Inmate: ERIC A PATTON
ODOC#: 250019
Birth Date: 04/07/1957
Race: Black
Sex: Male
Height: 6 ft. 00 in.
Weight: 185 pounds
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
County of Conviction: Okla
Date of Conviction: 11/21/96
Location: Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Mcalester

Reuters News

"Oklahoma handyman executed for 1994 robbery: murder." (Tue Aug 29, 2006 8:27pm)

McALESTER, Oklahoma (Reuters) - Oklahoma executed a former handyman by lethal injection on Tuesday for the 1994 robbery and murder of an Oklahoma City woman. Eric Allen Patton, 49, was condemned for stabbing Charlene Kauer, 56, to death with several knives, a barbecue fork and a pair of scissors on December 16, 1994.

Patton's fingerprints matched those found on the barbecue fork left protruding from Kauer's chest. Patton confessed to the killing, but later appealed his conviction on the grounds he was under the influence of cocaine and could not form the intent to kill. Patton was on a parole for a robbery in California at the time Kauer was killed in her home.

Earlier this month, a federal judge threw out a lawsuit Patton filed against Oklahoma arguing the state's method of lethal injection violates the U.S. Constitution's ban of cruel punishment because a condemned convict could be awake when the deadly chemicals are injected. Most states inject a large dose of a sedative to render a condemned prisoner unconscious before the prisoner is given chemicals that stop the lungs and heart. Even though Patton's lawsuit failed, Oklahoma doubled the dosage of sedatives that Patton and future condemned prisoners receive.

On Tuesday, while strapped to a gurney in the execution chamber, Patton thanked his family and prison officials. "I want to thank the guards here on death row who have been like family to me, and their lives have been a blessing to me," Patton said.

Patton was the 82nd person executed in Oklahoma since the state resumed capital punishment in 1990.

For his last meal, Patton requested a large pizza with pepperoni, sausage, mushrooms and a grape soda.

Tulsa World

"KC woman's killer put to death with new drug blend," by Sean Murphy. (Associated Press 8/30/2006)

MCALESTER -- Killer Eric Allen Patton was executed Tuesday night at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, becoming the third inmate the state has put to death this year. Patton, 49, was pronounced dead at 6:10 p.m., Department of Corrections spokesman Jerry Massie said. Patton was convicted of the Dec. 16, 1994, murder of Charlene Kauer during a robbery at her Oklahoma City home.

While strapped to a gurney with intravenous lines into each arm, he made no reference to Kauer or the crime but thanked his legal team, his family and Corrections Department employees. "I want to thank the guards here on death row who have been like a family to me and their lives have been a blessing to me," Patton said. Four members of Patton's legal team witnessed the execution, along with a Catholic priest. "I've had a good life here on Earth," Patton continued. "It's been a blessing. It's been a blast. "I want to thank my savior Jesus Christ for all he's done for me. I look forward to being with him now and for eternity."

During the execution, corrections officials used an altered drug recipe for the first time. The new system -- in part a response to a challenge filed by Patton -- was to deliver a larger dose of anesthesia before the fatal drugs were administered. Patton had argued that inmates might be subjected to pain during lethal injection. Although a federal judge rejected that argument this month, the Corrections Department revised its procedure. When the drugs began to flow, Patton exhaled deeply. His breathing stopped a few moments later.

None of Patton's or Kauer's relatives witnessed the execution, officials said.

Patton attacked Kauer after he knocked on her door and asked her for money. Kauer, then 56, had taken the day off from her job at Blue Cross and Blue Shield to go Christmas shopping, court records show. Les Kauer found his wife's nude body with stab wounds from several knives, a barbecue fork and a pair of scissors that were left protruding from her chest, records show.

Patton, who had done some painting for the couple, was arrested 13 days later when fingerprints he gave police matched those on a bloody barbecue fork found at the scene. Patton later confessed to the crime but said in his appeals that he was so drunk and high on cocaine that he could not form the intent to kill.

Shawnee News-Star

"Inmate executed for 1994 killing." (Web-Posted Aug. 30, 2006 02:35: AM)

McALESTER (AP) -- Convicted killer Eric Allen Patton was executed Tuesday night at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, becoming the third Oklahoma inmate put to death this year. Patton, 49, was pronounced dead at 6:10 p.m. CDT, Oklahoma Corrections Department spokesman Jerry Massie said. Earlier Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an emergency application, filed by Patton's attorneys, for a stay of execution with the U.S. Supreme Court.

Patton was convicted of the Dec. 16, 1994, murder of Charlene Kauer during a robbery at her Oklahoma City home.

While strapped to a gurney with intravenous lines into each arm, Patton made no reference to Kauer or the crime, but thanked his legal team, his family and corrections department employees. "I want to thank the guards here on death row who have been like a family to me, and their lives have been a blessing to me," Patton said. Four members of Patton's legal team, including attorney Susan Otto, witnessed the execution, along with a Catholic priest. They sat while watching Patton die. "I've had a good life here on earth," Patton continued. "It's been a blessing. It's been a blast. "I want to thank my savior Jesus Christ for all he's done for me. I look forward to being with him now and for eternity."

During Patton's execution, which began at 6:03 p.m., state corrections officials used a slightly different lethal drug recipe for the first time. The new system -- in part a response to a challenge filed by Patton -- was to deliver a larger dose of anesthesia before the fatal drugs were administered. When the drugs began to flow, Patton exhaled deeply. His breathing stopped a few moments later. Patton received his last meal on Tuesday afternoon -- a large pepperoni pizza with sausage and extra mushrooms and a large grape soda. The cost of the meal is limited to $15. Patton had challenged the state's execution procedure, arguing that inmates may be subjected to pain during lethal injection. Although a federal judge rejected that argument earlier this month, the state Department of Corrections revised its execution procedure.

No members of Patton's family or Kauer's family witnessed the execution, correction department officials said.

