1991 for shooting to death two acquaintances ­ Linda Lisa Seaborne, 28, and Arthur Lee Jones, also 28. Mr. Osborne confessed that on Aug. 6, 1990, he shot both people as they sat in a car parked alongside a dirt road. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial and sentence has been pending since June 1994.

Lyndon Fitzgerald Pace, 32, was sentenced to death in March 1996 in Fulton County. Mr. Pace committed a series of rapes and murders, mainly preying on elderly women from August 1988 through February 1989. He was convicted of killing women ages 78, 86, 79, 78 and 42. He was also convicted of several burglaries during that time period His first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Bryan Ashley Parker, 36, was sentenced to death in Douglas County in November 1984 for the sexual assault and murder of an 11-year-old girl June 1, 1984. When Christie Anne Griffith disappeared from her trailer park home, Mr. Parker was among the people police questioned. They later learned he had been convicted in Florida of a child molesting charge. Mr. Parker choked and tried to rape the girl while he left his 2-year-old son sitting a car parked nearby. His federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was filed in December.

David Aaron Perkins, 36, was sentenced to death in June in Clayton County for the Aug. 13, 1995, slaying of Herbert Ryals III, a 38-year-old man who lived in the same apartment complex. Prosecutors believe Mr. Perkins, who had a long history of criminal convictions for violence and theft, lured Mr. Ryals to his home to rob him. Mr. Ryals' body was found in the bathroom where he had fledtrying to defend himself from more than 11 stab wounds. During his trial when a Virginia police officer testified how Mr. Perkins had thrown a fellow officer through a window, Mr. Perkins taunted the courtroom by making boxing gestures.

Jack H. Potts, 52, was sentenced to death in March 1976 in two counties ­ Forsyth and Cobb counties for the kidnapping and murder of a 24-year-old good Samaritan, Michael Priest. Mr. Priest agreed to help Mr. Potts, who told him there had been an accident May 8, 1975. His co-defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for a 10-year sentence. Mr. Potts escaped from the Forsyth County Jail in September 1987 and was shot twice by officers. Mr. Potts' conviction was overturned in May 1984, but he was resentenced to death in 1988 and again 1990.

Virgil Delano Presnell Jr., 43, was sentenced to death in October 1976 in Cobb County. Five months earlier, on May 4, 1976, he kidnapped two school girls . Mr. Presnell lay in wait for the 10- and 8-year-old girls, he confessed. He raped and sodomized the older girl and when 8-year-old Lori Ann Smith tried to run away, he drowned her in a stream. His sentence was overturned in 1992 by a federal appeals court. Mr. Presnell is still awaiting a new sentencing trial.

Mark Anthony Pruitt, 32, was sentenced to death in September 1987 in Pulaski County for the Montgomery County killing of 5-year-old Charise Walker. The girl was found raped, sodomized and beaten Nov. 15, 1986, when she disappeared from home. Charise, who's skull was fractured and leg broken, died a short time later. Mr. Pruitt was seen coming out of the woods where Charise was found. He wasn't wearing any pants and had blood on him. Mr. Pruitt has been awaiting a new sentencing trial on the issue of mental retardation since September 1994.

Timothy Pruitt, 25, was sentenced to death in Lumpkin County in October 1996 for the stabbing and strangulation killing of a 10-year-old neighbor girl. Wendy Nicole Vincent was killed in her own home. Mr. Pruitt's first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court has not been filed yet.

William Howard Putman, 54, was sentenced to death in September 1982 in Cook County. Mr. Putnam, who had no prior felony record, attacked and robbed people at a truck stop the night of July 10, 1980, killing William Gerald Hodges, 49, David N. Hardin, 22, and Katie Christine Back, 28. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was denied, as was his appeal of that to the state Supreme Court in September 1995.

Willie James Pye, 29, was sentenced to death in Spalding County in July 1996. He was convicted of the November 1993 rape, sodomy and shooting death of a 21-year-old woman in a supposed drug deal gone bad. His co-defendant was sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Pye still claims he's innocent and a motion for a new trial is pending.

Billy Daniel Raulerson Jr., 27, was sentenced to death in March 1996 in Chatham County for a Memorial Day 1993 killing spree. Mr. Raulerson killed 18-year-old Charlye Dixon and her fiance, 19-year-old Jason Hampton, raping Ms. Dixon after her murder. Mr. Raulerson then broke into the home of Teresa Gail Taylor, 40, and killed her. His first possible appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court has not been filed yet.

James Randall Rogers, 36, was sentenced to death in May 1982 in Floyd County for the torture and killing of a 75-year-old woman. On May 21, 1980, Grace Perry died when a rake handle was forced up her vagina so hard it punctured a lung, causing massive hemorrhaging. At the time of the killing, Mr. Rogers was on parole for burglary. Mr. Rogers' case has been pending in the trial court since 1994 on the issue of mental retardation.

Larry Romine, 45, was sentenced to die in April 1982 in Pickens County for the shotgun slayings of his parents, Roy Lee, 48, and Aville R. Romine, 50. Police say robbery was the motive for the March 19, 1991, double homicide. Mr. Romine's death sentence was reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in June 1983, but he was resentenced to death again in August 1985. His federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial was filed in 1996.

William C. Sallie, 31, was sentenced to death in March 1991 in Bacon County for killing his 41-year-old ex-father-in-law. In a violent rampage against his ex-wife and her family on March 31, 1990, Mr. Sallie shot to death John Lee Moore and wounded Mr. Moore's wife. He then kidnapped his ex-wife and her sister and took them to Liberty County where he repeatedly raped both women. His first possible appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court has not been filed yet.

Demarcus Ali Sears, 25, was sentenced to death in September 1993 in Cobb County. He and Phillip Williams kidnapped Gloria Ann Wilbur, 59, on Oct. 7, 1990, and then robbed, raped, stabbed and beat her with brass knuckles over a four-hour period. Mr. Williams was sentenced to two life sentences in May 1991. Mr. Sears first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court has not been filed yet.

David Phillip Smith, 20, was sentenced to death Jan. 24 in Clayton County. He was convicted of the shotgun slaying of 16-year-old Jeremy Javies, a friend and neighbor. Mr. Smith methodically shot Jeremy in the arms and legs before putting the barrel of a sawed-off shotgun in the teen-ager's mouth and firing a final time. The first appeal to the state Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Norris Speed, 26, was sentenced to death in October 1993 in Fulton County for killing a police officer, 32-year-old Niles Johantgen, known on his beat as "Russian." Prosecutors contended Mr. Speed was angry with Officer Johantgen who had arrested a man selling drugs from Mr. Speed's home, and for stopping and patting down three friends on Dec. 12, 1991. Witnesses said Mr. Speed walked up behind Officer Johantgen and shot him in the head. Mr. Speed had prior felony convictions. His first possible appeal to the state Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Ronald Keith Spivey, 57, was sentenced to death in August 1977 in Muscogee County for shooting to death Columbus Police Officer Billy Watson, 41. The officer was off-duty on Dec. 28, 1976, when Mr. Spivey was in the process of robbing a lounge. Officer Watson, a six-year veteran officer, was married with three children. A federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since November 1995.

William Kenny Stephens, 49, was sentenced to death in Richmond County in February 1980 and again in November 1989. The second jury heard evidence of Mr. Stephens' schizophrenia and mental retardation but found death was the appropriate punishment for the shooting death of Investigator Larry D. Stevens, 38. The state Supreme Court sent Mr. Stephens' case back to Richmond County Superior Court for an answer to a question nearly seven years ago. The case has been pending every since.

Alphonso Stripling, 39, was sentenced to death in July 1989 in Douglas County. Mr. Stripling, who served time for armed robberies in 1973, 1979 and 1980, was convicted of shooting four co-workers on Oct. 15, 1988, when he decided to rob the fast food restaurant. Two of the employees ­ 19-year-old Anthony Evans and 34-year-old Gregory Bass ­ died from gunshot wounds. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since June 1995.