Patton, who had a lengthy criminal record of burglaries and robberies in Oklahoma and California, was accused of attacking Kauer after he knocked on her door and asked her for money.

Kauer, then 56, had taken the day off work from her job at Blue Cross and Blue Shield to do some Christmas shopping, according to court documents. Les Kauer discovered his wife's nude body at the couple's home with multiple stab wounds from several knives, a barbecue fork and a pair of scissors that were left protruding from her chest, court records show. Patton, who had previously done some painting work for the couple, was arrested 13 days after the murder when fingerprints he gave police matched those on a bloody barbecue fork found at the scene. Patton later confessed to the crime, but claimed in his appeals that he was so intoxicated and high on cocaine that he could not form the intent to kill.

Les Kauer said Monday that Patton's execution would do little more than stir up painful memories. "It's kind of hard to speculate as to whether this will bring closure," Kauer said from his Oklahoma City home. "I hope it does for all of my family that has been involved in this thing."

The Oklahoman

"Inmate executed for 1994 killing," by Sean Murphy. (Associated Press Tue August 29, 2006)

McALESTER, Okla. - Convicted killer Eric Allen Patton was executed Tuesday night at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, becoming the third Oklahoma inmate put to death this year. Patton, 49, was pronounced dead at 6:10 p.m. CDT, Oklahoma Corrections Department spokesman Jerry Massie said. Earlier Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an emergency application, filed by Patton's attorneys, for a stay of execution with the U.S. Supreme Court.

Patton was convicted of the Dec. 16, 1994, murder of Charlene Kauer during a robbery at her Oklahoma City home.

While strapped to a gurney with intravenous lines into each arm, Patton made no reference to Kauer or the crime, but thanked his legal team, his family and corrections department employees. "I want to thank the guards here on death row who have been like a family to me, and their lives have been a blessing to me," Patton said. Four members of Patton's legal team, including attorney Susan Otto, witnessed the execution, along with a Catholic priest. They sat stoically while watching Patton die. "I've had a good life here on earth," Patton continued. "It's been a blessing. It's been a blast. "I want to thank my savior Jesus Christ for all he's done for me. I look forward to being with him now and for eternity."

During Patton's execution, which began at 6:03 p.m., state corrections officials used a slightly different lethal drug recipe for the first time. The new system _ in part a response to a challenge filed by Patton _ was to deliver a larger dose of anesthesia before the fatal drugs were administered. When the drugs began to flow, Patton exhaled deeply. His breathing stopped a few moments later.

Patton received his last meal on Tuesday afternoon _ a large pepperoni pizza with sausage and extra mushrooms and a large grape soda. The cost of the meal is limited to $15.

Patton had challenged the state's execution procedure, arguing that inmates may be subjected to pain during lethal injection. Although a federal judge rejected that argument earlier this month, the state Department of Corrections revised its execution procedure.

No members of Patton's family or Kauer's family witnessed the execution, correction department officials said.

Patton, who had a lengthy criminal record of burglaries and robberies in Oklahoma and California, was accused of attacking Kauer after he knocked on her door and asked her for money. Kauer, then 56, had taken the day off work from her job at Blue Cross and Blue Shield to do some Christmas shopping, according to court documents. Les Kauer discovered his wife's nude body at the couple's home with multiple stab wounds from several knives, a barbecue fork and a pair of scissors that were left protruding from her chest, court records show. Patton, who had previously done some painting work for the couple, was arrested 13 days after the murder when fingerprints he gave police matched those on a bloody barbecue fork found at the scene. Patton later confessed to the crime, but claimed in his appeals that he was so intoxicated and high on cocaine that he could not form the intent to kill.

Les Kauer said Monday that Patton's execution would do little more than stir up painful memories. "It's kind of hard to speculate as to whether this will bring closure," Kauer said from his Oklahoma City home. "I hope it does for all of my family that has been involved in this thing."

ProDeathPenalty.Com

Eric Allen Patton was sentenced to death for the murder of Charlene Kauer in Oklahoma City on December 16, 1994. At the time of the murder, Patton was employed as a brick mason. In the morning, he borrowed a co-worker’s car and left a job site, stating that he was going to buy electrical boxes at a local hardware store. Patton was absent from the job site for four hours. When he returned, he was wearing different clothes and did not have the electrical boxes.

During that four-hour period, Patton went to Charlene Kauer’s home in northeast Oklahoma City and knocked on the front door. When Charlene answered, Patton asked to borrow money, and she gave him ten dollars. Patton then forced his way into the home, grabbed Charlene by the throat and dragged her through the house looking for money and valuables. He took Charlene to the bedroom and stabbed her numerous times. Then, he dragged her down the hallway into the kitchen, stabbing her several more times with a variety of knives and breaking several of them. Finally, he stabbed Charlene in the chest with a pair of scissors. Expert testimony offered at trial indicated that Charlene Kauer suffered a subgallous hemorrhage to a bone in her head and that a kick from a steel-toed boot was capable of producing this injury. Patton was wearing steel-toed boots during the crime.

Patton then left Charlene’s house, cleaned himself up, removed his bloody clothes, and changed into a pair of coveralls that he found in the coworker’s car. He left the bloody clothes in a field in northwest Oklahoma City and returned to the job site. Initially, Patton was not a suspect in Charlene’s murder. However, because he had previously done some painting for Charlene and her husband and had worked with them at a marketing company, Oklahoma City Police Department detectives conducted a series of interviews with him. They arrested Patton after discovering his fingerprints at the murder scene. During his initial police interview, Patton denied any involvement in the murder. He then stated that he had seen a suspicious vehicle at Charlene’s house and added that the person who committed the murder would have had to have control of the Kauers’ dogs, thereby suggesting that Mr. Kauer was involved. When asked about a scratch on his lip and cuts on his hands, he explained that he was changing a tire and the jack had slipped and hit him.