Keith Bryan Taylor, 43, was sentenced to death in October 1990 in Pierce County for killing his 29-year-old estranged wife the day he received a court order to stay away from her. When an officer went to check on Lorrie Taylor on Jan. 12, 1989, Mr. Taylor answered the door dripping blood. The jury rejected an insanity defense by Mr. Taylor, who had been hospitalized for paranoid schizophrenic in 1987 and 1988. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

Bryan Keith Terrell, 29, was sentenced to death in January 1995 in Newton County for the robbery and murder of 70-year-old John Henry Watson. Mr. Terrell had been released on parole about two months before Mr. Watson's June 22, 1992, murder. Mr. Terrell had forged about $8,000 in checks on Mr. Watson's bank account before the killing. Mr. Watson was beaten in the head and shot four times. Mr. Terrell's first possible appeal to the state Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Keith Leroy Tharpe, 39, was sentenced to death in January 1991 in Jones County for the shotgun slaying of his 29-year-old sister-in-law, Jacqueline Freeman. On Sept. 25, 1990, Mr. Tharpe, who had repeatedly threatened and harassed his estranged wife and her family, used his vehicle to force his wife's car off the road. After shooting Ms. Freeman twice, he kidnapped and raped his estranged wife. Mr. Tharpe's only prior arrests were for driving violations. The state Supreme Court ordered the trial court to reconsider Mr. Tharpe's sentence, and that has been pending since February 1993.

Gary Chad Thomason, 21, was sentenced to death in Floyd County in October 1996. Mr. Thomason was convicted of killing 34-year-old Jerry Self, who was shot in his truck in his own driveway when he interrupted a burglary. Mr. Thomason's defense attorney had him plead guilty and waive a jury trial, leaving a judge to determine his punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in July.

Ronnie Thornton, 32, was sentenced to death in November 1992 in Douglas County for the beating death of his girlfriend's 2-year-old daughter, Artealia Lavant, on May 7, 1991. Doctors determined Artealia and her siblings had been repeatedly abused. The state Supreme Court reversed Mr. Thornton's convictions in May 1994 because the prosecutor used videotaped testimony instead of calling the children to testify. A retrial hasn't been held yet and Mr. Thornton was transferred off death row in September. Artealia's mother, Shirley Lavant, pleaded guilty to cruelty to children and received a four-year sentence.

William Lamar Todd, 40, was sentenced to death in May 1989 in Harris County. On July 12, 1988, a co-worker found the body of Randy Churchwell, 33, at his home. Mr. Churchwell had been hit at least 12 times with a hammer. Mr. Todd later told police that he and his girlfriend stole Mr. Churchwell's wallet and car and headed to Texas where they were arrested two weeks later. Mr. Todd's only prior conviction was for simple possession of marijuana in Florida. A state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since December 1995.

Johnny Lamar Wade, 41, was sentenced to death in March 1987 in Newton County for the strangulation killing of 13-year-old Lance Barnes. The boy disappeared Aug. 8, 1986, after riding his bike to the store. Lance was seen leaving the store with Mr. Wade, his bike in the back of Mr. Wade's pickup truck. Lance's body was found the next day in the woods, his bike nearby. He had been beaten on the head and strangled. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Mr. Wade's death sentence, but he was resentenced to death by another jury in April 1989. His state appeal challenging the fairness of his second trial has been pending since January 1994.

Tommy Lee Waldrip, 51, was sentenced to death in October 1994 in Dawson County for killing an eyewitness to a robbery that his son committed. Keith Evans, 23, was beaten and shot to death on April 13, 1991. Mr. Waldrip's son John Mark Waldrip and friend Howard Kelly Livingston were both sentenced to life in prison. In March the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Waldrip's conviction and sentence. In July, the state Supreme Court overturned Mr. Livingston's conviction.

Jamie Ray Ward, 41, was sentenced to death in July 1991 in Walker County for killing a 23-year-old woman who was five months pregnant. Investigators believe Mr. Ward was a serial rapist whose crimes escalated to murder on Aug. 17, 1989, when he abducted Nikia Gilbreath from her home. Mr. Ward was arrested months later after he kidnapped and raped a woman in another county and police found items belong to Mrs. Gilbreath at his home. Mr. Ward's state appeal challenging the fairness of his trial has been pending since April 1993.

Eurus Kelly Waters, 52, was sentenced to death in January 1981 in Glynn County for killing a teen-age girl and a woman. On April 25, 1980, emergency workers found 35-year-old Kathryn Ann Culpepper bleeding from a chest wound. She described Mr. Waters and his car and told police that she and her friend, 16-year-old Anita Lynette Paseur, were fishing when accosted. Anita's body was found that night on a back road, and Ms. Culpepper died five days later. Mr. Waters, a Waycross cab driver, had been treated for mental illness since 1978. His case was sent back to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation in December 1995.

Marcus Wellons, 41, was sentenced to death June 1993 in Cobb County. In December, Mr. Wellons came within three hours of execution because an attorney who had just volunteered to file an appeal petition was denied time to study the case. A U.S. District judge stayed the execution. Mr. Wellons was convicted of the rape and murder of 15-year-old India Roberts who lived in the same apartment building as Mr. Wellons' girlfriend on the morning of Aug. 31, 1989.

Frederick R. Whatley, 23, was sentenced to die in Spalding County this year for the Nov. 3, 1993, robbery and beating death of a McDonald's restaurant employee. The 18-year-old victim, Mark Fugate, was a key witness against his own father, Wallace Marvin Fugate III, who killed his mother and is now on death row in Georgia. Mr. Whatley's co-defendant Jeffery Cross hasn't been tried yet. Mr. Whatley's first appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court hasn't been filed yet.

Alexander E. Williams, 29, was sentenced to death in Richmond County in August 1986 for the kidnapping, robbery, rape and murder of 16-year-old Aleta Carol Bunch. She disappeared March 4, 1986. Her body was found 11 days later after Mr. Williams' then attorney told police where to look. Mr. Williams had prior convictions for theft and entering an automobile. In August, U.S. District Judge Dudley H. Bowen Jr. denied Mr. Williams' federal appeal challenging the fairness of his trial.

Willie James Wilson Jr., 40, was sentenced to death in February 1982 in Pierce County for the shooting deaths of two men during an armed robbery. Alfred Boatwright, 64, and Morris Highsmith, 58, were shot to death June 22, 1981 at Mr. Boatright's handyman store. At the time, Mr. Wilson was a soldier who was AWOL from Fort Stewart. In March 1991, Mr. Wilson's case was sent back to the trial court on the issue of mental retardation.

Wikipedia: Georgia Executions

Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. 2001). (Direct Appeal)

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Jones County, Hugh V. Wingfield, III, J., of three counts of malice murder, two counts of burglary, and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury and a sentence of death was imposed. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Hines, J., held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury and finding that aggravating circumstances existed as to each murder; (2) trial court was not required to excuse two prospective jurors who were challenged for cause based on their death penalty views; (3) defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the voluntary manslaughter; (4) testimony regarding defendant's confessions to crimes made when he was a juvenile were admissible during sentencing phase; and (5) evidence supported imposition of a death sentence for three counts of malice murder. Affirmed. Carley, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sears, and Hunstein, JJ., concur in judgment.