During a subsequent interview, Patton stated that the co-worker whose car he had borrowed on the day of the murder was involved in the crime. He added that he had a lot of information to give them but was protecting someone. Patton explained that he had been at the Kauers’ home but that another person had committed the murder. In another interview, Patton admitted that the co-worker was not involved in the murder but then stated that a woman had been involved. Patton reported that this woman had stabbed Charlene while he wrestled with her dog, eventually stabbing it. He explained that the cuts on his hand and the scratch on his lip came from the dog’s bites. In a final interview, Patton described the killing as though he had had an out-of-body experience. He admitted seeing himself at the murder scene and stabbing Charlene, but he said there were demonic forces present and the victim was a demon. He added that he had ingested cocaine before the murder and believed the drug was laced with another drug. He said he was “tripping” from the effects of the drugs.

Patton was tried before a jury in the District Court for Oklahoma County in November 1996. The prosecution presented forensic evidence indicating that Patton’s fingerprints were present in the Kauer home and that blood at the scene matched Patton’s type. The prosecution also presented video and audiotapes of Patton’s interviews with police detectives in which he admitted stabbing Charlene. In response, Patton presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. John Smith. Dr. Smith testified that, on the day of the killing, Patton was in a cocaine delirium. As a result, Dr. Smith said, Patton was not capable of forming the intent to commit a crime “in a cognitive, logical sense like we think of. I think from then on he was in fact simply reacting to the cocaine intoxication once he saw her. Some of those things he said in the police report indicate he was out of his body watching it. He couldn’t control it. He didn’t know why he was doing it. He couldn’t stop it.”

After hearing this evidence, the jury convicted Patton of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Then, upon considering additional evidence presented during the sentencing phase, the jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. The jury found four aggravating circumstances: ( 1) Patton was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (4) the murder was committed while Patton was on parole for California felony convictions. The jury did not find a fifth aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution, that it was probable that Patton would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.

Regarding the "cocaine intoxication" defense offered by the defense psychiatrist, an appeals court said, "In particular, after initially denying any involvement in the killing of Mrs. Kauer, Mr. Patton admitted driving to Mrs. Kauer’s house and stabbing her. Moreover, after the killing, Mr. Patton had the presence of mind to clean himself up and exchange his bloody clothes for those of his coworker. Finally, the prosecution introduced testimony from both Mr. Patton’s girlfriend and from the co-worker that Mr. Patton’s demeanor seemed normal on the day of the killing, evincing no signs of delirium or strange behavior. Although Dr. Smith’s testimony that Mr. Patton was suffering from a cocaine delirium conflicted with some of this evidence, a rational jury could have rejected that testimony, relying on the prosecution’s evidence that Mr. Patton possessed the requisite intent, and convicted Mr. Patton of the first-degree murder charge."

National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty

Eric Patton - Oklahoma - August 29, 2006
Do Not Execute Eric Patton

Eric Allen Patton, a black male, is scheduled for execution on Aug. 29. In 1994, Patton entered the home of Les and Charlene Kaur in Oklahoma City. The Kaurs were acquaintances of his, as he had previously done some painting work for them. Patton asked Charlene Kaur to borrow money. Unsatisfied when she only gave him ten dollars, he dragged her around the house looking for more money. He forced her to undress, struggled with her, and eventually stabbed her numerous times with various weapons until she died.

Patton initially was not a suspect in this crime. However, after a series of interviews in which Patton gave a variety of different versions of what happened that day, he finally confessed. In his final interview, Patton told officers that he killed Kaur because he thought she was a demon. He also admitted that he was under the influence of cocaine during the time of the murder.

Patton was found guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary and was sentenced to death

Patton maintained on appeal that he did not have the intent to commit murder. While the law clearly states that any form of voluntary intoxication is no excuse for criminal culpability, one exception to this rule exists. If an individual is intoxicated to the level at which his or her mental abilities are completely overcome, then it is impossible for that individual to form criminal intent.

During Patton’s trial, the prosecution showed that his behavior before and after the crime was described as “normal,” but defense counsel argued that Patton was in a cocaine-induced delirium while committing the crime, thus negating the element of malice aforethought. The mental health professional assigned to this case confirmed that Patton was experiencing a cocaine delirium during the commission of the crime, adding that he also exhibited sociopathic and antisocial tendencies.

The trial was also marred by the questionable testimony of several witnesses. Certain witnesses made hearsay or speculative statements that, in a court of law, are considered inadmissible. Although a judge may admonish the jury to disregard such statements, the jury may already be prejudiced upon hearing the statement.

To further prejudice the jury, the prosecution displayed extremely gruesome crime scene photographs of the victim post-mortem. Photographs are admissible only if they contain relevant content and if their probative value is not outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Relevant evidence is defined as that which makes an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Because the location and cause of death in this crime were not disputed, the defense contends that photos of the victim are more prejudicial than probative.

Please write to Gov. Brad Henry on behalf of Eric Patton.

Patton v. State, 973 P.2d 270 (Okla.Crim.App. 1998) (Direct Appeal).

Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Oklahoma County, Leamon Freeman, J., of first degree murder and first degree burglary, and was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Lumpkin, J., held that: (1) trial court did not impermissibly restrict voir dire; (2) prospective jurors who were opposed to capital punishment were properly removed for cause; (3) evidence was sufficient to support convictions; (4) crime scene photographs were admissible; (5) defendant's statements were voluntary; (6) evidence supported finding of four aggravating circumstances; (7) trial judge's failure to prepare statutorily required report was harmless error; (8) defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel; (9) defendant was not entitled to hearing on his ineffective assistance claims; and (10) death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Affirmed. Chapel, P.J., and Strubhar, V.P.J., concurred in result.