HINES, Justice. A jury found Brandon Joseph Rhode guilty of three counts of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of burglary, and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury.FN1 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Bryan Moss was committed while Rhode was engaged in the murder of Kristin Moss, was committed while Rhode was engaged in a burglary, was committed while Rhode was engaged in a kidnapping with bodily injury, and was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2) and (7). The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Kristin Moss was committed while Rhode was engaged in the murder of Steven Moss and while Rhode was engaged in a burglary. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2). The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Steven Moss was committed while Rhode was engaged in the murder of Bryan Moss and while Rhode was engaged in a burglary. Id. The jury fixed the sentence for each murder at death. For the reasons set forth below, this Court affirms Rhode's convictions and sentences. FN1. The crimes were committed April 23, 1998. Rhode was indicted June 30, 1998, by a Jones County grand jury for three counts of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of burglary, and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury. The State filed written notice of its intent to seek the death penalty December 18, 1998. Rhode's trial began February 14, 2000, and the jury found him guilty on all counts on February 25, 2000. The felony murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-72(4), 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993); OCGA § 16-1-7(a)(1). The jury fixed the sentences for the murders at death February 27, 2000. In orders filed February 27, 2000, the trial court imposed a death sentence for each murder and consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the kidnapping with bodily injury and twenty years for each of the two burglaries. Rhode filed a motion for new trial March 3, 2000, which was denied by an order filed December 22, 2000. He filed a notice of appeal December 27, 2000, and his appeal was docketed in this Court February 7, 2001. The appeal was orally argued June 11, 2001. 1. The evidence presented at trial suggested the following account of the crimes. Rhode and his co-perpetrator, Daniel Lucas, burglarized the home of Steven and Gerri Ann Moss on April 23, 1998, fled the scene when Rhode discovered an alarm system, and returned later that day to burglarize the home again. While Rhode and Lucas were ransacking the home searching for valuables, eleven-year-old Bryan Moss arrived, observed Rhode and Lucas through a front window, and entered through a back door, armed with a baseball bat. Rhode and Lucas subdued Bryan at gunpoint, sat him in a chair, and began discussing what to do with him. Lucas turned and fired at the boy, inflicting a non-fatal shoulder wound. As Kristin Moss was approaching the house, Lucas took Bryan into a back bedroom. **859 *378 Rhode met Kristin as she arrived, sat her in a chair, and shot her twice with a .357 caliber pistol. Lucas repeatedly shot Bryan with a .25 caliber pistol. Rhode later shot Steven Moss with the .357 caliber pistol when Steven arrived. Finally, Lucas obtained a .22 caliber pistol from Rhode's automobile and shot Bryan and Kristin again. Chad Derrick Jackson, Rhode's roommate, testified that he observed Rhode and Lucas handing rifles and other items out of Jackson and Rhode's bedroom window and loading them into Rhode's automobile on the evening of the crimes. Jackson further testified that Rhode and Lucas admitted to him the next day that Lucas first shot Bryan in the shoulder, that Lucas then shot Bryan while Rhode simultaneously shot Kristin, that Rhode next shot Steven Moss, and that lastly Lucas shot each victim to ensure their deaths. Danny Ray Bell, who also lived in the same house as Rhode, testified that Rhode and Lucas spoke to him between the two burglaries and that Bell advised Rhode not to return to burglarize the same home. Bell testified that, at the time of this conversation, Rhode had a .357 caliber pistol in his waistband. According to Bell, when Rhode returned from the second burglary, Rhode said that he had “messed up big time” and needed to dispose of some weapons and other items. Rhode admitted to Bell that Lucas shot a young boy and that Rhode shot a girl and a man. Several witnesses testified that they saw an automobile similar to Rhode's at or near the victims' home on the day of the murders. A search of Rhode's automobile revealed damage to the front and rear bumpers and a spare tire in the trunk that showed signs of use. A photograph of the crime scene suggested a vehicle had backed into a gas tank at the victims' home. Expert testimony disclosed that paint on a cement block at the victims' home matched the paint on Rhode's automobile, including two layers applied at the factory and a third layer likely applied later. Additional expert testimony indicated that a crime scene imprint could have been made by Rhode's spare tire. Rhode made a statement admitting he fired two times at Kristin with the .357 caliber pistol, and he led law enforcement officers to two locations where he and Lucas had secreted weapons and other items. Expert testimony matched the found .357 and .25 caliber pistols to bullets retrieved from the crime scene and the victims' bodies. [1] Viewing the evidence produced at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, this Court finds that it was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rhode was guilty of all charges brought against him and that statutory aggravating circumstances existed as to each of the murders. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Sands v. State, 262 Ga. 367, 368(2), 418 S.E.2d 55 (1992); OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2) and (7). *379 Jury Selection [2] 2. The trial court did not err by allowing a Harris County jury commissioner, who testified that she participated in revising the electronically-generated jury list, to certify the jury list nunc pro tunc. Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 551, 565(3) (1886); see also Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 197(1)(c), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986) (“[W]e ‘do not find here such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the arrays.’ ”) (quoting Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 147(1), 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980)), overruled on other grounds by Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999). [3] 3. The process of qualifying jurors as to their views on the death penalty is not unconstitutional. DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 790(11), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997). [4] 4. Upon a review of the voir dire of prospective jurors in this case, particularly the portions highlighted by Rhode in this appeal, this Court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting voir dire and that a thorough examination of each prospective juror, particularly of each prospective juror's death penalty views, was permitted. See Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 351-352(10), 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998). The trial court properly sustained objections and gave cautionary directions to counsel when counsel's**860 questions called for a prejudgment of the case or failed to set forth the entire context within which jurors would consider a death sentence, including any mitigating evidence presented and the charge of the trial court, and the voir dire permitted after each sustained objection or cautionary direction was more than adequate. See Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 572(13)(a), 449 S.E.2d 98 (1994). [5] [6] 5. Rhode contends that the trial court erred by not excusing fourteen specific prospective jurors based upon their death penalty views. The trial court did not err by failing to excuse sua sponte twelve contested prospective jurors who were not challenged for cause based upon their death penalty views. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 249(7), 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987). Furthermore, one of the twelve prospective jurors was actually excused for reasons unrelated to his death penalty views. This Court finds, as to the two contested prospective jurors who were challenged for cause, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jurors' views on capital punishment would not “ ‘prevent or substantially impair ... [their] duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath.’ ” Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 48, 485 S.E.2d 741 (1997) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424(II), 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)); see also Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743-744(8)(a), 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997) (“A prospective juror's inability to recite circumstances which might lead her [or him] to vote for a life sentence is not *380 dispositive of her [or his] qualifications to serve as a juror.”). [7] [8] [9] 6. Rhode complains that three prospective jurors were erroneously excused for cause when they expressed an unwillingness or inability to consider a death sentence that was based on their understanding that Georgia law required execution by electrocution. A review of the record reveals that one of these prospective jurors was unwilling to consider a death sentence regardless of the method of imposition, and, furthermore, Rhode has waived his right to complain about that prospective juror by failing to object to the trial court's excusing her. Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 495(1), 422 S.E.2d 188 (1992). Regarding the other two prospective jurors, Rhode correctly argues that jurors in Georgia death penalty trials play no role in determining the method by which a death sentence is carried out. However, where a prospective juror is unable or unwilling, for any reason, to consider one or more of the sentences authorized by law, that juror should be excused for cause upon motion by one of the parties. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 429(III), 105 S.Ct. 844 (“[E]xcluding prospective capital sentencing jurors because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias....”); Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000). Here, the unwaivering biases of two of the prospective jurors against a death sentence, which arose both from personal knowledge and a preliminary charge about electrocution that had been requested by Rhode, rendered them unqualified. In fact, one of them was further unqualified because she was unwilling to consider a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. See Zellmer, 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802. The fact that the method of execution applicable in Rhode's case could be subject to change by the General Assembly or by court order is irrelevant, because it was the effect of the jurors' biases upon their deliberations that was at issue. Rhode's argument concerning the separation of governmental powers is also without merit. [10] 7. Rhode complains that three prospective jurors were improperly disqualified based upon their unwillingness or inability to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. Rhode raised no objection at trial regarding two of them, and the objection he raised regarding the third was withdrawn except as to the meritless contention that the trial court erred by allowing additional voir dire to clarify the juror's apparently contradictory responses. Accordingly, this claim has been waived. Earnest, 262 Ga. at 495(1), 422 S.E.2d 188. [11] Rhode also complains that seven other prospective jurors were improperly disqualified when it appeared that their religious**861 views would prevent them from considering a death sentence. This claim has also been waived because Rhode raised no objection to their disqualification other than a meritless challenge to the practice of qualifying *381 jurors according to their death penalty views. Id. Guilt/Innocence Phase [12] 8. The trial court correctly denied Rhode's pre-trial motion to suppress certain non-testimonial evidence and statements that were obtained during and as a result of non-custodial interviews at his residence and the Jones County Sheriff's Office and later interviews after he was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda warnings were not required to be given at any point before they actually were, because Rhode was not then under arrest or confronted with circumstances that would have led a reasonable person in his position to believe he or she was under arrest. Hightower v. State, 272 Ga. 42, 42-43(2), 526 S.E.2d 836 (2000). Before Rhode gave his first formal statement and before he was under arrest or would reasonably have perceived himself to be under arrest, proper Miranda warnings were given, and these warnings were given so often after that that counsel argued below that they were given too many times. We find nothing to contradict the State's evidence showing that Rhode's statements were voluntary and that he never requested an attorney or wished to remain silent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; OCGA § 24-3-50. [13] 9. Rhode complains that photographs and other exhibits depicting the victims and the crime scene were improperly presented to the jury. This Court finds nothing in the record to support Rhode's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the probative value of any contested items against their allegedly improper prejudicial impact. See Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 60-61(6), 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000); Woods v. State, 265 Ga. 685, 687(3), 461 S.E.2d 535 (1995). [14] 10. (a) Because the only evidence even remotely suggestive of a “serious provocation” sufficient to cause a reasonable person to kill was testimony suggesting that Steven Moss charged at Rhode upon witnessing the murder of his two children during an ongoing burglary, we find that a charge on voluntary manslaughter was not warranted. See Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 221(3), 526 S.E.2d 560 (2000); Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 872(1), 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982); OCGA § 16-5-2. [15] [16] (b) Because the evidence in this case afforded no basis whatsoever for a finding that the killings were unintentional or that Rhode was guilty of trespass rather than burglary, the trial court properly refused to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter involving an unintentional killing during an unlawful act other than a felony. OCGA § 16-5-3(a). Even if it were admitted that Rhode shot Steven Moss when Steven, unarmed, resisted the burglary of his home and *382 the murder of his two children, such admission would not show that Rhode committed a lawful act of self-defense, and, therefore, a charge on involuntary manslaughter involving a lawful act committed in an unlawful manner would not be warranted. Daniel v. State, 187 Ga. 411, 412(1), 1 S.E.2d 6 (1939) (holding that one cannot create an emergency requiring a killing and then claim self-defense), overruled on other grounds by McMichael v. State, 252 Ga. 305, 309 n. 7 (4), 313 S.E.2d 693 (1984); OCGA § 16-5-3(b). (c) The evidence was overwhelming that Rhode was guilty of felony murder for the killing of Bryan Moss. The jury, by also finding Rhode guilty of malice murder, made an additional, specific finding that Rhode intended Bryan's killing. In light of these circumstances, it is highly probable that the trial court's refusal to give a charge on aggravated assault did not contribute to the verdict. Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 133, 442 S.E.2d 444 (1994). Sentencing Phase [17] 11. Rhode argues that two confessions to crimes unrelated to the Moss murders, which he made when he was a juvenile, were improperly admitted during the sentencing phase. Two hearings held outside **862 the jury's presence showed that both confessions were made after Rhode and his mother had been advised of and had acknowledged his Miranda rights, that he and his mother had then agreed to the interviews, and that his mother had remained present throughout both interviews. The trial court properly found that the confessions were voluntarily made and were preceded by Miranda warnings, even under the more stringent requirements applicable to the statements of minors. Id.; Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 127-128, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976). [18] Rhode also argues that these juvenile confessions should have been suppressed because law enforcement officers did not, prior to their making, bring him before a juvenile court or contact a juvenile court intake officer for a determination of whether he should have been released or detained. See OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3); OCGA § 15-11-31(b). Pretermitting the fact that this Court has previously held that “statements obtained in violation of the [Georgia] Juvenile Code are not rendered per se inadmissible,” Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 103-104(2)(b), 454 S.E.2d 474 (1995), and the fact that the confessions at issue were made in Louisiana, this Court holds that Rhode waived his right to raise this issue on appeal by failing to raise it specifically at trial. Earnest, 262 Ga. at 495(1), 422 S.E.2d 188. [19] 12. Rhode contends that the prosecutor injected inadmissible hearsay into the sentencing proceedings by asking Rhode's mother on cross-examination if she had been present when a trial judge in Louisiana *383 made certain comments to Rhode when sentencing him for burglary. Pretermitting whether the prosecutor was attempting to elicit hearsay testimony (specifically whether the out-of-court statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein) and whether the testimony would have been cumulative of other admissible evidence and thus harmless, this Court holds that Rhode waived his right to raise this issue on appeal by failing to object at trial. Id. [20] 13. Rhode contends that the prosecutor's cross-examination of him and the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase of the trial were improper and require reversal. Rhode raised a single objection during the prosecutor's cross-examination, arguing that the prosecutor was taking too long to arrive at an actual question. We find no error in the trial court's resolution of that objection, which was essentially withdrawn. Rhode's right to raise his other contentions on appeal were waived by his failure to object at trial, except insofar as the challenged questions and comments might have in reasonable probability changed the jury's exercise of its discretion in sentencing Rhode to death. See Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 713-714(10)(b), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000). See also Heidler, 273 Ga. at 64-65(18), 537 S.E.2d 44. Although they were not preserved for appeal, this Court finds meritless Rhode's specific contentions that the prosecutor improperly disparaged the role of mercy and argued improperly by quoting Rhode's own statement under cross-examination, “My conscience is clear as far as anybody's death....” See Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 93-95(8)(i-2), 335 S.E.2d 567 (1985) (addressing a closing argument that suggested mercy was not appropriate in that case), vacated on other grounds by Ford v. Georgia, 479 U.S. 1075, 107 S.Ct. 1268, 94 L.Ed.2d 129 (1987). Pretermitting whether any of Rhode's other, more generalized allegations of impropriety have any merit, this Court concludes upon its review of the record that there is no reasonable probability that the alleged improprieties changed the jury's choice of sentence and that, therefore, these alleged improprieties cannot serve as the basis for reversal. [21] 14. (a) The jury's findings that the murder of Bryan Moss was committed during the murder of Kristin Moss, that the murder of Kristin Moss was committed during the murder of Steven Moss, and that the murder of Steven Moss was committed during the murder of Bryan Moss did not violate the rule against mutually-supporting aggravating circumstances. Hightower v. State, 259 Ga. 770, 772(5), 386 S.E.2d 509 (1989). See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2). (b) Even if Rhode had been sentenced to death for committing kidnapping with bodily injury against Bryan Moss in addition to **863 being sentenced to death for Bryan Moss's murder, there would be no violation of the rule against mutually-supporting aggravating circumstances. *384 Potts v. State, 261 Ga. 716, 720-721(4), 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991). There was certainly no such violation here where a life sentence was imposed for the kidnapping with bodily injury. (c) Burglary and kidnapping with bodily injury are not impermissible as statutory aggravating circumstances simply because they are less-serious crimes than murder, which can also serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance. (d) This Court has determined that kidnapping and kidnapping with bodily injury are distinct crimes. See Patrick v. State, 247 Ga. 168, 170, 274 S.E.2d 570 (1981); OCGA § 16-5-40. Accordingly, Rhode's argument that the State relied upon a non-existent crime by including kidnapping with bodily injury as an alleged statutory aggravating circumstance is meritless. [22] 15. The sentencing phase jury charges on mitigating circumstances, which were taken from the pattern jury charges, were not improper. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal Cases, Part 4(B), pp. 82 and 88 (1999). The trial court defined and set forth the function of mitigating circumstances in a manner that would not have misled the jurors. See Fugate v. State, 263 Ga. 260, 262-263(5), 431 S.E.2d 104 (1993). The trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury that findings of mitigating circumstances need not be unanimous, because the trial court properly charged the jury that it need not find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence less than death. Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 238(6), 517 S.E.2d 502 (1999). Viewing the sentencing phase charge as a whole, this Court concludes that the jury was not misled into believing that mitigating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or, for that matter, that any particular burden of proof rested on the defense as to mitigating circumstances. Id. The trial court was not required to identify in its charge the contended specific mitigating circumstance of residual doubt. See Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 385(17), 519 S.E.2d 221 (1999). [23] 16. Rhode contends that the trial court's sentencing phase charge on the OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(7) statutory aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional for vagueness. The charge in question, which was taken directly from the pattern jury instructions and properly adjusted according to the evidence, was not unconstitutional. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal Cases, Part 4(B), pp. 84-86 (1999); West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 158-160(2), 161-162, 313 S.E.2d 67 (1984) (recommending a suitable clarifying jury charge); compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). [24] Rhode also contends that the jury's partial reliance on the OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(7) statutory aggravating circumstance in recommending that he receive the death penalty for the murder of Bryan Moss was unconstitutional because it imposed vicarious liability on *385 him for Lucas's actions. This contention fails because, although the evidence suggested that Lucas was the triggerman in Bryan's murder, the evidence also supported a finding of depravity of mind on Rhode's part with regard to that murder in that Rhode continued to aid and abet Lucas in the murder despite the child's young age, despite an initial aggravated battery to the child that was committed in Rhode's presence, and despite the large number of gunshots required to kill the child. See Thomas v. State, 247 Ga. 233, 275 S.E.2d 318 (1981). Constitutional Issues [25] 17. Rhode filed a motion to have execution by electrocution declared unconstitutional, but no evidence was admitted in support of this claim. This Court finds that the motion, standing alone, was insufficient to require that it be granted. See Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 640(6), 544 S.E.2d 120 (2001) (“In the absence of admissible evidence demanding a different result, the trial court did not err in declining to declare execution by electrocution unconstitutional.”). 18. The Unified Appeal Procedure exists for the protection of the rights of defendants **864 in death penalty cases and is not unconstitutional or improper for any of the reasons alleged in this appeal. Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716(18), 532 S.E.2d 677; Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 498-499(10), 512 S.E.2d 241 (1999). 19. Georgia's death penalty statute is not unconstitutional, and, more specifically, “[t]his Court's review of death sentences is neither unconstitutional nor inadequate under Georgia statutory law.” Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716(16), 532 S.E.2d 677. 20. OCGA § 16-5-1, which defines malice murder and felony murder, is not unconstitutional for any of the reasons alleged in this appeal. See Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 698(48), 512 S.E.2d 896 (1999); Chester v. State, 262 Ga. 85, 88(3), 414 S.E.2d 477 (1992). Sentence Review [26] 21. Rhode actively participated in two burglaries of the Moss home, and he was armed at least during the second burglary. When confronted by eleven-year-old Bryan Moss who was attempting to protect his family's home with a baseball bat, Rhode, along with Lucas, committed aggravated assault upon the child with a pistol. Although Rhode claims he was surprised when Lucas first opened fire on Bryan, inflicting a non-fatal wound, Rhode's conduct afterward demonstrated his intent to kill not only fifteen-year-old Kristin Moss, whom Rhode admitted shooting, but also Bryan, who was likely shot to death with Rhode's knowledge as Rhode held Kristin at gunpoint. The evidence also suggested that Rhode was the triggerman in the *386 killing of Steven Moss. While absolute certainty as to how many shots Rhode fired at each of the victims cannot be obtained, as the only surviving witnesses to the crimes are Rhode and Lucas, the evidence in Rhode's trial showed that he participated in all three murders. Although there was evidence that Rhode consumed alcohol and drugs on the day of the crimes and appeared to be “speeding,” and although Rhode contended that his recollection of events was “hazy,” the jury's reaction to the evidence of some level of intoxication within the context of the other evidence presented at trial was not unreasonable or excessive. See Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 366-367(2), 211 S.E.2d 356 (1974) (“It is the reaction of the sentencer to the evidence before it which concerns this court and which defines the limits which sentencers in past cases have tolerated....”). The evidence showed that Rhode had a history of criminal conduct before the murders and that he escaped from the Jones County jail and participated in an attack on a guard in the Putnam County jail while awaiting trial in this case. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 717(19)(a), 532 S.E.2d 677 (noting that “past conduct and conduct after the crime” are relevant in a proportionality review). This Court's proportionality review “includes special consideration of the sentences received by co-defendants in the same crime,” and, accordingly, the Court notes that Lucas has also been sentenced to death. Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 395-396(8), 321 S.E.2d 710 (1984). [27] This Court concludes, considering both the crimes and the defendant, that the death sentences imposed for the murders in this case were neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases in Georgia. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(3); see id. The cases appearing in the Appendix support this conclusion in that each demonstrates a jury's willingness to impose a death sentence where a defendant has committed more than one murder. 22. The death sentences in this case were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(1). Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur except SEARS, P.J., and HUNSTEIN, J., who concur in the judgment and in all Divisions except Division 17. APPENDIX Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 544 S.E.2d 120 (2001); Esposito v. State, 273 Ga. 183, 538 S.E.2d 55 (2000); Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000); Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999); **865 Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 519 S.E.2d 655 (1999); Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 517 S.E.2d 502 (1999); Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (1999); jenkins v. state, 269 ga. 282, 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997); Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997); McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 458 S.E.2d 833 (1995); Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 401 S.E.2d 500 (1991); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 375 S.E.2d 442 (1988); Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 360 S.E.2d 258 (1987); Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987); Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521, 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986); Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 330 S.E.2d 575 (1985); Putman v. State, 251 Ga. 605, 308 S.E.2d 145 (1983); Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 300 S.E.2d 640 (1983); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303, 298 S.E.2d 1 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981). CARLEY, Justice, concurring. I concur in the opinion and in the affirmance of the conviction and death sentence. With regard to the enumeration of error discussed in Division 17, however, it should be emphasized that this Court has consistently and recently held that execution by electrocution is not unconstitutional. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 261(5), 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000); Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 66(25), 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000); Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 716(16), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000).

Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2009). (Habeas)

Background: Following affirmance of his malice murder, burglary, and kidnapping convictions and sentence of death, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855, and denial of state habeas relief, Georgia death row inmate sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, No. 07-00248-CV-CAR, C. Ashley Royal, Chief Judge, denied the petition, but issued a certificate of appealability (COA) as to inmate's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the district court did not err by denying federal habeas relief as to inmate's claim that counsel rendered ineffective penalty phase investigation; (2) the district court did not err by denying federal habeas relief as to inmate's claim that counsel rendered ineffective penalty phase presentation; and (3) the state habeas court's decision was not “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. Affirmed.

PER CURIAM: Brandon Rhode, a Georgia death row inmate, appeals from the district court's denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to Rhode's claim of ineffective penalty phase investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence by his trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's denial of Rhode's petition. I. Background A. The Crimes The Georgia Supreme Court provided the following account of the crimes in its opinion affirming Rhode's convictions: Rhode and his co-perpetrator, Daniel Lucas, burglarized the home of Steven and Gerri Ann Moss on April 23, 1998, fled the scene when Rhode discovered an alarm system, and returned later that day to burglarize the home again. While Rhode and Lucas were ransacking the home searching for valuables, 11-year-old Bryan Moss arrived, observed Rhode and Lucas through a front window, and entered through a back door, armed with a baseball bat. Rhode and Lucas subdued Bryan at gunpoint, sat him in a chair, and began discussing what to do with him. Lucas turned and fired at the boy, inflicting a non-fatal shoulder wound. As [Bryan's sister] *1278 Kristin Moss was approaching the house, Lucas took Bryan into a back bedroom. Rhode met Kristin as she arrived, sat her in a chair, and shot her twice with a .357 caliber pistol. Lucas repeatedly shot Bryan with a .25 caliber pistol. Rhode later shot Steven Moss with the .357 caliber pistol when Steven arrived. Finally, Lucas obtained a .22 caliber pistol from Rhode's automobile and shot Bryan and Kristin again. Chad Derrick Jackson, Rhode's roommate, testified that he observed Rhode and Lucas handing rifles and other items out of Jackson and Rhode's bedroom window and loading them into Rhode's automobile on the evening of the crimes. Jackson further testified that Rhode and Lucas admitted to him the next day that Lucas first shot Bryan in the shoulder, that Lucas then shot Bryan while Rhode simultaneously shot Kristin, that Rhode next shot Steven Moss, and that lastly Lucas shot each victim to ensure their deaths. Danny Ray Bell, who also lived in the same house as Rhode, testified that Rhode and Lucas spoke to him between the two burglaries and that Bell advised Rhode not to return to burglarize the same home. Bell testified that, at the time of this conversation, Rhode had a .357 caliber pistol in his waistband. According to Bell, when Rhode returned from the second burglary, Rhode said that he had “messed up big time” and needed to dispose of some weapons and other items. Rhode admitted to Bell that Lucas shot a young boy and that Rhode shot a girl and a man. Several witnesses testified that they saw an automobile similar to Rhode's at or near the victims' home on the day of the murders. A search of Rhode's automobile revealed damage to the front and rear bumpers and a spare tire in the trunk that showed signs of use. A photograph of the crime scene suggested a vehicle had backed into a gas tank at the victims' home. Expert testimony disclosed that paint on a cement block at the victims' home matched the paint on Rhode's automobile, including two layers applied at the factory and a third layer likely applied later. Additional expert testimony indicated that a crime scene imprint could have been made by Rhode's spare tire. Rhode made a statement admitting he fired two times at Kristin with the .357 caliber pistol, and he led law enforcement officers to two locations where he and Lucas had secreted weapons and other items. Expert testimony matched the found .357 and .25 caliber pistols to bullets retrieved from the crime scene and the victims' bodies. Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855, 858-59 (2001). B. Procedural History [1] The jury found Rhode guilty of three counts of malice murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of burglary, and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury. Id. at 858. Rhode's felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law. Id. He was sentenced to death after the jury concluded that death sentences were warranted for the murder convictions. Id.FN1 FN1. Under Georgia law, “[i]n a murder case, after conviction, where only two sentences can be imposed, life imprisonment or death, if the convicting jury is unable to agree on which of those two sentences to impose, the trial judge must impose the lesser, life imprisonment.” Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 821, 301 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1983) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rhode's co-defendant Lucas was also sentenced to death. Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440, 443 (2001). *1279 On March 3, 2000, Rhode moved for a new trial. The court denied his motion on December 22, 2000. Rhode then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which affirmed his convictions and death sentences on October 1, 2001. The court denied Rhode's motion for reconsideration on October 22, 2001. Rhode petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme Court denied on June 17, 2002. On April 4, 2003, Rhode filed a state habeas corpus petition to challenge his convictions and sentences. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the state habeas court denied relief on all claims. In denying relief, the court adopted as its own the State's proposed order and dated it March 14, 2006. Rhode then filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court denied on April 24, 2007. Ex. 84. On June 25, 2007, Rhode filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 a federal habeas corpus petition in the Middle District of Georgia. The district court denied Rhode's petition but issued a COA. II. Standards of Review [2] [3] Rhode's petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (“AEDPA”)FN2 “highly deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir.2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication FN2. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The statutory phrase “clearly established Federal law” “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the U.S. Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.). “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The [petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). [4] [5] “When examining a district court's denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, we review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error.” Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir.2006). “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir.2005). [6] The U.S. Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the legal principles governing ineffective assistance claims. “An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674). [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] We have explained that: *1280 The petitioner satisfies the test's performance prong by proving that counsel's performance failed to meet the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Our evaluation of counsel's performance is highly deferential; we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. We review counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time, to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Our review is objective, in that we consider whether there was any reasonable justification for the attorney's conduct. Thus, the petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take. The petitioner satisfies the Strickland test's prejudice prong by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1184 (11th Cir.2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The prejudice prong does not focus only on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (“[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”). III. Discussion Rhode argues that the district court erred by denying federal habeas relief. First, he argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the investigation of mitigation evidence for the penalty phase of his trial. Second, he argues that counsel's presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was ineffective. Finally, he argues that the state habeas court's decision to reject his ineffective assistance claims is contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. All of these arguments fail. We address each in turn. A. Counsel's Strategy [15] Before assessing Rhode's ineffective assistance claims, “we must determine the strategy actually pursued by counsel.” Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1273 (11th Cir.2008). Rhode asserts that counsel decided from the beginning that this was a mitigation-only case. The state habeas court found, however, that counsel thought that the penalty phase strategy would involve both mitigation and residual doubt. Ex. 80 at 8. [16] The state habeas court's finding is not unreasonable. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that the defense believed that the jury, while deliberating during the guilt phase, was “grappling with residual doubt on some portions of the case, and that [its residual doubt] would carry over to the penalty phase.” Ex. 59 at 3106. Counsel's trial tactics confirm that belief. Counsel conceded that Rhode was at the crime scene, but counsel otherwise “fought everything in that case.” Ex. 59 at 3063. During the guilt phase, counsel tried to show that Rhode's co-defendant Lucas murdered the three victims while Rhode fired only one shot after Rhode “turned his head and closed his eyes.” Ex. 12 at 2009. Rhode's penalty phase testimony supported the defense's account of the murders and may have addressed any residual doubt among the jurors. In addition to providing mitigating testimony about his *1281 childhood, Rhode testified that it was Lucas' idea to go to the Moss home on the day of the murders, that he remembered “freezing up” when the shooting started, and that he did not know where the one shot he fired went. Ex. 17 at 3997, 4010-21. During closing argument of the sentencing phase Rhode's attorney addressed the jury directly on the possibility of residual doubt.FN3 Counsel's decision to “f[i]ght everything” belies Rhode's assertion that counsel knew that this was a mitigation-only case. FN3. “I talked to you yesterday evening about the evidence in the case and the fact that I thought the evidence showed something different than the State's theory of the case. I don't know if you accepted what I said; what Mr. Bright said; or, you came up with your own reasoning to account for the evidence. But if you have a doubt about what happened, remember that the death penalty is irrevocable. There is no second guessing of that.” Ex. 17 at 4097. [17] [18] Even if this were a mitigation-only case, we would still conclude that counsel's penalty phase investigation and presentation were not ineffective. We have explained that “even when trial counsel's investigation is less complete than collateral counsel's, trial counsel has not performed deficiently when a reasonable lawyer could have decided, in the circumstances, not to investigate[ ]” further. Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.2001). We have also explained that “counsel [is not] required to present all mitigation evidence, even if the additional mitigation evidence would not have been incompatible with counsel's strategy.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). As we explain further below, the state habeas court did not make an unreasonable determination of the facts or contravene clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent when it rejected Rhode's claim that counsel rendered ineffective penalty phase investigation and presentation. B. State Habeas Court Order [19] Rhode complains that the state habeas court adopted verbatim the State's proposed order as its own. Because the court adopted the proposed order verbatim, Rhode asserts, “the order uncritically incorporates [the State's] selective use of evidence and mischaracterizations of the evidentiary record.” Appellant's Br. 23. He characterizes the order as an “artifact of [the State's] having drafted [it] with the specific intent, not of producing a fair and impartial assessment of the facts and law, but of deliberately glossing over or camouflaging significant attorney errors in order to ensure that those errors are shielded from any meaningful review.” Appellant's Br. 24. Rhode argues that because the state habeas court's “partisan final order” is based on ... “unreasonable determinations of fact,” the district court erroneously denied federal habeas relief. Appellant's Br. 24.FN4 FN4. In the sense that this section of Rhode's brief can be construed as an argument that because the state habeas court adopted the State's proposed order verbatim the district court erred by denying federal habeas relief, that argument cannot be considered now because it is outside the scope of the COA. Further, had Rhode asked to include this argument in the COA he would have to “make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The state habeas court's verbatim adoption of the State's facts would not rise to “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” id., and thus cannot be certified as an issue in a COA. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1510, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). [20] Rhode seems to be pointing out that the state habeas court adopted verbatim the State's proposed order simply to emphasize his position that the findings of the state habeas court were based on a *1282 State centered interpretation of the facts. However, the record clearly reflects that both Rhode and the State had the opportunity to present the state habeas court with their version of the facts. See Ex. 73, 75. Despite the fact that the state habeas court adopted the State's facts verbatim, these findings of fact are still entitled to deference from this court unless Rhode can show the facts to be clearly erroneous.FN5 As discussed further below, the record supports the findings of fact of the state habeas court. FN5. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1510, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (stating that while it is not the preferred practice for a court to adopt the prevailing side's facts verbatim, such findings of fact will be given deference unless found to be clearly erroneous); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 971 & n. 12 (11th Cir.1994) ( en banc) (finding that the lower court's adoption of an order prepared by the State did not render the fact finding procedure inadequate); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1067 & n. 19 (11th Cir.2002) (upholding a state court's evidentiary findings of fact even though the court adopted the State's facts verbatim); Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 984 & n. 4 (11th Cir.1986) (findings of fact from a lower court are not accorded less deference merely because they were adopted verbatim from either party, the appellant must still show the facts to be clearly erroneous to overcome this deference). C. Investigation [21] Rhode argues that counsel inadequately and untimely prepared for the penalty phase because counsel failed to oversee an adequate investigation. He further argues that the state habeas court made an unreasonable determination of the facts when it found that counsel was personally involved in the mitigation investigation. Rhode argues that the investigation was untimely because counsel spent the equivalent of one standard work week (40.16 hours) on the case in the first year of representation and because the defense lost opportunities to develop critical evidence. These arguments are without merit. 1. Performance Prong a. Inadequate Investigation [22] Rhode's argument that counsel's investigation was inadequate is without merit. Rhode's counsel included two experienced death penalty lawyers, Frank Ford and Jack Nebl. Ford, who was lead counsel, had practiced criminal law for about nine years by the time he was appointed to the case in June 1998. Ex. 59 at 3046-50. At that time, Ford had already handled several death penalty cases and had attended death penalty seminars annually for six or seven years. Ex. 59 at 3050-54. He asked that Nebl be appointed as co-counsel because Nebl had previous death penalty experience. Ex. 59 at 3056-57. Their extensive experience is important because “[o]ur strong reluctance to second guess strategic decisions is even greater where those decisions were made by experienced criminal defense counsel.” Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir.1998). We agree with the district court that the state habeas court did not unreasonably find that counsel's investigation was adequate. Ford contacted Rhode's mother, Patches Rhode, almost immediately after his appointment to the case, seeking Rhode's school and medical records. Ex. 59 at 3121. He reviewed tapes of witness statements and the crime scene. Ex. 59 at 3164. He also obtained funding for and hired Dr. Dan Grant, a defense psychologist, and Cheryl Abernathy, a mitigation investigator who had handled over twenty-five death penalty cases. Ex. 59 at 3059-61, 3069, 3119-24, 3205. Abernathy met with Rhode at least five times to collect information about his life. Ex. 61 at 3896-3901, Ex. 62 at 3903-18. *1283 She traveled to Louisiana and Mississippi to interview at least ten potential mitigation witnesses. Ex. 59 at 3215, Ex. 62 at 4004. She prepared her assistant Christopher DiPietro for his own trip to the two states to interview seventeen more potential mitigation witnesses. Ex. 59 at 3224-27, Ex. 62 at 4008. DiPietro shared the information he gathered with Abernathy; she, in turn, provided counsel with all of the information that she and DiPietro had gathered. Ex. 59 at 3207-08. She and DiPietro also interviewed several potential witnesses in Macon, Georgia. They discussed with counsel the results of those interviews. Ex. 59 at 3240-48. Through the investigation, Abernathy sought records that might contain mitigation evidence, including those from various hospitals, sheriffs' offices, and schools. She forwarded to counsel all of the records that she received. Ex. 59 at 3207-08. And she had numerous telephone conversations with lead counsel about those records. Ex. 59 at 3228-29, 3233. [23] Although “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards ... are [only] guides to determining what is reasonable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, counsel's investigation here met those prevailing norms. One of those norms is that “[c]ounsel should conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the presence of a third person so that there is someone to call as a defense witness at trial .... [or] have an investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews.” American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1020 (2003). Since Rhode's counsel hired investigators who interviewed potential witnesses and shared all of their information with counsel, we cannot say that counsel performed deficiently by delegating the mitigation investigation to them. And, contrary to Rhode's assertion, the state habeas court did not make an unreasonable determination of the facts when it found that counsel was personally involved in the mitigation investigation. Just because counsel did not personally gather all of the mitigation evidence does not mean that counsel was not personally involved in the investigation. Counsel evaluated all of the evidence that the investigators gathered; consulted them; and, with their help, decided which witnesses should be called to testify at the penalty phase. Ex. 59 at 3088, 3207-08. Thus, the record supports the state habeas court's finding that counsel was personally involved in the mitigation investigation. b. Untimely Investigation [24] Rhode's argument that counsel's investigation was untimely is also without merit. Contrary to his intimation, the effectiveness of counsel's representation at sentencing is not an exact derivative of the amount of time counsel spends investigating mitigation evidence. See Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1202 (11th Cir.2004). Rather, “the time and effort [that counsel spent] in preparing to defend [Rhode] in the guilt phase of [this] capital case continues to count at the sentencing phase.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 n. 27. In contrast to Rhode's argument that counsel only spent one standard work week on his case in the first year, Ford's billing records reflect that he alone spent over one hundred and twenty five hours working on Rhode's case in the last eight months prior to trial. See Ex. 59 at 3168-81. The extensive investigation here confirms counsel's initial belief that the defense strategy would involve mitigation, though not exclusively. See Ex. 59 at 3063. Rhode notes that Abernathy testified at the state habeas evidentiary hearing that *1284 she would have wanted more time to investigate. Ex. 59 at 3261, 3268-69. Her testimony is not, however, a sufficient basis to grant federal habeas relief because the record does not establish that she communicated that thought to Rhode's lawyer. Ex. 59 at 3065-67. The state habeas court noted Ford's testimony that he would have filed an ex parte motion asking for more time and funds if Abernathy had told him that she needed more time to investigate. Ex. 59 at 3066-67; Ex. 80 at 16. The record supports the state habeas court's finding that Abernathy did not tell counsel that she wanted more time to investigate. We agree with the state habeas court that counsel did not ineffectively investigate the mitigation evidence for the penalty phase and that counsel did not, in light of the chosen defense strategy, perform deficiently. 2. Prejudice Prong Even if counsel performed deficiently by not personally gathering mitigation evidence or by not initially spending much time on the case, counsel's performance was not prejudicial. Counsel reviewed all of the information presented to them, extensively discussed it with the investigators, and, as explained further below, could make strategic decisions based on it. Thus, Rhode fails to show that counsel's investigation rendered “the result of the proceeding ... fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842. The district court properly denied federal habeas relief as to Rhode's ineffective preparation claim. D. Presentation [25] Rhode argues that counsel ineffectively presented mitigation evidence by (1) unreasonably failing to inquire meaningfully into or present any mental health related mitigating factors other than Rhode's ability to adapt to prison despite having promised the jury such evidence, (2) unreasonably failing to use records of Rhode's prior psychiatric hospitalization at age thirteen or to contact any staff from the hospital, and (3) failing to review or use his juvenile probation records. [26] [27] In raising these arguments, Rhode faults counsel for failing to call certain witnesses and not inquiring into certain issues with others, and not introducing evidence that could have been presented. But “[w]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second guess.