LUMPKIN, Judge.
Appellant Eric Allen Patton was tried by jury and convicted of First Degree Murder (Count I) (21 O.S.1991, § 701.7) and First Degree Burglary, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (Count II) (21 O.S.1991, §§ 1431 & 51), Case No. CF-95-55, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. In Count I, the jury found the existence of four (4) aggravating circumstances and recommended the punishment of death. In Count II, the jury recommended as punishment one thousand one hundred and twenty (1,120) years imprisonment. The trial court sentenced accordingly. From this judgment and sentence Appellant has perfected this appeal.FN1 FN1. Appellant's Petition in Error was filed in this Court on May 19, 1997. Appellant's brief was filed November 26, 1997. The State's brief was filed March 11, 1998. The case was submitted to the Court March 13, 1998. Appellant's reply brief was filed March 31, 1998. Oral argument was held July 28, 1998.

¶ 2 On December 16, 1994, Appellant was employed as a brick mason. During the morning, Appellant left the job site in Edmond, Oklahoma, ostensibly to purchase electrical connection boxes at a local hardware store. Appellant drove co-worker Chris Williams' car and was gone four hours. *279 When he returned, he did not have the electrical boxes and was wearing clothes belonging to his co-worker Chris Williams, clothes different than he had worn earlier in the day.

¶ 3 During the time Appellant was gone, he went to the home of Les and Charlene Kauer in northeast Oklahoma City. Charlene Kauer answered Appellant's knock at the front door. He asked to borrow money. Mrs. Kauer gave him ten dollars ($10.00). Not satisfied, Appellant forced his way into the home, grabbed Mrs. Kauer by the throat and dragged her through the house looking for money and valuables. He took her to the bedroom where he forced her to undress and then struggled with her. He stabbed her numerous times, then dragged her down the hallway into the kitchen. The struggle between Appellant and Mrs. Kauer continued and he stabbed her several more times with a variety of knives. As the fierceness of the attack broke a succession of knives, Appellant resorted to a barbecue fork. Unsure if the severely wounded Mrs. Kauer was dead, he plunged a pair of scissors into her chest. Appellant left the scene, cleaned up and traded his bloody clothes for a pair of coveralls found in Williams' car. The bloody clothes were dropped in a field in northwest Oklahoma City and Appellant returned to his job in Edmond.

¶ 4 Appellant initially was not a suspect in the victim's murder, but at the request of the police, he came to their office for questioning, as he had previously done some painting work for the Kauers and worked with them at Dial American Marketing. Through a series of interviews, Appellant gave body samples and answered questions. He was eventually arrested when fingerprint comparison revealed his prints at the murder scene. During this series of interviews, Appellant initially denied any involvement in the murder. He then stated that he had seen a suspicious vehicle at the victim's residence and suggested Mr. Kauer was involved in the murder. When asked about a scratch on his lip and cuts on his hands he explained that he was changing a tire and the jack slipped and hit him.

¶ 5 During a subsequent interview, Appellant inculpated his co-worker Chris Williams in the murder. He told police he had a lot of information to give them, but he was protecting someone. He said he was guilty just because he was at the Kauer's home but that the other person committed the murder. Appellant went on to say that Mrs. Kauer was not supposed to be home that day, that he had gone over to steal some items from the house and discovered her there by accident. He said the other person assaulted Mrs. Kauer and tore her clothes off. Afraid Mrs. Kauer was going to be raped, Appellant intervened. That was when he was cut on the hand and scratched on the lip. He added that they “had only gotten a lousy $14.00 and the woman didn't even put up a fight.” Appellant took the officers to a field in northwest Oklahoma City where he had disposed of his bloody clothes and showed the officers several convenience stores which he admitted robbing.

¶ 6 In another interview, Appellant admitted that Chris Williams was not involved in the murder but there had been a woman with him at the victim's home. This woman, called a “strawberry” FN2 by Appellant, took part in the murder. Appellant said the woman stabbed the victim while he wrestled with the victim's dog, eventually stabbing the dog. He said the cuts on his hand and the scratch on his lip came from the victim's dog which bit him. At the end of the interview, Appellant admitted there had been no “strawberry” with him. When asked who the woman with him was, Appellant only indicated she was a family member. FN2. A “strawberry” was defined in the record as a woman who exchanged sex for drugs.

¶ 7 In a subsequent interview Appellant admitted seeing himself at the murder and stabbing the victim, but said there were demonic forces present and the victim was a demon. Appellant also said that he had ingested cocaine before the murder and believed the drug was “laced” with another drug. He said he was “tripping” from the effects of the drugs. Appellant described in detail his activities immediately before the murder, during the murder and afterwards.

* * *

In his sixth assignment of error, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for first degree malice aforethought murder. Appellant argues that the evidence at trial showed that he was so intoxicated and in a state of delirium from cocaine at the time of the homicide as to be incapable of forming a specific intent to kill, thus negating the essential element of malice aforethought.

¶ 35 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court reviews the evidence under the standard set forth in Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Okl.Cr.1985), whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. Washington v. State, 729 P.2d 509, 510 (Okl.Cr.1986).

¶ 36 “A design to effect death [i.e., premeditation] is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed.” 21 O.S.1991, § 702. Premeditation sufficient to constitute murder may be formed in an instant. Boyd v. State, 839 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Okl.Cr.1992). Malice aforethought may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Cavazos v. State, 779 P.2d 987, 989 (Okl.Cr.1989).

¶ 37 Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to criminal culpability. 21 O.S.1991, § 153. However, we recognize an exception to this rule where the accused was so intoxicated that his mental abilities were totally overcome and it therefore became impossible for him to form criminal intent. Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627, 638 (Okl.Cr.1992). If voluntary intoxication is to be relied upon as an affirmative defense, the defendant must introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his ability to form the requisite criminal intent. Id.

¶ 38 Here, Appellant initially denied any involvement in the case, but then admitted his involvement and tried to minimize it. He described in detail his activities immediately before, during and after the murder. He had the presence of mind to clean up after the murder and discard his bloody clothes. Witnesses who talked with Appellant shortly after the murder testified he was not under the influence of cocaine. Co-worker Chris Williams testified that when Appellant returned to the job site after having been gone for four hours he did not seem to be under the influence of cocaine. Sandra Moore, Appellant's girlfriend, testified that she saw Appellant and talked to him only a few hours after the murder and his demeanor seemed “normal.” We find this evidence supports a finding that Appellant had the specific intent to kill the victim.

¶ 39 Although Appellant's evidence of a cocaine delirium conflicted with this evidence, it is within the exclusive province of the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Yell v. State, 694 P.2d 946, 948 (Okl.Cr.1985). This Court will not disturb the jury's verdict if it is supported by competent evidence. Enoch v. State, 495 P.2d 411, 412 (Okl.Cr.1972). Here, the jury apparently found Appellant was not so intoxicated and his mental abilities so overcome as to be unable to form the specific intent to kill. This finding is supported by sufficient competent evidence. Therefore, we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for first degree malice aforethought murder. This assignment of error is denied.

* * *

Evidence presented at the in-camera hearing showed that Appellant was arrested on December 29, 1994, thirteen days after the murder. Prior to that time, he was interviewed by the police on December 23, 1994. Appellant was not considered a suspect at that time, went to the police station voluntarily, and was free to leave when the interview was concluded. He voluntarily gave fingerprints and agreed to give body samples at a later date. No Miranda warnings were required and none were given. On the morning of December 29, 1994, Appellant voluntarily went to the police station again and agreed to give body samples. Appellant read and signed a waiver of rights to that effect. At both of these pre-arrest interviews Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs and no threats or promises were made in conjunction with either interview. The investigating officer described Appellant's demeanor as “normal” and said he was more intelligent than the people with whom he usually dealt. The officer stated Appellant seemed very willing to do what he could to help. Later in the day on the 29th the results of the fingerprint comparisons were received by police, and Appellant was subsequently arrested. Appellant was taken to the police station, read his Miranda warnings and signed a waiver indicating he understood those rights and that he agreed to talk with officers. Appellant initially was hesitant to talk with the officers without his minister present, so the interview was delayed until the minister could be present.

¶ 64 The following morning, December 30, 1994, Appellant contacted officers and volunteered to take the officers to the clothes he had worn during the murder. Appellant was informed of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of those rights. Appellant voluntarily talked to the officers and showed them the location of the bloody clothes. At Appellant's request, the officers talked to him again on January 7, 9, and 13, 1995. At each interview, the Miranda rights were read and Appellant signed a waiver of those rights. At each of the post-arrest interviews, Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but was coherent and appeared to understand the officers and speak of his own free will. At no time did police coerce, threaten or make promises to Appellant. The interviews on December 29, January 7, 9 and 13 were taped and admitted into evidence. These *292 tapes show a very cooperative Appellant who responded to the officers' questions in an appropriate manner and who did not seem to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This record clearly shows Appellant's rights were protected and that each of his statements was given knowingly and voluntarily. We find no error in the admission of his statements, fingerprints or clothes.

* * *

In his eleventh assignment of error, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances. “When the sufficiency of the evidence of an aggravating circumstance is challenged on appeal, the proper test is whether there was any competent evidence to support the State's charge that the aggravating circumstance existed”. Romano v. State, 847 P.2d at 387. “In making this determination, this Court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State”. Id.

¶ 84 The jury found the existence of four aggravating circumstances: 1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; 2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and 4) the murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of a felony.

¶ 85 In support of the “prior violent felony” aggravator, the State presented the testimony of Walter Simco, Appellant's probation and parole officer. Mr. Simco testified that Appellant had been transferred from a prison in California to a prison in Oklahoma and that at that time he was serving sentences for robbery and burglary convictions. Simco also stated that as a normal course of business, the Department of Corrections maintains a file concerning inmates and that he relied upon those records and discussed those records with Appellant during the supervisory period. Those records also reflected a conviction for assault with a deadly *296 weapon. Sybil Newcomb, custodian and supervisor of the Records Division of the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office, testified that she compared Appellant's fingerprints to the those on the California convictions and they matched. This evidence of Appellant's prior assault with a deadly weapon conviction was sufficient to support the aggravator of “prior violent felony.”

¶ 86 Appellant finds further error in the omission of a jury instruction informing the jury that the California robbery and burglary convictions were not to be used in support of the aggravator. Therefore, he argues it could not be determined from the record which one or more of the prior felony convictions the jury relied upon in finding the existence of the aggravator.

¶ 87 The jury was instructed that the California robbery and burglary could be used to enhance the punishment for the first degree burglary conviction. However, the jury was not specifically instructed that the “prior violent felony” aggravator was based upon the assault with a dangerous weapon conviction. Neither our state statutes nor case law require the trial court to instruct the jury on the specific evidence which can be used to support an aggravating circumstance. All that is required is that the terms used in the particular aggravating circumstances be adequately defined for the jury. Further, there is no requirement that the jury specify the evidence relied upon to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance. In this case it is sufficient that the jury was instructed that it must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time of the murder, Appellant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, and that evidence was introduced by the State to support such finding. We find no error in the omission of Appellant's requested instruction.

¶ 88 Appellant next challenges the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance of “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.” Appellant asserts that as the order in which the injuries were inflicted could not be determined, there was no evidence of the victim's conscious physical suffering sufficient to support the aggravator.

¶ 89 Appellant's account of the murder, standing alone, is sufficient to support this aggravator. He stated that upon forcing his way into the victim's home, he grabbed her by the throat and dragged her to the bedroom. He made the victim undress, and although he said he did not touch her sexually, he stated that she “fought strongly.” Appellant stated that while they were in the bedroom, he stabbed the victim in the chest and arms before dragging her into the kitchen. He stabbed her numerous more times with a variety of knives before plunging scissors into her chest. Detective Cook testified that general disarray of the victim's house and the blood splatters in the bedroom, down the hallway and in the dining room indicated a struggle had taken place.