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc). Furthermore, “[i]t is well-settled in this Circuit that a petitioner cannot establish an ineffective assistance claim simply by pointing to additional evidence that could have been presented.” Van Poyck v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam). Here, counsel had nine lay witnesses,FN6 Dr. Grant, and Rhode himself testify during the penalty phase. Counsel testified at the state habeas evidentiary hearing that the defense team chose these specific witnesses to avoid presenting duplicate testimony. Ex. 59 at 3127. The defense team, counsel testified, tried to figure out what each witness could contribute uniquely and *1285 informed each what he or she would be asked while on the witness stand. Ex. 59 at 3127. Through the defense's eleven witnesses, counsel developed the following mitigation themes: (1) Rhode could adapt to prison and not be a future danger so there was no need to put him to death FN7; (2) Rhode had a bad childhoodFN8; (3) Rhode was constantly failed by the adults in his lifeFN9; (4) Rhode started to abuse drugs when he was just a childFN10; (5) Rhode was a follower led by Lucas, his co-defendant who was more responsible for the crimesFN11; (6) Rhode was not evil and had done good deeds in the pastFN12; and (7) many innocent people would be penalized if Rhodes were sentenced to death.FN13 For the reasons explained further below, Rhode's argument that counsel ineffectively presented mitigation evidence is without merit. FN6. The nine lay witnesses were (1) Maggie Ragsdale, mother of Rhode's former girlfriend; (2) Claudine Ladner, Rhode's paternal grandmother; (3) Pamela Farve, Rhode's aunt and his father's half-sister; (4) Brenda Jackson, mother of Rhode's half-sister; (5) Raven Jackson, Rhode's then-twelve-year-old half-sister; (6) Joshua Ladner, Rhode's then-fifteen-year-old half-brother; (7) Billie Ladner, Rhode's maternal grandmother; (8) C.W. Parker, Rhode's paternal grandfather; and (9) Patches Rhode, Rhode's mother. FN7. Ex. 17 at 4059-65. FN8. Ex. 17 at 3955-56, 3964, 3978. FN9. Ex. 17 at 3902, 3946-48, 3950-51, 3964. FN10. Ex. 17 at 3983-89, 3992-94. FN11. Ex. 17 at 3918, 3997. FN12. Ex. 17 at 3927-32, 3936-45. FN13. Ex. 17 at 3940-46, 3968. 1. Performance Prong a. Mental Health Rhode faults counsel for failing to deliver on the defense's promise to the jury that an expert witness, Dr. Grant, would testify “as to [Rhode's] psychological state ... and [would] have a definite opinion as to how [Rhode] became involved in this type of life style and eventually became involved with [the crimes].” Ex. 17 at 3642. Contrary to Rhode's assertion, however, Dr. Grant testified accordingly. Dr. Grant told the jury that Rhode's drug use interfered with his ability to learn to deal with people and that the lack of structure at home caused many of his problems. He further testified that Rhode would be able to adapt to prison and not be a danger to anyone because prison provides a structured environment with strict limits and few choices. He explained that if drugs and alcohol were removed from Rhode's life, their absence would “eliminate a lot of ... problems.” Ex. 17 at 4080. Rhode faults counsel for not hiring an expert like Dr. David Fassler, a psychiatrist retained by Rhode who testified at the state habeas evidentiary hearing. See Ex. 47 at 212-61. Dr. Fassler testified that Rhode's development of severe polysubstance addiction occurred through his exposure from infancy to drug and alcohol abusing family members at every turn. Dr. Fassler concluded that Rhode had no real choice in the development of his addiction, which extended through the time of the crime. He also offered expert testimony about Rhode's problems with judgment and impulse control. He testified that Rhode's organic brain damage impaired his ability to control his impulses and behavior. Ex. 47 at 241-42. Rhode contends that Dr. Fassler's testimony is the kind of testimony that counsel promised to present during the penalty phase but never delivered. [28] Dr. Fassler's testimony, however, merely expands upon that of Dr. Grant, who also found, but as part of the defense strategy did not tell the jury, that Rhode had organic brain damage. The emergence of an additional expert witness at a state collateral proceeding does not mean that trial counsel was ineffective. See Hendrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 527 F.3d 1149, 1154 (11th Cir.2008). “[C]laims based on such witnesses are made seemingly without regard to the trial counsel's actual investigation and the basis for his strategic decisions.” Id. Counsel reasonably*1286 believed that the jury would see Rhode's impulsive behavior, which more than one expert believed was triggered by his organic brain damage, as aggravating. Rhode also faults counsel for not introducing Dr. Jerold Lower's report. Dr. Lower, a State psychologist who evaluated Rhode, reported that although Rhode did not suffer from a major disorder of thought or mood that rendered him insane at the time of the crimes, Ex. 50 at 1079-84, Rhode's most serious psychiatric problem was his substance abuse and his resulting organic brain damage. Ex. 50 at 1081. The state habeas court reasonably concluded, however, that counsel strategically decided not to introduce Dr. Lower's report. The report would have exposed to the jury how lightly Rhode made of his drug abuse. It would also have exposed Rhode's view of himself as antisocial and unable to learn from punishing experiences. Ex. 80 at 34-35. Keeping Lower's report away from the jury was reasonable because counsel, through Dr. Grant, tried to show that Rhode could adapt to prison. Since Rhode's counsel could have reasonably believed that the jury would consider the report aggravating rather than mitigating, we cannot say that counsel performed deficiently by not presenting it. b. Prior Records Rhode further faults counsel for failing to use Rhode's prior psychiatric hospitalization records or juvenile probation records and not contacting anyone from New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (“NOAH”), including psychiatric social worker Frances Wellington, who had treated Rhode and could have offered mitigation testimony. Rhode argues that counsel's failure to use that evidence prejudiced the defense because the evidence would have rebutted Patches Rhode's intimation that her son had wilfully rejected treatment.FN14 FN14. During the penalty phase, the prosecutor cross-examined Patches Rhode as follows: Q: Because, Ms. Rhode, you were always there for your son, weren't you? A: Yes, I was. Q: Ms. Rhode, let me ask you a very difficult question. In your opinion, who is responsible for Brandon Rhode's being here today? A: Brandon Rhode. Ex. 17 at 3981. The record supports the state habeas court's finding that counsel had copies of the NOAH records and juvenile probation records before trial and gave them to Dr. Grant for his review. The record also shows, for example, that counsel obtained and reviewed a June 1993 psychological assessment by Dr. Jorge H. Durana, a NOAH clinical psychologist. Dr. Durana evaluated Rhode after Rhode was arrested as a juvenile on five felony charges and two counts of misdemeanor trespassing. Dr. Durana found that Rhode had a significant history of antisocial behavior and a disregard for rules and the well being of others. Ex. 62 at 3947. Rhode's NOAH records, in fact, indicate that he was disciplined during his treatment for breaking major rules. They show that he was frequently uncooperative, undermining, and generally in denial. Ex. 62 at 3943, 3951. Counsel's decision not to introduce Rhode's NOAH and juvenile probation records at trial was strategically reasonable because the jury could have seen them as aggravating and inconsistent with counsel's argument that Rhode could adapt to prison. Counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to present Wellington's testimony because the emergence of an additional expert witness at a state collateral proceeding does not mean that trial counsel was ineffective. Hendrix, 527 F.3d at 1154. *1287 2. Prejudice Prong Even if counsel performed deficiently by failing to present the above mitigating evidence, Rhode still fails to show prejudice. First, his experienced counsel had the opportunity to evaluate the evidence that Rhode argues counsel should have presented during the penalty phase. Counsel strategically determined, however, that the jury could view that evidence as aggravating. We are strongly reluctant to second guess these types of determinations by counsel. Provenzano, 148 F.3d at 1332. [29] Second, much of the evidence that Rhode faults counsel for not presenting to the jury is potentially aggravating or cumulative. Counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence or evidence incompatible with the defense strategy. Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at 1324 n. 7; Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1319. Dr. Fassler's testimony would have merely expanded upon Dr. Grant's, which the penalty phase jury heard. Dr. Lower's report, Dr. Durana's psychological assessment, and Rhode's NOAH and juvenile probation records would have, at worst, been perceived as inconsistent with counsel's argument that the jury should consider a penalty other than death and that Rhode could adapt to prison. At best, the evidence would have been cumulative, providing more information about Rhode's bad childhood and early exposure to drugs and alcohol. Because the evidence that Rhode faults counsel for failing to present is either inconsistent with the defense strategy or cumulative, he cannot establish ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to present it. Finally, Rhode testified during the penalty phase. He told the jury, “I accept what I've done. But in all fairness, I can't blame anyone else. You know, no one. It's my responsibility.” Ex. 17 at 4004. By “[choosing] to testify on his own behalf, he ran the risk that the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.” Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n. 7 (11th Cir.1992). For these reasons, Rhode fails to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [supposed] errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Newland, 527 F.3d at 1184. The district court properly denied federal habeas relief as to Rhode's ineffective presentation claim. E. “Contrary to” Rhode argues that the state habeas court's decision is contrary to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). In so arguing, he asserts that his jury appeared to struggle with its verdicts during both the guilt and penalty phases. He argues that the jury's struggle suggests that had counsel presented more mitigating evidence, there is a strong likelihood that “at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. at 2543. Rhode argues that the state habeas court overlooked the jury's struggle when it found that counsel's performance did not prejudice the defense. In overlooking that struggle, he argues, the state habeas court failed to assess whether the entire record raised a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different. [30] A state court decision is “contrary to” the U.S. Supreme Court's clearly established precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the U.S. Supreme Court's] cases,” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. at 1519, or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the U.S. Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent,” *1288 id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-20. The phrase “clearly established Federal law” “refers to the [Court's] holdings,” not dicta. Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. [31] The state habeas court's decision here is not contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent because Rhode's case is not materially indistinguishable from Williams and Rompilla. Unlike counsel in those two cases, Rhode's counsel did not, as explained above, perform deficiently. Unlike Williams' counsel, who did not adequately investigate for mitigating evidence, Rhode's counsel strategically decided not to present certain mitigating evidence after a thorough investigation. Cf. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. at 1514 (“[T]he failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams' favor was not justified by a tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confession.”). And, unlike Rompilla's counsel, Rhode's counsel did not fail to examine any file that the prosecutor warned would be used at trial. Cf. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377, 125 S.Ct. at 2460 (“hold[ing] that ... [a capital defendant's] lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review materials that counsel knows the prosecutor will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial”). The state habeas court's decision is not contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. IV. Conclusion The district court did not err by denying federal habeas relief as to Rhode's claim that counsel rendered ineffective penalty phase investigation and presentation. Rhode has failed to show that the state habeas court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. AFFIRMED.