¶ 90 The medical examiner, Dr. Chai Choi, testified to numerous stab wounds over the victim's body and a pair of scissors protruding from her chest. She also testified to numerous bruises, scratches and abrasions on the victim's lips, cheek, scalp and legs. Numerous cuts and scratches found on the victim's hands and arms were described as “defensive” wounds. Dr. Choi testified that none of the defensive wounds were life threatening and that the presence of those wounds indicated the victim was conscious during part of the attack.

¶ 91 “[E]vidence supporting a finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel requires proof that the death was preceded by torture or serious physical abuse”. Revilla v. State, 877 P.2d 1143, 1155 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 115 S.Ct. 764, 130 L.Ed.2d 661 (1995). Although the exact order in which the wounds were inflicted could not be determined by Dr. Choi, she did state the victim was alive when she received certain wounds, particularly the stab wounds to the throat and chest. She also stated that none of the wounds individually were fatal, but it was the totality of the wounds which caused the victim's death. This evidence, combined with the evidence of the defensive wounds and that of a struggle, clearly established the victim was conscious and aware of the attack. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding of torture and *297 serious physical abuse. See Welch v. State, 1998 OK CR 54, 968 P.2d 1231, 1247, 69 OBJ 3369, 3375-6; Romano v. State, 909 P.2d 92, 118-19 (Okl.Cr.1995); Spears v. State, 900 P.2d 431, 448-9 (Okl.Cr.1995), cert.denied, 516 U.S. 1031, 116 S.Ct. 678, 133 L.Ed.2d 527 (1995); Hooker v. State, 887 P.2d 1351, 1364-5 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858, 116 S.Ct. 164, 133 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995).

¶ 92 Appellant next contends the evidence supporting the aggravator that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution is not sufficient. To support a finding of this aggravating circumstance the State must prove the defendant killed in order to avoid arrest or prosecution. Carter v. State, 879 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172, 115 S.Ct. 1149, 130 L.Ed.2d 1107 (1995). The defendant's intent is critical. Id. However, as in other areas of criminal law, the defendant's intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Snow v. State, 876 P.2d 291, 299 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1179, 115 S.Ct. 1165, 130 L.Ed.2d 1120 (1995). There must also be a predicate crime, separate from the murder, for which the defendant seeks to avoid arrest or prosecution. Carter, 879 P.2d at 1250.

¶ 93 In the instant case the evidence showed Appellant was well known to the victim and her husband. His forceful entry into the Kauer home and search for valuables would certainly have been reported to the police. Therefore, it is logical to conclude, and the evidence supports the finding, Appellant killed the victim to avoid arrest or prosecution for the burglary, which is a predicate crime, separate from the murder. This case is distinguishable from Barnett v. State, 853 P.2d 226, 233-4 (Okl.Cr.1993) relied upon Appellant. In Barnett, the defendant's initial assault and battery upon the victim was not separate and distinct from the murder itself, but due to the protracted nature of the assault it constituted a part of a continuing transaction which culminated in the death of the victim. This Court found that because the aggravated assault and battery, at a minimum, was a significant contributing cause of the victim's death, the defendant could not be found to have murdered the victim in order to avoid prosecution for the assault and battery. In the present case, the burglary was complete upon entry into the victim's home and was therefore separate and distinct from the murder. We find the evidence sufficient to support this aggravator.

¶ 94 Finally, Appellant challenges the evidence supporting the aggravator that the murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of a felony. Appellant argues this aggravator is not applicable as he was not serving a term of imprisonment under Oklahoma law but was instead on parole in Oklahoma on a California conviction. Appellant cites no authority for his argument, nor have we found any. Neither our state statutes nor case law limit the application of the aggravator to imprisonment on solely Oklahoma convictions. Therefore, we reject Appellant's request to so limit the aggravator in this case.

¶ 95 Appellant additionally argues the aggravator is invalid as duplicative and that it is limited to killings committed within a prison or correctional institution. This argument was rejected in Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 25-26 (Okl.Cr.1995). We do so again. ¶ 96 Appellant further challenges the constitutionality of the aggravators found in this case. Each of these aggravators has been found constitutional. See Neill, 896 P.2d at 554-5 (especially heinous, atrocious or cruel held constitutional), Cannon v. State, 904 P.2d 89, 106 (Okl.Cr.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176, 116 S.Ct. 1272, 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996) (the murder was committed to avoid a lawful arrest or prosecution held constitutional); Cleary v. State, 942 P.2d 736, 746 (Okl.Cr.1997) (prior violent felony and while serving a sentence of imprisonment held constitutional). We decline Appellant's request to reconsider our position on these aggravators.

¶ 97 Appellant's last allegation in this assignment of error is that the trial judge's refusal to give his requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence during the second stage violated his right to a reliable sentencing proceeding. An instruction *298 on circumstantial evidence was given during the first stage of trial. The court instructed the jury that all first stage instructions applied in the second stage, where appropriate. We find no error in omitting an additional circumstantial evidence instruction in second stage.

¶ 98 Having reviewed all of Appellant's challenges to the aggravating circumstances, we find modification of the sentence is not warranted. Accordingly, this assignment of error is denied.

* * *

Pursuant to 21 O.S.1991, § 701.13(C), we must determine (1) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and (2) whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstances as enumerated in 21 O.S.1991, § 701.12. Turning to the second portion of this mandate, the jury found the existence of four (4) aggravating circumstances: 1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; 2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and 4) the murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of a felony. 21 O.S.1991, § 701.12(1)(4)(5)(6). As discussed previously, each of these aggravators was supported by sufficient evidence.

¶ 144 Turning to the mitigating evidence, Appellant presented four (4) witnesses, his mother, father, sister and brother. These witnesses testified that Appellant has a family that loves and cares for him; that he fully cooperated with the authorities after his involvement in the crime; that he has a mental disorder and this mental disorder caused him to be previously committed to a mental hospital; that he has abused crack cocaine and his mental, psychological development has been permanently damaged thereby; that he was under the influence of crack cocaine at the time of the homicide and was in a state of psychotic delusion induced by crack cocaine; that he was then and is now unable to remember all the circumstances surrounding the victim's death due to his degree of intoxication at the time; that twenty-three months after his arrest, Appellant is sober and drug free; that while incarcerated, Appellant has not been a threat to anyone in the prison system; that Appellant is a brick mason by trade and can readily utilize that trade in a closed prison environment which will benefit and contribute to society; that Appellant's brother, Phillip, was deliberately electrocuted and Appellant has suffered sever emotional disturbance ever since that time; and that Appellant has strong feelings of sorrow, remorse and sadness that he was involved in the taking of the victim's life. This evidence was summarized into fourteen (14) factors and submitted to the jury for their consideration as mitigating evidence, as well as any other circumstances the jury might find existing or mitigating.

¶ 145 Upon our review of the record and careful weighing of the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating evidence, we find the sentence of death to be factually substantiated and appropriate as to Count I, first degree murder. Under the record before this Court, we cannot say the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor contrary to 21 O.S.1991, § 701.13(C), in finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating evidence. Accordingly, finding no error warranting reversal or modification, the JUDGMENT and SENTENCES for First Degree Murder and First Degree Burglary are AFFIRMED and the APPLICATION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS IS DENIED.

Patton v. State 989 P.2d 983 (Okla.Crim.App. 1999) (PCR).

Defendant was convicted, in the District Court, Oklahoma County, Leamon Freeman, J., of first degree murder and first degree burglary, and was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, 973 P.2d 270. Defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Lumpkin, V.P.J., held that: (1) defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of direct appellate counsel; (2) res judicata barred claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) defendant was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of direct appellate counsel. Petition denied.

LUMPKIN, Vice-Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Eric Allen Patton was convicted of First Degree Murder (Count I) (21 O.S.1991, § 701.7) and First Degree Burglary (Count II) (21 O.S.1991, § 1431), Case No. CF-95-55, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. In Count I, the jury found the existence of three (3) aggravating circumstances and recommended the punishment of death. In Count II, Petitioner was sentenced to one thousand one hundred and twenty (1,120) years imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgments and sentences in Patton v. State, 973 P.2d 270 (Okl.Cr.1998). Petitioner filed his Original Application for Post-Conviction Relief in this Court on September 3, 1998, in accordance with 22 O.S.Supp.1998, § 1089.

* * *

After carefully reviewing Petitioner's Application for post-conviction relief, we conclude (1) there exists no controverted, previously unresolved factual issues material to the legality of Petitioner's confinement; (2) Petitioner could have previously raised collaterally asserted grounds for review; (3) grounds for review which are properly presented have no merit; and (4) the current post-conviction statutes warrant no relief. 22 O.S.Supp.1998, § 1089(D)(4)(a)(1), (2) & (3). Accordingly, Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief is DENIED.

Patton v. Mullin 425 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2005) (Habeas).

Background: Following affirmance of conviction for first-degree murder and burglary offense, and ensuing death sentence, 973 P.2d 270, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Ralph G. Thompson, J., denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on nine of petitioner's claims.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Henry, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) state court's evidentiary rulings did not violate petitioner's due process right to a fair trial;
(2) prosecution witness' reference to petitioner's prior conviction was not so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial;
(3) first-degree malice aforethought murder instruction did not impermissibly relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(4) prosecutor's comments concerning the presumption of innocence during jury selection and at both stages of capital murder trial did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial. Affirmed.

HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Eric Allen Patton was convicted after a jury trial in the District Court for Oklahoma County of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary after former conviction of two or more felonies, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21 §§ 701.7, 1431, and 1451. As to the murder conviction, the jury found four aggravating circumstances and, upon the jury's recommendation, the trial court imposed the death penalty.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Mr. Patton's convictions on direct appeal, see Patton v. State, 973 P.2d 270 (Okla.Crim.App.1998), and then denied his motion for post-conviction relief, see Patton v. State, 989 P.2d 983 (Okla.Crim.App.1999). Subsequently, Mr. Patton filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, asserting twenty grounds for relief. The district court denied Mr. Patton's petition but, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), granted a certificate of appealability on nine of his claims.

Mr. Patton now argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction; (2) the trial court's evidentiary rulings violated his due process right to a fair trial; (3) improper comments from a prosecution witness concerning a former conviction also deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (5) the trial court's instructions improperly allowed the jury to presume that the prosecution had proven the element of malice aforethought necessary to support his first-degree murder conviction; (6) the trial court's instructions prevented Mr. Patton from presenting a defense of voluntary intoxication; (7) the trial court erred in admitting duplicative evidence regarding two aggravating circumstances; (8) to support the death penalty, the prosecution relied upon evidence not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (9) prosecutorial misconduct in both the guilt and sentencing stages deprived Mr. Patton of a fair trial.

Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Mr. Patton is not entitled to relief on any of his claims. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of his § 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the killing of Charlene Kauer in Oklahoma City on December 16, 1994. The relevant facts are not in dispute and are set forth in the OCCA's opinion on direct appeal. See Patton, 973 P.2d at 278-79. At the time of Mrs. Kauer's killing, Mr. Patton was employed as a brick mason. In the morning, he borrowed a co-worker's car and left a job site, stating that he was going to buy electrical boxes at a local hardware store. Mr. Patton was absent from the job site for four hours. When he returned, he was wearing different clothes and did not have the electrical boxes.

During that four-hour period, Mr. Patton went to Mrs. Kauer's home in northeast Oklahoma City and knocked on the front door. When Mrs. Kauer answered, Mr. Patton asked to borrow money, and she gave him ten dollars. Mr. Patton then forced his way into the home, grabbed Mrs. Kauer by the throat and dragged her through the house looking for money and valuables. He took Mrs. Kauer to the bedroom and stabbed her numerous times. Then, he dragged her down the hallway into the kitchen, stabbing her several more times with a variety of knives and breaking several of them. Finally, he stabbed Mrs. Kauer in the chest with a pair of scissors. Mr. Patton then left Mrs. Kauer's house, cleaned himself up, removed his bloody clothes, and changed into a pair of coveralls that he found in the co-worker's car. He left the bloody clothes in a field in northwest Oklahoma City and returned to the job site. Initially, Mr. Patton was not a suspect in Mrs. Kauer's murder. However, because he had previously done some painting for Mrs. Kauer and her husband and had worked with them at a marketing company, Oklahoma City Police Department detectives conducted a series of interviews with him. They arrested Mr. Patton after discovering his fingerprints at the murder scene.

During his initial police interview, Mr. Patton denied any involvement in the murder. He then stated that he had seen a suspicious vehicle at Mrs. Kauer's house and added that the person who committed the murder would have had to have control of the Kauers' dogs, thereby suggesting that Mr. Kauer was involved. When asked about a scratch on his lip and cuts on his hands, he explained that he was changing a tire and the jack had slipped and hit him. During a subsequent interview, Mr. Patton stated that Chris Williams, the co-worker whose car he had borrowed on the day of the murder, was involved in the crime. He added that he had a lot of information to give them but was protecting someone. Mr. Patton explained that he had been at the Kauers' home but that another person had committed the murder.

In another interview, Mr. Patton admitted that Chris Williams was not involved in the murder but then stated that a woman had been involved. Mr. Patton reported that this woman had stabbed Mrs. Kauer while he wrestled with her dog, eventually stabbing it. He explained that the cuts on his hand and the scratch on his lip came from the dog's bites. In a final interview, Mr. Patton described the killing as though he had had an out-of-body experience. He admitted seeing himself at the murder scene and stabbing Mrs. Kauer, but he said there were demonic forces present and the victim was a demon. He added that he had ingested cocaine before the murder and believed the drug was laced with another drug. He said he was “tripping” from the effects of the drugs.

Mr. Patton was tried before a jury in the District Court for Oklahoma County in November 1996. The prosecution presented forensic evidence indicating that Mr. Patton's fingerprints were present in the Kauer home and that blood at the scene matched Mr. Patton's type. The prosecution also presented video and audiotapes of Mr. Patton's interviews with police detectives in which he admitted stabbing Mrs. Kauer. In response, Mr. Patton presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. John Smith. Dr. Smith testified that, on the day of the killing, Mr. Patton was in a cocaine delirium. As a result, Dr. Smith said, Mr. Patton was not capable of forming the intent to commit a crime “in a cognitive, logical sense like we think of.” Tr. Trans. vol. IX, at 143.

After hearing this evidence, the jury convicted Mr. Patton of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Then, upon considering additional evidence presented during the sentencing phase, the jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. The jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Mr. Patton was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (4) the murder was committed while Mr. Patton was on parole for California felony convictions. The jury did not find a fifth aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution, that it was probable that Mr. Patton would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.

* * *

Mr. Patton first argues that the OCCA unreasonably applied federal law by concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction. Mr. Patton invokes the testimony of Dr. John Smith, the *796 psychiatrist who examined Mr. Patton and reviewed his medical records. According to Dr. Smith, Mr. Patton was incapable of forming the intent necessary to commit first-degree murder. In particular, when Mr. Patton's trial counsel asked Dr. Smith whether “[i]n your professional opinion after [Mr. Patton] entered [Mrs. Kauer's] home do you think he was capable of forming the intent to commit a crime?” Dr. Smith responded, “Not in a cognitive, logical sense like we think of. I think from then on he was in fact simply reacting to the cocaine intoxication once he saw her.” Tr. Trans. vol. IX, at 143.

Dr. Smith then described the “cocaine-induced psychosis” suffered by Mr. Patton as “a discharge from the brain of inten[se] aggression and inability to control his reaction.” Id. According to Dr. Smith, “[s]ome of [the] things [that Mr. Patton] said in the police report [indicated that] he was out of his body watching it. He couldn't control it. He didn't know why he was doing it. He couldn't stop it.” Id. at 143-44.

In advancing this argument, Mr. Patton faces a high hurdle. The appropriate inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (internal citations omitted). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

Moreover, the AEDPA adds an additional degree of deference to state courts' resolution of sufficiency of the evidence questions. See Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir.2000) (“Under AEDPA, however, where a habeas petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence challenge has already been decided in state court, we employ a more limited review.”). Thus, the question before us is whether the OCCA's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient constituted an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir.2003).

On this question, the opinions of the OCCA and the federal district court explain the evidence upon which a rational juror could have relied in rejecting Mr. Patton's intoxication defense and concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Patton possessed the intent necessary to support the first-degree murder charge. In particular, after initially denying any involvement in the killing of Mrs. Kauer, Mr. Patton admitted driving to Mrs. Kauer's house and stabbing her. Moreover, after the killing, Mr. Patton had the presence of mind to clean himself up and exchange his bloody clothes for those of his coworker Mr. Williams. Finally, the prosecution introduced testimony from both Sandra Moore, Mr. Patton's girlfriend, and from Mr. Williams, that Mr. Patton's demeanor seemed normal on the day of the killing, evincing no signs of delirium or strange behavior.

Although Dr. Smith's testimony that Mr. Patton was suffering from a cocaine delirium conflicted with some of this evidence, a rational jury could have rejected that testimony, relying on the prosecution's evidence that Mr. Patton possessed the requisite intent, and convicted Mr. Patton of the first-degree murder charge. Accordingly, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Patton's conviction.

* * *

III. CONCLUSION One of Mr. Patton's claims gives us pause. The trial court's instruction that “[a] design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed” had the potential to mislead the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proof. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion of the OCCA Committee for the Preparation of Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions that trial judges should avoid that instruction. Nevertheless the trial court's other instructions here clearly informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving all elements of first-degree murder, including the element of malice aforethought. Thus, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting Mr. Patton's claim. None of Mr. Patton's other arguments are persuasive. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's decision denying Mr. Patton's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.